

JPRS 77987

4 May 1981

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1587



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4 May 1981

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This issue of the magazine "Soviet Military Review" is devoted to a remarkable date—the 35th anniversary of the termination of the Second World War (1939-1945). The issue highlights the decisive contribution made by the Soviet Armed Forces to the rout of German fascism and Japanese militarism, the liberation mission of the Soviet Army, the internationalist assistance of the USSR to the peoples of many countries.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LONG-TERM LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 2-5

[Article by Maj Gen S. Tyushkevich, D. Sc. (Philosophy), professor: "The Second World War and the Contemporary Period"]

[Text]

THE GREAT VICTORY of the Soviet people over nazi Germany exerted and continues to exert a tremendous influence on the entire course of historical development and on the solution of outstanding social problems of the contemporary period. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said:

"The collapse of fascism, signifying the defeat of the most reactionary detachment of the imperialist bourgeoisie, resulted in the weakening of the entire world system of capitalism. The working people of many liberated countries forcefully declared their striving for a radical change of the social order. For many European peoples the spring of 1945 became the spring of a new historical epoch. The working people in a number of countries took power into their hands and started building socialism. Thus the community of socialist states came into being. This was a gigantic change in the history of Europe and the history of the whole world."

Many peoples and states of the anti-Hitler coalition contributed to victory. But the main force that halted the advance of nazi Germany to world domination and routed the fascist bloc was the Soviet Union. The bulk of the forces of the fascist coalition were concentrated on the Soviet-German front — the main front of the Second World War. The crushing blows of the Soviet Armed Forces smashed the Hitler war and state machine and brought closer the subsequent rout of imperialist Japan.

A direct political result of the Second World War was the destruction of the most reactionary political regimes in Germany and Japan, which threatened the existence and development of material and spiritual culture in the world.

The victory over fascism promoted the interests of all progressive mankind. It helped preserve a new, higher type of state — the socialist state born of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It paved the way for the further development of socialism, and democracy and for the solution of fundamental problems confronting the peoples.

THE war was not due to internal laws governing the development of socialist society. But when it broke out, it revealed the tremendous potentialities of the builders and defenders of the new society, the indisputable advantages of the Soviet social and state system. After the rout of the fascist bloc the Soviet Union exerted an immeasurably greater influence in world politics. The USSR's victory was the triumph of the socialist economy, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the moral and political unity of Soviet society and the inviolable friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

The Soviet people showed that a state free from social antagonisms is superior to imperialist

states in war thanks to the unity of the army and the people. Such a state could stand up better to the hardships of war. The victory of the USSR proved the viability of socialist relations between nations and nationalities and further strengthened the friendship and unity of the nations and nationalities inhabiting the USSR. It also showed that the Leninist nationalities policy of the Soviet state was the correct one.

The victory over fascism marked the triumph of humane communist ideology over the cannibalistic ideology of fascism. Socialist ideology inspired the people in their just war, made them more mature and staunch in surmounting hardships. It hardened their will for and strengthened their confidence in victory. Educated in the communist spirit, the Soviet people demonstrated their moral superiority. They performed a feat without precedent in history.

At the same time the war exposed to the light of day the reactionary essence of bourgeois ideology in general, and fascist ideology in particular. It laid bare the anti-Soviet character of chauvinism and racism. It uncovered their ideological basis — anti-communism. The war showed that fascist ideology was an ideology of nationalism, racial hatred, mass annihilation of people and destruction of their material and spiritual culture.

Socialist economy was the material basis of the Soviet Army's fighting capacity. As far as the economic aspect is concerned the victory of the Soviet people demonstrated the advantages of public ownership of the means of production, of socialist economy organised and managed on the basis of a single plan.

The war clearly demonstrated the decisive superiority of the socialist state's military organisation, its military art based on advanced military science, modern military equipment, on the devotion, skill and heroism of the officers and men of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is an indisputable fact that the war machine of nazi Germany then represented the biggest force of the capitalist world. At the time it had gained vast experience in waging predatory wars. And yet nazi Germany's war machine could not stand up to the clash with the socialist military organisation.

The outcome of separate battles and the entire war showed the vast creative potentialities and organisational abilities of the Soviet military leaders, commanders and political workers in the use of weapons and other military equipment, in wresting the initiative from the enemy and retaining it, and in forcing their will on the enemy on the battlefield.

The war also proved the soundness of the Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy. Soviet diplomacy was operative, flexible and persistent in pursuit of the measures essential for ensuring the interests of the Soviet state and gaining victory over the enemy. Soviet diplomacy prevented the formation of a single alliance of all imperialist states against the USSR. It played an outstanding role in the formation and consolidation of the anti-Hitler coalition, in the settlement of the fundamental questions of the war and postwar development. The war against fascism and the victory over it helped the peoples of the world to get a better knowledge of Soviet policy. They realised more clearly its importance for the destinies of the world in the past and present.

THE political, organisational and ideological work of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a decisive factor in the Soviet Union's historic victory. The CPSU organised and inspired the people, it equipped them ideologically for the war against the enemy. It elaborated a policy for the pursuit of the war in defence of the Socialist Homeland. It explained the causes and character of the war to the working people and the men at the front. The Party activated all the forces, means and potentialities, it applied its collective intellect, will power and energy to secure victory over the aggressor.

The victory in the Second World War paved the way for freedom, independence and social progress for many peoples and countries in Europe and Asia. The Constitution of the USSR says that the historic victory "...consolidated the influence and international standing of the Soviet Union and created new opportunities for growth of the forces of socialism, national liberation, democracy, and peace throughout the world." After the war the peoples of the colonies and dependent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America waged an unrelenting struggle for national liberation which resulted in the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism.

Over 90 sovereign states were born out of this struggle. In many countries it entered a new phase, manifesting itself in socialist orientation.

In the late 1940s - early 1950s a world system of socialism took shape and waxed strong. This factor further accelerated historical progress. This was a turning point in the history of Europe and the whole world. New relations took shape in the community of socialist countries, determined by

common economic and political interests and based on principles of justice.

The great victory over fascism and militarism exerted and continues to exert influence on the mounting role of the popular masses, Communist and Workers' Parties in public life and in the fight against imperialism. In the war many peoples realised that they were directly concerned with the danger of fascism and reaction. They saw that it constituted a threat to the whole world, that it affected not only the present, but the future too. The Resistance Movement grew in the war against fascism. The class struggle became more acute too. These factors contributed to the growth of the working people's political consciousness. As a result, the international working class and communist movement acquired a mass character. It became better organised and gained cohesion. The Marxist-Leninist Parties effected more mature theoretical and political leadership of the movement.

These parties were the ideological and organisational force, the soul and brain of the Resistance Movement. They strengthened the alliance of the anti-fascist forces and organised the class struggle in the capitalist countries. Despite the tremendous difficulties and heavy losses the Communist Parties faced and sustained during the war, they gained strength. The fighting steeled them, their membership and their number increased. In 1939 the membership of the Communist Parties totalled four million, by 1945 it had risen to nearly 20 million. The number of Communist Parties increased from 43 in 1939 to 76 in 1946.

THE victory over fascism and the subsequent radical change in the balance of world forces in favour of socialism created new conditions for solving the problem of war and peace. Imperialism has lost the historical initiative. It can no longer reverse the course of world development. Although the reactionary essence of imperialism has not changed, it is no longer in a position to unleash world war or, in certain circumstances, even local wars.

The world system of socialism, the international working class, the national-liberation movement and all other revolutionary forces now determine the main trend in the development of mankind and exert a major influence on international politics. These forces support détente and broad international cooperation, and oppose war. The powerful state and public forces which are now in motion are capable of stopping the aggressor,

extinguishing the flame of war, strengthening the foundations of peace and international security.

However, this task still presents enormous difficulty. The experience acquired since the war has shown that the monopoly bourgeoisie has been and still is trying to revise the military and political results of the war. Immediately after the war it relied on building up a military potential of imperialist states that would be far superior to the defence potential of the countries of the socialist community. The imperialists produced a whole series of military-political doctrines, such as the doctrine of military "deterrent" and "rolling back" communism. Today the imperialist reactionaries are desperately trying to put a stop to the positive processes in international relations and to resist the trend towards détente. It should also be borne in mind that the policy of the Maoist leaders is having a destabilising effect. The subversive efforts of the Maoists are spearheaded against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

In playing the so-called "Chinese card" the ruling circles of the NATO countries are seeking to use the anti-Soviet trend of Chinese social-militarism for their own aims. Such actions are reminiscent of the short-sighted Munich policy. Forty-one years ago the Western powers encouraged the aggressive plans of the fascist-militarist bloc. This line resulted in a grave tragedy for themselves and the whole of mankind.

THE lessons of the Second World War show that imperialism will resort to the most refined tricks and methods in pursuit of its aggressive policy. Its reactionary policy today is also fraught with the danger of war, acts of aggression and violence, encroachments on the freedom of peoples. Therefore it is important to exhibit vigilance. The peoples cannot afford to underestimate the danger of war arising from imperialism and the aggressive forces wherever they emerge. One of the lessons of the past war is that the peoples and all peace-loving states must undertake collective efforts to combat the danger of war.

Today it is in the interests of peace to promote the achievements of socialism and to defend it with all possible means. That is why the Communist and Workers' Parties emphasised that the defence of socialism is an internationalist duty. The growing development and consolidation of the system of socialism is a condition for the development of each individual country. The defence capacity of the socialist states reliably guarantees progress in upbuilding socialism and communism

in individual countries and their economic and political growth.

As in the past the capitalist world is vigorously engaged in material preparations for another world war. The imperialists have built up unprecedentedly vast stockpiles of lethal weapons which are a grave threat to mankind. This is why the socialist countries are compelled to allocate funds for defence and to build up the combat capacity of their armed forces. Lovers of military adventures must constantly feel that the defences of the socialist world are secure and that the peoples are determined to defend the achievements of socialism against aggression. The defence potential of the socialist system is a vital factor in social life today.

The experience of the last war is important also because it helps the peoples realise the historic role of the Soviet Armed Forces in establishing socialism, democracy and social progress on the earth and in strengthening peace. One of the great services of the Soviet Army in the last war was that, having smashed the war machines of nazi Germany and militarist Japan, it prevented the export of counter-revolution. It safeguarded the peoples of several countries who had embarked on the road of free development from imperialist intervention and helped strengthen a just peace in the world.

The recent events in Afghanistan show that the Soviet state and its armed forces have greater possibilities for rendering internationalist aid to peoples engaged in building a new life, to all working people waging revolutionary struggle, and for maintaining world peace.

At present the armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries are standing on guard over peace and socialism together with the Soviet Armed Forces.

This fact is of special importance. Unlike the imperialist military-political blocs the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has the sole purpose of defending the socialist achievements and the cause of peace. It constitutes no threat to any country.

The fraternal armies of the Warsaw Treaty member countries have been welded together with blood shed in the joint struggle against fascism in the Second World War. Their cooperation substantially increases the defence capacity of the socialist countries.

The victory over nazi Germany and imperialist Japan marked a historic stage in the destinies of all mankind. Its far reaching consequences are manifested in the current achievements of world socialism and of the national-liberation movement, in the steady growth of all revolutionary forces and in the successes scored in the fight for peace and progress. The popular masses are now really intervening in the solution of problems posed by history. Their role in the creation of history has increased in a marked degree.

In solving fundamental national and social problems bearing on historical progress the masses of people proceed from the wealth of historical experience accumulated in the struggle against the dark forces of reaction, fascism and militarism during the last war. This experience is a potent factor, because it teaches the peoples to be vigilant and warns them not to underestimate the power of the class enemy.

The victory the Soviet Union and the other countries scored over fascism and militarism is of world-wide historic importance. It links the past, present and future into a continuous process. It inspires with optimism the people fighting for peace and happiness in the world.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD WAR II VICTORY

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 6-9

[Article by O. Rzheshhevsky (Rzheshvskiy), D. Sc. (History): "Decisive Contribution"]

[Text]

The Second World War was the biggest in the history of mankind. Imperialism and fascism, to whom it gave birth, were directly to blame for the unheard of sacrifices and losses the war brought to the peoples of dozens of countries. Many thousands of cities and villages were destroyed and over 50 million people killed.

The Soviet Union suffered the heaviest losses.

The nazis turned into ruins 1,710 Soviet cities and towns, 70,000 settlements and villages, leaving 25 million people homeless. They destroyed 32,000 industrial enterprises, 40,000 hospitals and medical institutions, 65,000 km of railway lines, 84,000 schools, tens of thousands of other cultural establishments. The Soviet country lost over 20 million people killed and nearly 30 per cent of its national wealth.

The war of nazi Germany and her allies against the USSR was of a particular character. German fascism, playing the role of the iron fist of international reaction, strove in the war against the USSR not only to capture the territory of the country, but also to destroy the Soviet social and state system, i. e. pursued class aims. The war of nazi Germany against the Soviet Union differed radically from its wars against capitalist countries. Class hatred for the socialist state, predatory strivings and the savage essence of fascism were merged in politics, strategy and the methods of pursuing the war.

According to the plans of the nazi clique the Soviet Union was to be dismembered and liquidated. It was planned to organise four Reichskommissariats on its territory. Moscow, Leningrad,

Kiev and a number of other cities were ordered to be blown up and completely razed to the ground. "It is a matter of struggle for annihilation... In the East even cruelty is a blessing for the future," said the Führer at a meeting of his generals on March 30, 1941. The nazi leadership demanded the annihilation of the civilian population of the USSR. Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were handed leaflets which said: "Kill every Russian, Soviet citizen. Don't stop whether there is a woman, an old man, a little girl or boy before you. Kill! Thus you will save yourself, secure a future for your family and glorify yourself for ages."

The planning of nazi aggression against the Soviet Union began in the middle of the 1930's. The war against Poland and then the campaigns in North and West Europe (1939-40) temporarily switched the German staff thought over to other problems. But even at that time the preparation of the attack against the USSR was not lost sight of by the hitlerites. It was intensified after the rout of France and the capture of many European states, when in the opinion of the nazi leadership, the rear of the future war was secured and Germany received enough resources to pursue the war.

On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed directive No. 21 codenamed the "Barbarossa" plan containing general intentions and initial data on war against the USSR. The strategic basis of the "Barbarossa" plan was the theory of "Blitzkrieg" — lightning war. The plan envisaged the rout of the Soviet Union by a swift campaign in 8-10 weeks.

To carry out the aggression a military coalition was created. The Berlin Pact concluded in 1940 between Germany, Italy and Japan became the basis of this coalition. Germany drew in Romania, Finland and Hungary to participate in the attack against the USSR. The hitlerites were helped by the reactionary circles of Bulgaria and also by the puppet states of Slovakia and Croatia. Spain, Portugal and Turkey cooperated with nazi Germany. The nazi leadership intensively used the economic and manpower resources of the captured and occupied European countries and territories: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia and Greece. The economic potentials of the neutral countries of Europe were practically subordinated to the interests of Germany. Thus, in carrying out the "Barbarossa" plan nazi Germany placed the resources of practically all the European states, whose population exceeded 300 million people. From the East the Soviet Union was threatened by Japan, which was strong enough to carry out an aggressive war. From recently published Japanese documents it has become clear that Japan planned to carry out a perfidious attack on the USSR on August 29, 1941. But the development of events at the time on the Soviet-German front forced it to postpone this intention for a more suitable time which, by the way, never came.

The nazi leadership was so sure of success in the war against the USSR that, approximately from the spring of 1941, it set about a detailed elaboration of further plans to achieve world domination. An entry on February 17, 1941, in a service diary of the High Command of the nazi armed forces sets forth Hitler's demand: "After the termination of the Eastern campaign... to foresee the capture of Afghanistan and organisation of the attack against India." Proceeding from these instructions the German High Command began planning the Wehrmacht's operations for the future. These operations were intended to be carried out late in the autumn of 1941 and in the winter of 1941-42. Their aim was set forth in draft directive No. 32 "Preparation for the Period after Carrying Out the 'Barbarossa' Plan," sent to the land forces, the air force and navy on June 11, 1941.

The draft foresaw that after the rout of the Soviet Armed Forces the Wehrmacht was to capture the British colonial possessions and certain independent countries in the Mediterranean area, Africa, the Middle East, to invade the British Isles, to develop hostilities against the countries of America. The hitlerite strategists were reckoning to start by the autumn of 1941 the conquest of

Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal area and then India, where it was planned to link up with the Japanese forces.

Directive No. 32 and other documents testify that after the rout of the USSR and solving the "British problem" the hitlerites intended in alliance with Japan to "eliminate the influence of Anglo-Saxons in North America." It was intended to capture Canada and the USA, by landing large forces by sea from bases in Greenland, Iceland, the Azores and Brazil on the east coast of North America and from the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands on the west coast. Admiral I. Yamamoto, commander of the united Japanese fleet, declared: "It is not enough for us to capture Guam and the Philippines, even the Hawaiian Islands and San Francisco. We must enter Washington and sign the treaty in the White House."

A mortal danger hung over the whole of humanity. The key positions for achieving world domination, as the aggressors saw it, was a Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union.

On June 22, 1941, nazi Germany dealt the USSR a surprise blow of enormous, unseen in history invasion army comprising 5,500,000 men, nearly 4,300 tanks, 4,980 combat planes and over 47,000 guns and mortars.

To defend its freedom and independence, to defeat the aggressor, the Soviet Union had to crush the most powerful war machine of the capitalist world.

As a result of the treacherously unleashed aggression the nazi armies managed to capture and occupy a considerable part of Soviet territory. In the most difficult conditions the Soviet people under the guidance of the Communist Party managed to overcome the consequences of the surprise attack, to change the balance of forces in its favour during the struggle.

It should be noted that successes of the nazi Wehrmacht, which rapidly defeated armies of many European countries, favoured the myth of the invincibility of the nazi aggressor, gave rise to despondency and gloom not only in the enslaved countries of Europe, but also in Britain and the USA. And only when the Soviet Union, entering practically into a duel combat with nazi Germany and her allies, withstood the first onslaught and began to deliver successive crushing blows, the peoples of the world saw a force capable of securing the rout of the aggressor and saving mankind from fascist enslavement.

The attention of hundreds of millions of people in all continents was riveted on events on the Soviet-German front. An episode from the reminiscences of Khodji Ahmad Abbas, an Indian wri-

ter, throws light on the atmosphere of one of the most difficult periods of the Second World War for the peace-loving peoples. "In 1942 I was responsible for the news section in our newspaper. In the autumn that year I was usually men on duty in the editorial office up to 5 a.m. We did not go to bed until we had heard the news from Stalingrad in order to include the latest news in the issue. I remember one night in November. It was 2 a.m. News on Stalingrad was late. Suddenly the telephone rang.

"'Any news on Stalingrad?' a tired man's voice asked.

"'Unfortunately, telegrams are late and I can't say anything new yet,' was the reply.

"'Then let me call you later...'

"And he called the office in fact in half an hour, then once again. It was already 3 a.m. Delhi time when the editors got the latest news. It was fresh and encouraging.

"Again the telephone rang. The familiar voice.

"'What about Stalingrad?' the man asked.

"'Stalingrad has won. The Red Army has encircled the nazis.'

"'Very good!' was the relieved reply. 'Now I can go to bed.' That was Jawaharlal Nehru."

Bourgeois historians and propagandists trying to keep from the young generation the truth about the great victory of the Soviet people, ascribe the role of the "architect of victory" to the USA and Great Britain. In this connection it is necessary to say the following.

The contribution of the USA, Great Britain and other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition to the victory over the fascist-militarist bloc is assessed at its worth in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet military-historical literature (particularly the 12-volume "History of the Second World War, 1939-1945") operations and battles of the Western Allies in East and North Africa, in Western Europe, on the Asian continent and at sea are dealt with at length. Great attention is paid to show the activity of the Resistance Movement and to reveal its importance, the struggle of the freedom-loving countries and continents against fascism. However the facts irrefutably testify that it was the Soviet Union that bore the main blow of nazi aggressors and made the decisive contribution to the victory. Historical landmarks on the road to the rout of the fascist militarist bloc were the grandiose battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Leningrad, on the Dnieper, in Byelorussia and other strategic operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.

"The Soviet people's heroic struggle," L. I. Brezhnev emphasised, "brought about a radical change in the course of the Second World War. Its battles were fought over a vast expanse, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, from the ice-fields of Greenland to the deserts of Africa, but it was the Soviet-German front that became the main theatre of military operations. This is where the destinies were decided not only of the Soviet people but of mankind."

On no front of the Second World War (North African, Italian, West European, American-Japanese) were the battles so prolonged, continuous and stubborn as on the Soviet-German front. One can rightly say that out of four nazi soldiers three fought in the East and only one in the West. Six hundred and seven enemy divisions were defeated or taken prisoner on the Soviet-German front. The Soviet forces destroyed and captured the major part of the enemy combat equipment, i.e. 75 per cent. The armies of the USA, Great Britain and other participants of the anti-Hitler coalition put out of action 176 divisions of nazi Germany and her allies. During the Second World War nazi Germany lost 10 million men (killed, wounded, taken prisoner) on the Soviet-German front out of 13.6 million men of her total losses in the Second World War.

The results of fighting on the Soviet-German front greatly influence the plans and strategy of the sides in the Pacific theatre of operations. The rout of nazi Germany and her capitulation predetermined the outcome of the Second World War in favour of the Allies of the anti-Hitler coalition.

However, Japan, the last participant of the fascist-militarist bloc, waging the war against the USA and Great Britain had no intention to cease resistance and planned to continue the fight. Only the entry in August 1945 into the war against Japan of the Soviet Union whose Armed Forces routed in a short time a million strong enemy's land grouping forced Japan to capitulate.

The contribution of the Soviet Union to the victory over the fascist-militarist bloc consists not only in its effort to rout the armed forces of the aggressors but also in its untiring activity in uniting anti-fascist progressive forces and helping the peoples fighting for liberation.

To the Soviet Union belongs, in particular, a great role in creating and strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition. The political aims of the USSR in the war differed in many respects from the political aims of the ruling circles of the USA and Great

Britain. The Soviet Union was always true to its allied duty, strictly fulfilled the obligations taken. However, the governments of the USA and Great Britain tried to achieve one-sided advantages, postponed the fulfillment of a number of important decisions, first of all, the opening of the second front in Europe. As far back as May-June 1942, during negotiations between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, held in London and Washington, the joint communique pointed out that "complete understanding in respect of the pressing tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942" was achieved. However the second front was opened by the western Allies only in June 1944 when it had become clear that further delay with its opening would lead to the liberation of the whole of Europe from nazi tyranny by the Soviet Armed Forces alone. Nevertheless the military and political cooperation of the Allies in the common struggle against nazism was carried to victory. The anti-Hitler coalition demonstrated

the broad possibilities of all-round cooperation of states with different social systems for achieving common and vitally important aims for the peoples.

The most important feature of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against the nazi militarist bloc was the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet Army liberated completely or partially the territories of twelve countries of Europe and Asia.

Thus, the Soviet Union was the first to stop further spreading of the nazi aggression, deprived Hitler Germany of the main means of waging the war, and played the main role in liberating many peoples of Europe and Asia.

The memory of the great feat of the Soviet people in the Second World War, of millions of its sons and daughters, who stood in the struggle against fascist aggression and won victory, will live for ever in the hearts of grateful peoples of the world.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

SOVIET WORLD WAR II CONTRIBUTION IN THE FAR EAST

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 12-14

[Article by Col G. Plotnikov, Cand. Sc. (History): "Liberation Mission in the East"]

[Text]

On May 8, 1945, the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Nazi Germany's armed forces was signed. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against German fascism was ended. One of its most important results was the liberation by the Soviet Army of the peoples and countries of Europe from the Nazi yoke. But the flame of war was still blazing in the East, where many peoples of Asia were under the boot of the Japanese invaders.

The Japanese government having refused to fulfil the demands of the USSR's Allies in the anti-fascist coalition for an unconditional surrender, the Soviet Union declared the war on imperialist Japan on August 8, 1945. By taking this decision the Soviet Government strove to hasten the end of the Second World War, to secure the Soviet Far Eastern borders, to fulfil its allied obligations taken at the Crimean Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA and Britain in February 1945, to help the peoples of Asia in their liberation struggle.

The dawn of liberation was rising over the countries occupied by the Japanese imperialists and firstly over China, whose people had been fighting the invaders since July 1937. The Soviet soldiers brought liberation to the peoples of Korea who had been under a foreign yoke for nearly 40 years.

The Chinese people began to receive the Soviet assistance long before August 1945. Already in April 1937, prior to the Japanese invasion of Central and Northern China the Soviet Government had offered the Chinese government its help should China be attacked.

Soon after the beginning of the Japanese aggression the Soviet Union agreed to grant China a credit of several hundred million American dollars over a number of years for the purchase of weapons. Out of the credit, on which the agreement was signed in March 1938, China purchased in the USSR weapons for more than 20 divisions. Their delivery to China began as early as October 1937. In the following years deliveries of weapons and combat equipment continued.

Considerable support was rendered to the Chinese people by thousands of Soviet citizens and in the first place by Soviet military specialists including the well-known military leaders V. Chuikov, P. Rybalko, P. Batitsky and others. At the beginning of 1939, there were over 3,500 Soviet military advisers and specialists in China. In the summer of the same year more than 400 volunteer pilots and mechanics arrived in China. Many of them gave their lives for the freedom of the Chinese people. For courage, valour and selflessness in carrying out their internationalist duties several hundred volunteers were awarded Orders and medals, and 14 were honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The rout of the Japanese militarists in the Far East at Lake Hassen (1938) by the Soviet forces and jointly with units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia (1939) inspired the Chinese people to a stubborn struggle, stopped temporarily the offensive actions of the aggressor in Northern and Central China and showed the Korean people that it could rely upon the assistance of its northern neighbour.

The announcement of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against imperialist Japan in August 1945 was stirring news for the peoples of Asia suffering under the yoke of the Japanese invaders. "On behalf of the Chinese people," said a telegram of the High Command of China's armed forces, "we warmly welcome the declaration of war on Japan by the Soviet Government. The hundred million population and the armed forces of the liberated areas of China will coordinate their efforts in every possible way with the Red Army and the armies of other Allied states for the cause of defeating the hated aggressors."

The Soviet Armed Forces began operations on August 9. The enemy was simultaneously attacked by land, sea and air. Successfully pressing home the attack, the Soviet forces created favourable conditions for the operations of the armed forces guided by the Communist Party of China. Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief, ordered the 8th Army to pass over to the offensive as from August 11.

The Soviet forces, however, advanced so rapidly that the Japanese Kwantung Army was finished with before the units of the 8th Army were able to launch an offensive on a wide frontage. The operations of the 17th Army of the Trans-Baikal Front were most opportune, for a week before the entry of the Soviet Union into the war the Japanese forces had encircled large grouping of the 8th Army under General Zhao Wenjin in the area of Pinquan.

"We are particularly grateful to the Red Army of the Soviet Union," General Zhao wrote afterwards; "we were in an extremely difficult position. Many times superior enemy forces were concentrated against us, surrounding us and cutting off all withdrawal routes, and restricting our manoeuvres. Before August 9, we were racking our brains how to get out of this situation. The Red Army's entry into Manchuria on August 9 radically changed the correlation of forces. From defenders we became the attacking side."

Powerful blows of the Soviet forces in Northeast China in three strategic directions — from the West, North and East — led to the quick rout of the main body of the land forces of Japan's million strong Kwantung Army.

On September 2, Japan's act of unconditional surrender, signifying the end of the Second World War, was signed. Peace had come to Asia.

The population of Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and Northern Korea expressed their gratitude to their liberators. Wherever Soviet forces appeared, they rendered the population every assistance. The population voluntarily participated repairing roads and bridges and laying crossings,

and acted as guides. In Fusin, for example, the local population actively helped the Soviet soldiers to destroy pill-boxes held by Japanese soldiers. Many Chinese and Koreans asked the Soviet Command to give them arms to fight the invaders.

Tens of thousands of people came to the spontaneously arising meetings, gatherings and demonstrations carrying red and national flags. Such meetings were held both in Chinese and Korean towns and villages. Thousands of addresses of welcome, collective letters from a number of provinces, towns and villages, communes and individual citizens were conveyed to the Soviet Command. Many of them are still kept at the USSR Armed Forces Central Museum in Moscow. Among these moving relics is a roll of silk more than 700 m long with signatures of citizens of the Chinese province of Girin.

One message signed by over 16,500,000 Korean citizens said: "More than once in its many-century history has Korea seen foreign invaders on its territory. Our patriots died from their swords and our peaceful population perished. And only the Soviet troops came to us as liberators and not as conquerors. The Korean people will never forget the heroic feats of the Soviet fighting men."

After the liberation of Northeast China, Inner Mongolia and North Korea the Command of the Soviet forces were faced with a number of urgent tasks such as to restore normal life in towns and villages, repair damaged enterprises, bring in the harvest, supply the population with food, guard the inhabitants against the pro-Japanese bands, etc. The Soviet Command assigned this mission to the military commandant's offices, whose varied activity contributed to a great extent to normalise life in the liberated areas.

The Soviet military administration, for example, not only took the necessary measures to preserve the national riches of North Korea, but also rendered the Korean working people disinterested assistance in restoring industrial enterprises destroyed by the Japanese and in building new ones. Soviet specialists and soldiers enthusiastically worked side by side with Koreans at works, on the railways and in mines.

The presence of the Soviet forces in Manchuria considerably helped the Chinese people and strengthened its revolutionary forces. The troops under control of the Communist Party of China were secured a reliable rear for reforming and increasing their numerical strength. For example, in January 1946, a United Democratic Army of up to 300,000 men was created here. It played a decisive role in the subsequent rout of the Kuomintang forces.

By May 3, 1946, the Soviet Union, conforming to the decision of the conference of foreign ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain held in Moscow in December 1945, completely withdrew its forces from Northeast China. However, the USA continued to keep its forces on Chinese territory. These troops strove to prevent the development of the revolutionary-liberation struggle of the Chinese people and intensified military and economic assistance to the Kuomintang, whose aim was to destroy the forces led by the Communist Party of China. Before leaving Northeast China the Soviet Command handed over to the forces under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party weapons and combat equipment of the defeated Kwantung Army: over 3,700 guns, mortars and grenade launchers, 600 tanks, 861 planes, nearly 12,000 machine guns, over 2,000 automobiles and other weaponry. Later on the USSR supplied China with a great quantity of Soviet-made weapons. All this made it possible to train and rearm the newly formed units and formations which became the striking force of revolutionary China in the struggle against the Kuomintang forces.

Without the decisive assistance of the Soviet Union the Chinese people would not have been able to throw off the yoke of the Japanese militarists so quickly. In August 1945, Mao Zedong, acknowledging this, said: "The Red Army came to help the Chinese people to drive away the aggressor. The history of China has never known such an example. The influence of this event is beyond any estimation." Without the moral and material support of the USSR the subsequent revolutionary struggle of the Chinese working people, which ended with the creation of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1949, would not have been so successful.

Thanks to the Soviet help rendered to the Korean people after liberation, the working people of the country were able in a short time to carry out radical revolutionary transformations. "The direct liberation of Korea by the Soviet Army from the yoke of Japanese imperialism," pointed out Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, "resulted in the creation of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the victorious advance of the national-liberation movement."

Powerful and rapid blows of the Soviet forces at the Japanese Kwantung Army in Northeast China were a signal for decisive actions by the Vietnamese patriots. The Vietnamese people under the leadership of the Communist Party began the August Revolution of 1945, which led to the creation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam — the first socialist state in Southeast Asia.

Underlining the importance of victories of the Soviet people, the first President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) Ho Chi Minh wrote that the Soviet Army under the leadership of the Communist Party defeated fascism and "thus favourable conditions were created for the development of the world revolution."

Under the influence of the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces the Indonesian Revolution broke out and on August 17, 1945, the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed. The persistent struggle of the Philippine people fighting for their country's independence resulted in victory on July 4, 1946. A powerful national-liberation movement against colonisers developed in other areas of Southeast Asia.

Thus the rout of the Japanese Kwantung Army and Japan's subsequent capitulation were of world-historic importance. The last centre of the Second World War was liquidated.

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REVIEW OF VOLUME 11 OF HISTORY OF SECOND WORLD WAR

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 56-57

[Book review by Capt 1st Rank V. Achkasov: "The End of the War"]

[Text]

The eleventh volume of the "History of the Second World War. 1939-1945" appeared on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the end of World War II.

Well-known Soviet historians, philosophers, economists and distinguished military leaders during the Great Patriotic War worked on this fundamental edition. Documents and materials from Soviet and foreign archives were widely used. It is well illustrated and supplied with colour maps.

Of the volumes that were already published, the first, entitled "The Origin of War. The Struggle of the Progressive Forces to Maintain Peace," came out in 1973. It reviews the development of events from the time of the establishment of the imperialist Versailles - Washington system, which internationally and legally put an end to World War I, up to the appearance of two hotbeds of the Second World War. The book surveys the process of the emergence of these hotbeds and the predatory schemes of the aggressor countries, exposes the danger that threatened humanity.

shows the struggle of the progressive forces to preserve peace, analyses the international historical significance of building socialism in the USSR and expounds the Leninist peaceful foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government aimed at averting the Second World War.

The second volume, published in 1974, includes events of the prewar years — from the autumn of 1935 up to August 31, 1939. It analyses the complex political, economic, diplomatic and military processes that took place on the eve of the Second World War and exposes the criminal role played by imperialism and its shock force — German nazism, in unleashing war. A special place is allotted to the political and ideological education of the Soviet people in defending their Socialist Motherland and to the measures taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in strengthening the socialist economy and the Soviet Armed Forces.

"The Beginning of the War. Planning Aggression Against the USSR" is the subject of the third volume. It covers events from

* "History of the Second World War. 1939-1945." Volume 11. Chairman of the Chief Editorial Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1980, 474 pp. (in Russian).

September 1, 1939, till June 22, 1941: nazi Germany's war against Poland, Belgium, Holland and France, the occupation of Denmark and Norway and the German and Italian aggression in the Balkans. Military operations in Asia, North China and the Middle East are also reviewed here, as well as the notorious "Barbarossa" plan of direct war preparations against the Soviet Union.

The fourth volume, published in 1975, is entitled "Nazi Aggression Against the USSR. Collapse of the 'Blitzkrieg Strategy'." It is dedicated to the most difficult months of the Great Patriotic War — from June 1941 to April 1942. Carrying out heavy defensive operations the Soviet Union at the same time not only halted the advance of the strong and perfidious enemy but assumed the offensive and frustrated Hitler's "Blitzkrieg" plan. The launching of aggression in the Pacific and South-East Asia by militarist Japan and the formation of the united front of states and peoples in the struggle against fascism are also reviewed in the volume.

The fifth volume deals with the collapse of nazi bloc's aggressive schemes. It analyses events of the most complex stage of the war — from April to November of 1942, when a stubborn and fierce struggle was being waged in many theatres of military operations. It shows how Hitler's plans for gaining world supremacy were once and for all foiled as a result of joint efforts on the part of many nations, with the Soviet Union playing the decisive role.

The sixth volume "The Turning Point in the War," published in 1976, shows how the struggle proceeded, from the autumn of 1942 till the spring of 1943, to win the strategic initiative on the Soviet-German front. In the fierce battle of Stalingrad the Soviet forces routed the crack nazi German troops

and those of its allies. This victory was a decisive contribution to the basic turn in the course of the whole Second World War.

The seventh volume covers the events of the war from April until December of 1943. The Soviet Armed Forces' victory on the Kurak Bulge meant that the Wehrmacht's last attempt to gain the strategic initiative had failed, that nazi Germany had suffered a defeat from which it could not recover to the very end of the war, and it hastened the decision of the states allied with the USSR to open a second front in Europe.

The title of the eighth volume, published in 1977, is "The Collapse of the Nazi Bloc's Defensive Strategy." It takes in events from December 1943 to May 1944. During this period the operations of the European Allied armies were confined to air attacks on Germany and to offensive operations in Italy. In the Pacific they had succeeded in capturing the forward line of Japanese defences, which showed the unsoundness of the Japanese plans of waging war.

The ninth volume — "The Liberation of the Territory of the USSR and European Countries. The Pacific and Asian War," published in 1978, reviews the events of the second half of 1944. The main content of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front in the summer and autumn of 1944 was the rout of the enemy's strategic forces and the liberation of the occupied Soviet territory. The Soviet Armed Forces assumed offensive operation beyond the country's borders with the aim of liberating Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Norway. The USA and Great Britain opened the second front in Europe and the Allies' military operations in the Pacific and Asia were intensified.

"The Completion of the Rout of Nazi Germany" is the title of the

tenth volume published in 1979. It embraces events from January to May 1945. During this period the Vistula-Oder, East-Prussian, Vienna, Berlin, Prague and other offensive operations were carried out.

The recently published eleventh volume is self-contained and stands out among the many volumes of the publication. It is a survey of military and political events of the concluding period of the Second World War.

Although in May 1945 routed and defeated Germany capitulated unconditionally and long-awaited peace was established in Europe, the war continued to rage in the Eastern and South-East Asian countries and in the Pacific. The peoples of Manchuria, Korea, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia, parts of North and Central China, Burma and the Philippines, who were still under the yoke of the Japanese occupants, were calling for help.

The concluding period of the Second World War, saturated with military and political events, occupies a special place in the book. It is determined by a number of specific factors. Among the main ones are the fundamental changes that occurred in the military-political situation as a result of nazi Germany's capitulation, the Soviet Union's entry into war against Japan and, finally, militarist Japan's capitulation, which signified the end of the Second World War.

The book gives a survey of the Allied powers' military operations against Japan during the period from January till September of 1945.

In August 1945 the American and English armed forces managed to achieve considerable success: they reached the near approaches to Japan and cut off the lines of communication connecting the Japanese islands with the regions rich in strategic raw materials. Nevertheless the USA and Great Britain

were unable to break Japan's resistance by the beginning of August.

Although the armed forces of the USA and Great Britain approached Japan proper, to invade it they would have required from one to one and a half years and a five million strong army. But at the time they only had 1,400,000 men in the theatre of war.

The eleventh volume deals in detail with the measures taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in planning, preparing and transferring a large contingent of forces from the west to the east with the aim of creating a powerful striking force that could, in the shortest possible time, inflict a decisive blow on the big Japanese grouping, the basis of which was the Kwantung Army.

As a result of the Soviet Union's entry into the war and its brilliant strategic offensive operations, one of the strongest groupings of the Japanese armed forces was routed in a short time. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky, who commanded the Soviet forces in the Far East,* later noted that the Manchurian strategic operation of three fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Order of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla was one of the remarkable operations of the Second World War in its planning, scope, dynamism, methods of fulfilling tasks and final results. At the same time the blow by the fronts and the armies, with the use of all the fighting services and arms united by a single strategic plan, made it

possible, in a short period of time, to achieve the complete rout of the enemy grouping.

It was not the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but the Soviet Union's entry into the war in the Far East in accordance with the Yalta Conference decisions that had led to Japan's unconditional capitulation. The mass extermination of the population of the Japanese cities was not dictated by any military necessity.

The rout of the Japanese Kwantung Army and the Soviet Union's assistance to the Chinese and Korean peoples ensured the victory of the revolutions in these countries. The liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East contributed to the development of the national-liberation movement in the countries of East and South-East Asia, as a result of which many of them achieved independence.

The Soviet Union's active role in liberating North-east China and Korea and the establishment of the Manchurian revolutionary base, which played a decisive role in developing the Chinese people's struggle against the corrupt Kuomintang regime and in the victory of the people's revolution in China, is analysed in detail in the book. It gives a well-grounded criticism, exposing the bourgeois and Peking falsifiers who grossly distort or hush up the historical facts testifying to the enormous contribution made by the USSR in defeating militarist Japan.

* See supplement to the issue — booklet "Rout of the Kwantung Army" by A. Vasilevsky.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MARSHAL VASILEVSKIY ON FAR EAST CAMPAIGN IN WW II

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 Supplement pp 2-14

[Introductory comment entitled "Second World War" and excerpts from war memoirs of Mar SU A. Vasilevskiy: "Route of the Kwantung Army")]

[Text]

On September 2, 1945, i.e. 35 years ago, imperialist Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. This marked the end of the Second World War, which began with nazi Germany's attack on Poland on September 1, 1939.

This war caused vast destruction. It carried off over 50 million human lives, and involved 61 states inhabited by more than 80 per cent of the planet's population. It brought incalculable suffering and grief to hundreds of millions of people.

Why did the Second World War break out? What were its causes?

Imperialism was responsible for the Second World War. That war was the outcome of the acute contradictions between two imperialist groupings: Germany, Japan and Italy, on the one hand, and Great Britain, France and the USA, on the other, their rivalry for world supremacy and their common desire to destroy the Soviet Union, the world's first socialist state.

The attack of the imperialists on the young Soviet Republic in 1918-20 ended in the defeat of the aggressors. In the subsequent period imperialism made persistent efforts to create an anti-Soviet front, to isolate the USSR. It was the US and British monopolies who took the initiative in hammering together such a front. They tried to set Germany and Japan on the Soviet Union, thereby hoping to kill two birds with one stone—destroy the Soviet state and weaken their rivals.


Western ruling circles set high stakes on German militarism. The USA and Great Britain did their utmost to restore Germany's military-industrial potential. At the Nuremberg trial of the principal nazi war criminals in 1946 Jalmar Schacht, one of the accused, said to the US representative:

"If you wish to try the manufacturers who contributed to the rearmament of Germany, you should try your own manufacturers."

In 1933 the nazi regime came to power in Germany. Nazism was a dictatorship of the most reactionary circles of monopoly capital. Nazi Germany assumed the role of the main strike force of world imperialism in the war against socialism. A military alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan took shape. The aggressive schemes of these countries were encouraged by the ruling circles of the USA, Great Britain and France. In the future they hoped to check the nazis in their quest for world domination. Meanwhile the USA, Great Britain and France were resorting to "appeasement" to channel nazi Germany's aggression against the USSR. At the same time the Western powers were seeking a deal with nazi Germany and its allies on the basis of anti-Sovietism.

Pursuing an active peace-loving policy, the Soviet Union resolutely advocated the need to curb the aggressors and worked to create a collective security system. While proclaiming their desire for peace in words, the Western powers actually sabotaged all the Soviet Government's concrete proposals for creating a European security system. The Soviet Union alone persistently exposed the predacious intentions of the nazis and the hypocritical policy of "neutrality," "non-intervention" and "appeasement" pursued by the USA, Great Britain and France and favoured the defence of the victims of aggression.

In the 1930s nazi Germany seized Austria, Italy, overran Ethiopia and the Japanese militarists attacked China. The Spanish Republic was strangl-



ed with the assistance of German and Italian interventionists. In September 1938 Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy signed the disgraceful Munich agreement under which Czechoslovakia was first dismembered and later wholly taken over by the hitlerites. When the Munich deal took place the Soviet Union alone firmly declared its readiness to render aid, including military aid, to Czechoslovakia. However, its proposal was rejected by the bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia, which betrayed its own people. The Munich agreement actually paved the way for the Second World War.

Mortal danger threatened the existence of the world's first socialist state and the fate of world socialism. Having exhausted all possibilities for reaching agreement with the Western powers on measures for curbing German aggression and convinced of the duplicity of their policy, the Soviet Government decided in August 1939 to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany. This step split the anti-Soviet front of the imperialist powers. The Soviet Union gained some time to prepare for repelling the future nazi aggression.

After nazi Germany attacked Poland, Great Britain and France who had "guaranteed" the security of Poland, were forced to enter the war. But the British and French forces did not engage in any active military operations. The British and French ruling circles sacrificed Poland in the hope that the Wehrmacht would attack the Soviet Union. However, the hitlerites had plans of their own.

In summer 1940 France was defeated and capitulated. The remnants of the British Expeditionary Force fled to the British Isles. Soon practically the whole of Europe was groaning under the nazi jackboot. The threat of invasion hung over Great Britain. The aggression gained further scope in Africa. Japan took over more territory in China and was preparing to seize the Soviet Far East, Siberia and South-East Asia.

On June 22, 1941, nazi Germany perfidiously attacked the Soviet Union. This marked the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union which became the main part of the Second World War. As far as its political character was concerned the Great Patriotic War was an uncompromising struggle between two social systems, a fight to the death between the striking forces of imperialism and of socialism. The aims of the Soviet Union in this war were the liberation of Soviet soil from the nazi invaders, the liberation of other countries conquered by the hitlerites, the destruction of German fascism, and the establishment of a lasting democratic peace based on the right of each people to determine its fate as it saw fit.

The Second World War broke out as a conflict between two capitalist coalitions. As far as the fascist bloc countries were concerned the entire war was an imperialist one. As far as the other capitalist states (which fought against the fascist aggressors and their allies) were concerned the character of the war gradually changed. The entry of the USSR into the war was a decisive factor as a result of which the Second World War grew over into a just, anti-fascist and liberation war of forces opposing the fascist bloc.

An anti-fascist coalition took shape in the course of the war. It was a military-political alliance of states and peoples fighting against the aggressive bloc of nazi Germany, fascist Italy, militarist Japan and their satellites. The anti-fascist coalition included over 50 states. The main participants in it were the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. The USSR played a leading part. Its role was decisive in forming and cementing the coalition, mobilising its forces and resources to fight the aggressors.

Despite certain difficulties and differences between its members the functioning of the coalition demonstrated in practice broad possibilities for all-round cooperation of states with different social systems.

The inspirer and organiser of the struggle waged by the Soviet people against nazi aggression was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. On its call the whole of the people rose to defend the Homeland. During that grim period the Soviet people showed their unshakable fidelity to the ideas of socialism, their indomitable spirit, and demonstrated mass heroism.

In the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, in the Caucasus, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic republics the main body of the nazi Wehrmacht was crushed. Having driven the enemy out of their Homeland the Soviet forces courageously fought to liberate the other peoples of Europe from fascist tyranny.

On May 2, 1945, the Soviet forces captured Berlin, capital of nazi Germany. On May 8, 1945, the Act of Unconditional Surrender of the armed forces of nazi Germany was signed at Karlshorst, a suburb of Berlin. Peace set in Europe.

However, a hotbed of war was still smouldering in the East, where the Japanese militarists were continuing the war. The United States and Great Britain, who had been at war with Japan since December 1941, had inflicted a serious defeat on the naval and air forces of Japan. However, its land forces were still strong.

In February 1945 the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain reached

agreement at the Yalta Conference on the USSR's entry into the war against Japan. The Soviet Union was to declare war on Japan two-three months after the surrender of Nazi Germany. In this the USSR was guided by the desire to eliminate quickly the last hotbed of the Second World War, to secure its Far Eastern frontiers and to render aid to the peoples who had been enslaved by the Japanese militarists.

In July 1945 the Japanese government rejected the ultimatum to capitulate presented to them by the USA, Great Britain and China. It decided to continue the war.

True to its commitments, the Soviet Government announced its entry into the war against Japan on August 8, 1945. On the following day hostilities opened. As a result of the powerful blow the Soviet Armed Forces dealt at the more than a million strong enemy grouping in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Korea, the latter was routed.

The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, on orders from US ruling circles was not determined by military necessity. It did not affect in any way the decision of the Japanese government to continue the war. This criminal act resulted in the death of several hundred thousand civilians. Its purpose was to frighten the Soviet Union, the other freedom-loving peoples and to force them to accept the diktat of US imperialism which was seeking to establish world domination.

Having lost its most battle-worthy grouping of land forces, its military and economic base on the Asian continent, Japan was forced to abandon the idea of continuing the war and to capitulate.

The Second World War ended in the complete rout of German fascism and Japanese militarism. The peoples and armies of the member-states of the Anti-Hitler Coalition and the partisans and fighters of the Resistance movements in the occupied countries made a major contribution to the common victory over the enemy. However, it was the USSR which made the main and decisive contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. The losses of the Nazi German army in the war against the USSR exceeded 10 million officers and men, or 80 per cent of its total losses. The Soviet forces destroyed and captured over 75 per cent of the enemy's weapons and other military equipment.

The Soviet Armed Forces saved mankind from the threat of enslavement, saved world civilisation and aided the peoples of Europe in securing liberation from fascist slavery. The German people were also delivered from Nazi tyranny. The Soviet Armed Forces lived up to their internationalist duty towards the peoples of Asia enslaved by

militarist Japan, above all the peoples of China, Korea and Vietnam.

Another vital result of the Second World War was the upsurge of the revolutionary movement. The conditions for the development and victory of socialist revolutions in several European and Asian countries were favourable. This led to the formation of a mighty world system of socialism. The development of the national-liberation movement triggered off the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism.

Appraising the labour and military feat of the Soviet people in the Second World War Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said:

"While defending their Homeland and fighting against fascism, our soldiers, our Soviet people, thought about peace. We fought so that there would be no more military conflicts. We fought so that mothers would not weep in mourning over their sons. We fought to uphold freedom of our people and of the peoples of other countries, to uphold their right to life, to work in peace, to happiness."

Today the imperialists are again fanning a campaign of slander about a "Soviet threat" to bring back the days of the cold war, to revive international tensions. In this context the lessons of the past are of special importance. They teach the peace-lovers to be vigilant, constantly to expose the schemes of imperialism and to foil them.

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The present pamphlet contains excerpts from the war memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky (1895-1977)*. It gives the story of the Far Eastern campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in August 1945.

The author of the memoirs was a distinguished Soviet military leader, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, who was awarded many Soviet Orders and Orders of other countries. He served in the Soviet Army from 1919. During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) he was Chief of General Staff, representative of the Supreme Command GHQ, and commander of a front. At the time of the operations against imperialist Japan, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. After the war he held a number of top posts, including that of Chief of General Staff and Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

* A. M. Vasilevsky. *Purpose of Life* Moscow, Political Literature Publishers, 1973, pp. 505-526.

[Excerpts of memoirs of A. Vasilevskiy, marshal of the Soviet Union: "Route of the Kwangtung Army"]

Even during the most difficult months on the Soviet-German front we were compelled to keep 30-40 divisions on the Far Eastern frontier. The Kwantung Army, deployed in Manchuria and constantly spearheaded against the Soviet Far East doubled its strength in the summer of 1941. On November 25, 1941, Germany and its allies, including Japan, extended the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin. On instructions from Tokyo the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed in April 1941 was being constantly violated. In December 1941 the Japanese opened artillery fire at our merchantmen "Simferopol," "Sergel Lazo," "Svirstroy" and "Krechel" and sank the "Perekop" and "Maikop."

The new version of the Japanese plan of military operations against the USSR, produced in Tokyo in 1942, provided for the annexation of the Soviet Far East and Siberia. However, the rout of the Hitler grouping at Stalingrad confused the plans not only of Berlin, but also of Tokyo.

Even while fighting against the US forces, the Japanese retained two-thirds of their tanks, half of their artillery and the emperor's crack divisions in the Kwantung Army. And although the Soviet victories in 1943 and 1944 compelled the Japanese to forget about their commitments to Berlin about attacking the USSR, they continued to pursue an outspokenly anti-Soviet and aggressive foreign policy. By 1945 the number of Soviet merchantmen held up by the Japanese reached 178. Japanese diplomats in the USSR actively engaged in collecting espionage information. The Bacteriological Institute under the Kwantung Army (the so-called Manchurian Detachment No. 731) was preparing for massive use of the bacteriological weapon against the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic and China.

The Soviet Government realised the importance of eliminating the hotbed of war in the Far East, and strengthening our frontiers. They considered it their duty to help the peoples of East and South-East Asia in their struggle for liberation from Japanese oppression.

Moscow remained true to its allied duty. At the Big Three Conference in Teheran in December 1943 the Soviet delegation gave their consent in principle to aid them in the war against Japan. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945 an "Agreement of the Big Three Powers on Far Eastern Questions" was signed. Under its terms the Soviet Union was to enter the war against Japan two-three months after the surrender of Germany.

After the Yalta Conference the preparations for war against Japan were sharply stepped up by the Supreme Command GHQ and especially by the General Staff.

Upon completion of the East Prussia operation I was recalled from the 3rd Byelorussian Front. On April 27 I proceeded with the elaboration of a plan of war against

Japan. It is true that early in May and on V-E Day I was in the Baltic region. On May 10 I returned to Moscow. At the time the General Staff was directly engaged in work on the Far Eastern question. A. I. Antonov, S. M. Shtemenko, Chief of the Operations Department, and General N. A. Lomov had already accomplished a lot. Preliminary estimates on the concentration of Soviet forces in the Amur region and the Maritime Territory had been made in autumn 1944. At that time also we had made a rough estimate of the material resources we might need. However, until the Yalta Conference was convened no detailed plan for the war against imperialist Japan had been drawn up.

On April 5, 1945, the Soviet Government informed the Japanese ambassador in Moscow (through the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs) of the rescindment of the Pact of Neutrality between the USSR and Japan.

The cardinal strategic aim of the Far Eastern campaign was to rout the Kwantung Army, the main strike force of the Japanese militarists, and to liberate the north-eastern provinces of China (Manchuria) and North Korea from the Japanese invaders. The accomplishment of this mission would sharply accelerate the surrender of Japan.

The Kwantung Army under the command of General of the Army Otsuo Yamada, an experienced commander, and Lieutenant-General Hiposaburo Hata, Chief of Staff, formed the core of the Japanese armed forces in Manchuria and Korea. Together with the puppet forces of the local rulers of Manchoukuo, Inner Mongolia and the Province of Suiyuan, the Kwantung Army had a strength of over 1.2 million officers and men. However, by the time hostilities were opened the Soviet Armed Forces enjoyed a marked superiority in combat equipment. The Kwantung Army was divided between three fronts.

The Japanese forces relied on the abundant material, food and raw material resources of Manchuria and Korea and the munitions industry in Manchuria which met practically all their needs for the maintenance, functioning and combat operations of the Kwantung Army. In the area occupied by the Kwantung Army there were 13,700 kilometres of railways, 22,000 kilometres of motor roads, 400 airfields, 870 large military depots and well equipped cantonments for an army of 1.5 million men.

Along the frontiers of the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR in Manchuria the Japanese militarists had built 17 fortified areas. Eight of these were located in the east, on the frontier with the Soviet Maritime Territory. Each fortified area was from 20 to 100 kilometres in frontage and over 40 kilometres in depth. Their purpose was not only to strengthen the defence positions, but also to create more favourable conditions for concentrating and

deploying forces. The line of fortified areas on the frontier comprised three defence positions. Four fortified areas had been built in Korea and one along the frontier on Sakhalin Island, facing the north. The Kuriles were covered with shore batteries installed in ferro-concrete emplacements and garrisoned. The islands were organised for defence with elaborate engineer works, including permanent fortifications.

The intention of the Japanese leaders was to preclude the landing of US-British forces on the islands of Japan and rely to defend their conquests in China and Korea. Having rejected the Potsdam Declaration presented by the USA, Great Britain and China, Japan decided to carry on the war. In taking this decision Japan relied on its strong land forces and powerful munitions industry. By summer 1945 the Japanese armed forces including the Kwantung Army, numbered over seven million officers and men, over 10,000 aircraft and close on 500 fighting ships.

It was obvious that the allies were not in a position to force Japan to capitulate quickly. The governments of the USA and Great Britain clearly realised that the outcome of the war in the Pacific depended above all on the rout of Japan's land forces on the Asian continent. They justly admitted that in order to effect a landing on the islands of Japan they would need an army at least seven million strong. Unless the Soviet Union entered the war, it would last no less than 18 months after the surrender of Germany and would involve tremendous losses. The plans for the invasion of Japan which were produced at the time provided for the landing of the 6th US Army and marines on the island of Kyushu in November 1945, and of the 8th and 10th US armies on the island of Honshu in March 1946. At the Potsdam Conference, the head of the Soviet Government confirmed that we would declare war on Japan exactly three months after the surrender of Germany.

Even before the Yalta Conference the Supreme Commander-in-Chief told me and Antonov to give thought to reducing the period of preparations for the military campaign against Japan. Having discussed the question with General A. V. Khrulyov, Logistics Chief of the Red Army, we arrived at the conclusion that this would be possible only if we did not move the army motor transport to the Far East. A partial solution to this problem was found when the Americans offered their services for the delivery of trucks to our ports in the Far East.

The strategic plan approved by the Soviet Supreme Command provided for using the advantageous configuration of the Soviet-Manchurian frontier to deal crushing blows at the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea in three directions: the two main converging attacks from the Trans-Baikal region, i.e. from the eastern salient of the Mongolian People's Republic, and from the Soviet Maritime Territory, and a secondary attack from the area south-west of Khabarovsk. The aim was to encircle the main body of the Kwantung Army and to destroy it.

To execute these strategic missions in the Far East provision was made for the deployment of three fronts (groups of armies).

The Soviet Pacific Fleet was to take part in the campaign.

Taking into account the remoteness of the Far Eastern theatre of operations from the centre, its vast area, difficult natural conditions, and also the need to make appropriate and timely use of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in support of all three fronts, the State Defence Committee set up a separate High Command for the Soviet Forces in the Far East to effect strategic guidance of military operations. I was appointed head of the High Command, Lieutenant-General I. V. Shikin member of the Military Council, and Colonel-General S. P. Ivanov chief of staff.

The establishment of a High Command for the Far East as a body of strategic guidance of the forces justified itself, in my opinion. Such a body made it possible to carry out effectively the instructions of the Supreme Command, taking into account the changes in the operational, strategic, general military and political situation, and to respond to them with adequate speed. It also enabled us to render assistance to the fronts on the spot. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief maintained direct daily contact with me and the battlefronts, even when he was attending the Potsdam Conference.

For purposes of security the 1st Far Eastern Front was known as the Maritime Group till August 5. From April 1945 it was headed by the former Command of the Karelian Front. The 2nd Far Eastern Front was called the Far Eastern Front and the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East operational group of Colonel-General Vasilyev. (Vasilyev was the pseudonym of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. — Ed.)

During the spring and summer our forces concentrated in the Far East.

During the whole of June and early in July we in the General Staff defined exactly the plan of the Far Eastern campaign together with the front commanders. Proceeding from the strategic decisions adopted by GHQ, the General Staff completed its work on the directives to the fronts by June 27. On June 28, GHQ approved them. The directive to the commander of the Trans-Baikal Front ordered him to advance rapidly into Central Manchuria and, acting in cooperation with the forces of the Maritime Group and the Far-Eastern Front, to rout the Kwantung Army and capture the Chihfeng, Mukden, Changchun and Chelantun areas. The operation was to be based on surprise and the use of the front's mobile formations, the 6th Guards Tank Army above all. The directive to the commander of the Maritime Group of Forces instructed him to advance into Central Manchuria and, jointly with the forces of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts, to rout the Kwantung Army and seize the Harbin, Changchun and Selishin areas. The Commander of the Far Eastern Front was ordered to render active assistance to the forces of the Trans-Baikal Front

and Maritime Group in routing the Kwantung Army and capturing the Harbin area.

On July 5, I arrived in Chita and handed the directive to the commander of the Trans-Baikal Front. At the same time the directives were delivered to the commanders of the Maritime Group and Far Eastern fronts.

On July 16, J. V. Stalin telephoned me from Potsdam. I was at Headquarters of the Far Eastern Forces, located 25 kilometres south-west of Chita. He asked me what progress had been made in the preparations for the operation. He wanted to know whether they could be completed about ten days before the original deadline. I replied that the concentration of troops and transportation of the necessary equipment and supplies made this impossible and asked him to leave the initial date in force. Stalin gave his consent. I do not know the reason why Stalin had raised the question about speeding up the preparations. However, what we do know is that just before the opening of the Potsdam Conference the Americans had conducted the first atom bomb test in the USA, and a week later, on July 24, ex-Vice President H. Truman, who had taken over the office of president and attended the conference in this capacity, ordered the commander of the US Strategic Air Command to drop an atom bomb early in August 1945 on one of the following Japanese cities: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, Nagasaki. On receiving the report on the results of the atom bomb test while he was in Potsdam, Harry Truman tried to exert political pressure on the Soviet delegation. However, he was met with calm confidence and restrained firmness. When he spoke over the phone with me on July 16 Stalin apparently could not have known that a few hours earlier the "Fat Man" (code name for the bomb undergoing test) had been exploded at Los Alamos. It is to be assumed that in asking about the time when the operation could be launched, he was guided by general military-political considerations rather than by the above fact.

On July 30, 1945, the Supreme Command GHQ issued an order officially appointing me Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East and subordinating to me, as of August 1, the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts, the Maritime Group of Forces and the Pacific Fleet.

On August 2, I received the following directive:

"The Supreme Command GHQ hereby orders that
as of August 5, 1945,

"1. The Maritime Group of Forces (Commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov) be renamed the 1st Far Eastern Front.

"2. The Far Eastern Front (Commander, General of the Army M. A. Purkayev) be renamed the 2nd Far Eastern Front.

"3. The Operational Group of Colonel-General Vasilyev be renamed Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East.

"4. Colonel-General S. P. Ivanov be appointed Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East."

On August 7, a new directive was received.

"The forces of the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern fronts will commence military operations on August 9 to execute the missions laid down by the directives of GHQ of June 28. The air forces of all the fronts shall begin combat operations on the morning of August 9. The land forces of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern fronts shall cross the frontier of Manchuria in the morning of August 9. The 2nd Far Eastern Front shall act in accordance with my instructions. The Pacific Fleet shall introduce operational condition No. 1, shall proceed with the laying of mines. All independent shipping shall be discontinued. The transport vessels shall be directed to assembly harbours for subsequent organisation of convoys to be accompanied by escorts (fighting ships), the submarines shall be deployed in patrol zones. The fleet shall begin operations in the morning of August 9."

I regularly informed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the preparations for the operations and later on the hostilities against the Japanese forces. The telephone system functioned perfectly. On the eve of the offensive I rang him up to report on the readiness of the Soviet forces to begin operations...

The fronts launched and executed their operations according to the following operational pattern. On the front of B. Ya. Malinovsky, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army under Marshal Khoroloin Choibalsan struck from Sain-Shand in the Gobi Desert at the forces of Prince De Wang and Army Group Suiyuan in the direction of Kalgan (Changkai-kow); the mixed Soviet-Mongolian Mechanised Cavalry Group under Colonel-General I. A. Pliyev attacked from the Northern Gobi in the direction of the town of Dalaunur (Dolung); the 17th Army under Lieutenant-General A. I. Danilov struck from Yugodair-Hid at Chihfeng to rout the left-wing forces of the 44th Japanese Army. The implementation of this plan helped to isolate the Kwantung Army from the forces of the Japanese Northern Front operating in the region of Peiping (Peking), thereby depriving it of the possibility to receive aid from the south. The 53rd Army under Colonel-General M. M. Managarov and the 6th Guards Tank Army under Colonel-General of Tank Troops A. G. Kravchenko attacked from Mamai in the direction of Mukden (Shenyang), the seat of the headquarters of the 3rd Japanese Front, dealing a blow at the right wing of the 44th Army. The 39th Army under Colonel-General I. I. Lyudnikov struck from the Iamtsak-Bulak Salient at the 30th and left wing of the 4th Separate Japanese armies, and advanced along the railway leading to Changchun (Hsinking) where the headquarters of the Kwantung Army was located. The 5th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front was advancing from the east to meet the 39th Army. The 36th Army under Lieutenant-General A. A. Luchinsky launched an attack from Dauriya through Hailar towards Tsitsihar at the centre of the 4th Separate Army. The 12th Air Army under Marshal of the Air Force S. A. Khudjakov provided air support for the Trans-Baikal Front.

The forces of the Trans-Baikal Front were advancing on

difficult terrain. Even the Chinese and Japanese had no decent maps, and our cartographic service was hard put to provide the commanders with the necessary aids. The enemy could not possibly suppose that the Soviet forces would be able to advance several hundred kilometres in a week in the most difficult conditions. The surprise was so complete and the attack on the Kwantung Army from the north-west so overwhelming that it never recovered from it.

On the 2nd Far Eastern Front under General of the Army Furkayev six small groups were covering a railway in the Trans-Baikal region from the mouth of the Shilka to the mouth of the Zeya. The 2nd Order of the Red Banner Army under Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops M. F. Terryokhin advanced from Bureya Plateau through the Little Khingan Mountains, from the north in the direction of Tsitsikar. The 15th Army under Lieutenant-General S. K. Mamonov headed from Birobidzhan down the Sungari for Harbin. The 5th Separate Infantry Corps under Major-General I. Z. Pashkov, overcoming enemy opposition, advanced from Bikin in a direction parallel to that pursued by General Mamonov's forces, towards Poli. The 16th Army under Lieutenant-General L. G. Chermisov dealt a blow from North Sakhalin at the southern part of the island. Units of the Kamchatka Defence Area under Major-General A. R. Onchiko occupied the Kuril Islands (in pursuance of my order of August 15). The forces of the front were given air support by the 10th Air Army under Colonel-General of the Air Force P. F. Zhigarev.

The front maintained very close cooperation with the Pacific Fleet and two naval flotillas. The naval forces took part in landing forces on the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, in crossing the Amur and the Ussuri and in the operations on the Sungari. An interesting episode in the fighting on Sakhalin was the landing of a parachute force at Toyohara (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), a move the enemy had not expected at all. The landings from the sea on the islands of Iturup, Kunashir and Shikotan was equally amazing from the standpoint of speed, skill and daring.

On the 1st Far Eastern Front the 35th Army under Lieutenant-General N. D. Zakhvatayev launched its attack from Gubarov and Lesozavodsk at Linkow. The 1st Order of the Red Banner Army under Colonel-General A. P. Baloborodov advanced from Lake Khanka through Muling and Muntchiang (headquarters of the 1st Japanese Front) on Harbin where it joined the 15th Army. The 5th Army under Colonel-General N. I. Krylov forced its way from Grodekovo to Qirin. The 25th Army under Colonel-General I. M. Chistyakov advanced from Wonsan (headquarters of the 3rd Japanese Army), making a turn towards the Yangtze, in the direction of Korea and then heading along the shore of the Sea of Japan to reach the famous 38 parallel (which later became the frontier between the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and South Korea) and struck at the 17th Front. The 9th Air Army of Colonel-General of the Air Force I. M. Sokolov provided air support for the forces of

the front. The 10th Mechanized Corps under Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops I. D. Vasilyev engaged the enemy in the zone of the 5th Army.

Most of the ships of the Pacific Fleet based at Vladivostok cooperated with this front. The coordinated operations of the mobile land forces and landings from the sea to capture such Korean ports as Yuki, Rashin, Seishin and Gensan were swift and successful. The paratroopers dropped at Harbin, Qirin and Hameng — then far behind the enemy lines — distinguished themselves in action. The confusion caused among the Japanese forces by the defeat of the Kwantung Army on the front helped them accomplish their hazardous missions.

On August 10 the Mongolian People's Republic entered the war against Japan. Our joint offensive developed successfully from the outset. The element of surprise and the tremendous power of the initial attacks enabled the Soviet forces to seize the initiative at once. The opening of hostilities by the Soviet Union caused a panic in the government of Japan. In a statement made on August 9 the Prime Minister Suzuki said:

"The entry of the Soviet Union into the war this morning has placed us in a totally hopeless position which makes the further continuation of the war impossible."

Thus, as the Japanese leaders admitted, it was precisely the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces, and not the atomic bombing of Japanese cities by the US Air Force on August 6 and 9, that sealed the fate of Japan and hastened the end of the Second World War.

The mass annihilation of the population of Japanese cities was not determined by military necessity. As far as the United States was concerned the atomic bomb was not so much an act marking the end of World War Two as an act ushering in the cold war against the USSR.

The Soviet offensive was conducted against fierce enemy opposition. Despite this, the Soviet forces effectively fulfilled their missions. The advanced units of the Trans-Baikal Front approached the western slopes of the Great Khingan Mountains as early as August 11. By then the mobile forces of the main body had negotiated it to emerge in the Central Manchurian Plain. The crossing of the Khingan Range was a feat unequalled in modern warfare. By the end of August 14 the forces of the Trans-Baikal Front had covered from 250 to 400 kilometres, reached the heart of Manchuria and made further headway to Changchun, its capital, and Mukden, a big industrial centre. At the same time the forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front penetrated a powerful defence zone similar to the Mannerheim line (Finland), only of greater scope and built on difficult mountainous forest terrain, seized seven heavily fortified strong points, advanced 120-150 kilometres into Manchuria and engaged the enemy on the outskirts of Muntchiang. The forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front were fighting on the approaches to Tsitsikar and Chiamussu. Thus, by the end of the sixth day of the offensive the Soviet forces had broken up the Kwantung Army into several isolated parts.

The rapid advance of Soviet forces in separate, isolated operational directions was possible only thanks to the carefully thought out composition of the groupings, knowledge of the specific natural conditions of the country and specific features of the enemy defence systems in each operational direction, the daring use of large tank, mechanized and cavalry formations, utilisation of the element of surprise in the attack, the offensive spirit of the forces, the audacious, determined and exceptionally skillful actions, valour and mass heroism of the officers and men of the Red Army, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army and the Soviet Pacific Fleet and river flotillas.

The frontier guards rendered effective assistance to the forces in the Far East throughout the campaign. In the early days of the operation in Manchuria they fought together with the field units, by attacking and destroying numerous strong points and fortified areas on the frontier. In subsequent fighting the frontier guards actively contributed to the pursuit of the enemy and did guard duty on the lines of communication, at headquarters, key objectives and rear areas behind the lines of the field forces. In the early period of the war in the Far East special detachments were formed out of frontier guards to cover, or rather to defend on the assignment of the front command, large sections of the battlefield to replace field forces which were employed in key operational directions. The frontier guards rendered invaluable assistance in fighting enemy groups of saboteurs and scouts.

In the face of inevitable military defeat the Japanese government decided to capitulate on August 14. On the following day Premier Suzuki's cabinet collapsed. However, the Kwantung Army continued to offer stubborn resistance. In this connection the Soviet press published an explanatory note issued by the General Staff of the Red Army, which said:

"1. The statement of the Japanese emperor of August 14 on the surrender of Japan is only a general declaration of unconditional capitulation.

"The order to cease hostilities by the armed forces has not been issued and the Japanese armed forces are still continuing to offer resistance. Therefore, the armed forces of Japan have not yet surrendered.

"2. The armed forces of Japan will be considered to have surrendered only after the Japanese emperor has ordered his armed forces to end hostilities and lay down their arms and only after they have actually started to carry it out.

"3. In view of the aforesaid the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East will continue their offensive operations against Japan."

In the days following the Soviet statement the Soviet forces continued to develop the offensive and increase the rate of advance. On a 1,000-kilometre frontage of the Trans-Baikal Front General Puryev's Mechanized Cavalry Group approached Kaigan and Chengtse (Jehol), the 17th Army forced its way to the Bay of Liangtung through Chih-feng, the 6th Guards Tank Army, though experiencing

tremendous difficulties owing to the irregular arrival of supplies, was seeking to carry out the key mission of the front, i.e. to take Mukden. The 39th Army was restoring the bridges and railway tracks the enemy had destroyed and steadily advancing through Tsoen to Changchun. It was then that the 53rd Army was brought up from the second echelon and committed to action by decision of the front commander in the gap between the 17th and 39th armies. It was to advance to Fusin through Kailu. As a result, by the end of August 19, the forces of the Trans-Baikal Front reached the areas of Chih-feng, Changchun, Mukden, Kailu and Taitshikar. This meant that the Soviet Armed Forces had driven a huge wedge into the dispositions of the Kwantung Army from the west over an area of approximately 600,000 sq km.

The forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front also continued to develop their offensive. On August 16 the 35th Army reached the Chiamussu-Tumen railway in the area of Fuli thus providing reliable cover to the right flank of the main body of the front by cutting off the 4th Separate Japanese Army, which was retreating before the forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and withdrawing southward from the Mufanchiang grouping. Meanwhile the 1st Order of the Red Banner and 5th armies were engaged in heavy fighting for the big railway and highway junction and important administrative and political centre of Mufanchiang. Offering fierce resistance the enemy repeatedly undertook counterattacks. However, on August 16 the city fell. In this engagement the Kwantung Army lost over 40,000 officers and men. Acting in cooperation with the 10th Mechanized Corps, the 25th Army on the same day took the city of Wonsen, which covered the approaches to Qirin and the north of Korea. At the same time units of this army and a force landed from the sea seized the big naval base of Seishin and reached the lines of communication of the 3rd Japanese Army cutting off the forces of the 17th Front from the 1st Front and from the coast of the Sea of Japan. By the end of the first week of the war the 5th Japanese Army was completely routed, while the 3rd Japanese Army and other forces of the 1st Front suffered serious losses. The enemy attempt to prevent at all costs the penetration of Soviet forces into the Central Manchurian Plain and into North Korea had failed completely.

Meanwhile the forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front seized the city of Chiamussu and, acting in cooperation with the Order of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, advanced along the Sungari in the direction of Harbin. The Soviet Air Force enjoyed supremacy in the air over the entire theatre of operation. The Pacific Fleet retained complete control of the coastal zone of North Korea. The Kwantung Army was utterly defeated.

On August 17, having lost all control of the isolated groups of troops and realising the futility of all further resistance General Ootosoo Yamada, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, issued the order to start negotiations with the Soviet High Command in the Far East. At 1300 hours on August 17 headquarters of the Kwantung

Army radioed the following statement:

"To implement the order to cease hostilities as quickly as possible we, Command of the Kwantung Army, have issued the order this morning to send aircraft with our representatives between 1000 and 1400 hours (Tokyo time) on August 17 to the following cities and towns: Mutanchiang, Mishang and Muling — to establish contact with the Command of the Red Army. Headquarters, Kwantung Army, hopes that this measure will not give rise to any misunderstanding."

At 1700 hours on August 17, the Soviet Command received a radio message from the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to the effect that he had ordered immediate cessation of hostilities by the Japanese forces which were to surrender their arms to the Soviet forces. At 1900 hours a Japanese aircraft dropped in the dispositions of the forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front two pennants with an appeal of headquarters, 1st Front of the Kwantung Army, for the cessation of hostilities. However, on most sectors of the front the Japanese forces not only continued to offer resistance, but in some places even launched counterattacks. As a result, I was forced to send the following radio message to General Yamada:

"Headquarters of the Japanese Kwantung Army has radioed a proposal to Headquarters of Soviet Forces in the Far East on the cessation of hostilities. However, not a word has been said about the surrender of the Japanese armed forces in Manchuria."

"At the same time Japanese troops have launched a counteroffensive on some sectors of the Soviet-Japanese front. I propose that as from 1200 hours on August 20 the commander of the Kwantung Army should end all hostilities against the Soviet forces on the entire front, lay down arms and surrender. The above time limit is provided to enable headquarters of the Kwantung Army to bring the order on cessation of resistance and surrender to the knowledge of all of its forces. As soon as the Japanese troops start surrendering their arms the Soviet forces will end hostilities."

At the same time I ordered the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front to send staff officers to the airfields at Mutanchiang and Muling authorizing them to inform the representatives of headquarters of the Kwantung Army, that the Soviet forces would end hostilities only after the Japanese troops began to surrender. This measure was made necessary by the fact that many Japanese military units and garrisons had lost contact with Japanese headquarters and thus failed to receive General Yamada's order or refused to carry it out. At 0330 hours on August 18 Yamada radioed a reply to the Soviet High Command stating his readiness to comply with all the terms of surrender. On August 18 Japanese units began to surrender on many sectors of the front.

To expedite the disarmament of the Japanese troops that had surrendered and the liberation of the territory they had seized I issued the following order to the forces of the Trans-Baikal and the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern fronts:

"Japanese resistance having been broken down and the poor condition of roads preventing the rapid advance of our main forces in pursuit of their missions, it is necessary for the speedy capture of the cities of Changchun, Mukden, Qirin and Harbin — to switch over to operations by use of specially formed highly mobile and well equipped detachments. These or similar detachments will be employed for the execution of next missions without leaving to operate separately from the main body."

Such detachments were formed in all the armies of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern fronts. They comprised tank units, infantry subunits mounted on motor vehicles and subunits of self-propelled and antitank destroyer artillery. To seize vital military and industrial objectives and to receive the surrender of their garrisons we landed airborne troops at Mukden, Changchun, Port Arthur, Dainy, Harbin and Qirin. Soon after the landing of airborne troops advanced detachments entered Mukden, Changchun, Port Arthur and Dainy. Later the units and formations of the 6th Guards Tank Army reached these cities.

Taken by surprise, the Japanese officers and men surrendered.

On August 18 an airborne landing under Major-General G. A. Shelakhov, Deputy Chief of Staff, 1st Far Eastern Front, unexpectedly met Lieutenant-General Hiposaburo, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, on an aerodrome. In a talk with him General Shelakhov proposed that he should come in our plane with a group of officers selected by the Japanese Command to the command post of the Commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front to settle all matters concerning the surrender of the entire Kwantung Army. Hiposaburo accepted the proposal and at 1530 hours (Far Eastern time) on August 19 this meeting took place.

We presented our demands concerning the procedure for the surrender, named the assembly points for the prisoners, the routes to them and time of arrival. Hiposaburo accepted all the terms. He said that the failure of some of the Japanese units and subunits to carry out the order to surrender arms was due to the fact that the Command of the Kwantung Army was unable to make the order known to them. The reason for this was that already on the second day of the Red Army offensive headquarters of the Kwantung Army had lost control of the forces. We further warned Hiposaburo that the Japanese forces were to surrender in an orderly way together with their officers and that in the first few days after surrender the Japanese Command would be responsible for supplying the prisoners with food. The troops were to come over to us with their field kitchens and supplies of food; the Japanese generals were required to come with their aides and personal effects. We also made it clear that we guaranteed humane treatment not only to high ranking officers, but also to all other prisoners of war.

It is worth noting that Hiposaburo asked permission for the Japanese soldiers to retain their arms in some regions of Manchuria and Korea till the arrival of Red Army units. The reason for this was, he said, that the "population was

unreliable there." We replied that the Soviet Command would ensure maintenance of complete order in the territory held by the Red Army and would not permit any unlawful excesses. After that we issued pertinent orders on the forthcoming meeting of Soviet officers with the Japanese Command, on what aircraft were to be used and clarified which members of the Kwantung Army staff would be sent to the different localities. Hirasaburo asked if the Japanese Command could retain the necessary transportation and means of communication to transmit to the troops the instructions of the Soviet Command. The request was granted. Having discussed all the details concerning the surrender of the Kwantung Army, he and his party received permission to proceed to his own headquarters in our plane escorted by Soviet officers.

During the talks Hirasaburo and most of his party looked rather downcast. They did not display even a trace of their "Samurai" arrogance. The previously haughty lords of Manchuria behaved meekly and even humbly. Whenever we said something they would hasten to nod their heads in agreement. It was obvious that psychologically they had been broken down.

From August 19 onwards practically all the Japanese forces began to surrender. Thus, we took prisoner 148 Japanese generals, 594,000 officers and men. By the end of August we completed the disarmament of the Kwantung Army and other enemy forces in Manchuria and North Korea. The operations for the liberation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were successfully completed.

The military campaign of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Far East was crowned with a brilliant victory. It is difficult to overestimate its results. Officially the campaign lasted 24 days. But actually the hostilities went on only half that time. The striking force of the enemy was routed. The Japanese militarists lost their bases for aggression and raw material and weapon supply bases in China, Korea and South Sakhalin. The collapse of the Kwantung Army brought closer the capitulation of Japan as a whole.

The end of the war in the Far East saved the lives of several hundred thousand US and British soldiers and millions of Japanese from countless sacrifices and sufferings. It prevented the further destruction and plundering of the peoples of East and Southeast Asia by Japanese invaders.

As a result of the rout of Japan conditions were favourable for the triumph of people's revolutions in China, North Korea and Vietnam. In the past Mao Zedong reckoned with the historical truth. In August 1945 he wrote:

"The Red Army came to help the Chinese people expel the aggressors. This has no precedent in the history of China. The effect of this event is inestimable."

Without the decisive assistance of the Soviet Union the Chinese people could not have so quickly discarded the yoke of Japanese militarists and liberated their country.

The rout of Japanese militarism contributed to a powerful rise in the national-liberation movement in the whole of Asia. On August 17 an independent Indonesian Republic was proclaimed. On September 2 Mamoru, the Japanese foreign minister, and Yoshijiro, Chief of the General Staff, signed the act of unconditional capitulation, and on that day President Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On October 12 the patriots of Laos proclaimed the establishment of the Pathet-Lao (Free Country of Lao).

The victory secured by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was evidence of the might of the socialist social and state system, the great organising role of the Communist Party and a new triumph of Soviet military art. The Homeland generously appreciated the feat of its sons. Eighty-seven officers and men were awarded the title of Hero or twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Over 300,000 servicemen were honoured with Orders and medals. Many formations and units were given honorary titles: Kuril, Sakhalin, Ussuri, Harbin, Amur, Khingan, and Mukden. All the participants in the war against Japan received the medal "For Victory over Japan."

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CSO: 1812

MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN ORGANIZING STRATEGIC DEFENSES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 9-17

[Article by Arm Gen M. Kozlov, chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "The Organization and Conduct of Strategic Defenses from the Experience of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] A strategic defense during the years of the Great Patriotic War, as a rule, was a forced type of combat operation. This was employed in the absence of opportunities for conducting an offensive and when time was needed to create and concentrate reserves for the purposes of going over to a decisive offensive (counter-offensive) as well as if a strategic offensive was ill-advised at the given moment.¹

"In world history," commented V. I. Lenin, "there were no such wars which started and ended by a complete victorious offensive, or if they did exist they were an exception."² For this reason, he emphasized, the troops should be able not only to advance but also to actively and stubbornly defend themselves.

The fundamentally new means of armed combat and the increased scope and decisiveness of modern operations predetermine the use of various types of combat operations, including a strategic defense.³ It will be marked by high activeness, dynamism and decisiveness of objectives. The article examines the most important trends in the organization and conduct of a strategic defense during the years of the past war and their importance for modern times is shown.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military theoreticians felt that the conducting of a defensive would outgrow tactical limits and assume an operational scale. The questions of an army defensive operation had been worked out in great detail but less so for a front. Since the possibility of the deep penetration of the enemy into the territory of our nation was assumed to be improbable, the theory of preparations for and conduct of strategic defensive operations had not been thoroughly worked out. These problems had to be solved in the actual course of the armed struggle of the Soviet Army against the Nazi invaders.

As a result of the treacherous surprise attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 in the border engagements against superior enemy forces, the covering armies suffered great losses in personnel and military equipment and

were forced to retreat. Combat operations were carried out under the conditions of enemy air supremacy and a disrupting of the plans for the mobilization and deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces. The reserves were committed to battle on the move, by units and on unprepared terrain. Because of this the available troops were unable to deal a strong retaliatory blow and restore the position on the state frontier. At the end of June, they went over to a strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German Front and this lasted until the end of November and the beginning of December.

Such defensive actions in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 proved effective. The Nazi strategy of a blitzkrieg was defeated and the going over of our troops to a counteroffensive at Moscow on 5-6 December led to its complete collapse.

The strategic defense in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 was carried out in a different situation. As early as April the General Staff had submitted to Headquarters Supreme High Command [HqSHC] a proposal for a temporary going over to a strategic defense for the purpose of repelling a possible enemy attack on the Moscow and southwestern sectors, for gaining time to prepare reserves and thereby create the necessary conditions for the subsequent going over to an offensive. HqSHC, having approved this proposal, demanded that offensive operations be carried out in the Leningrad, Smolensk and L'gov-Kursk sectors, and in the regions of Demyansk, Khar'kov and the Crimea in order to thwart the enemy offensive being prepared and improve the strategic situation.

However, after the unsuccessful outcome of the offensive operations by our troops at Khar'kov and on the Kerch' Peninsula, the enemy, at the end of June 1941, in having a significant superiority in resources on the southern sector of the Soviet-German Front, went over to an offensive. It was able to exploit it on the Voronezh-Stalingrad and Northern Caucasus sectors, as a result of which the enemy again assumed the strategic initiative. The Soviet fronts were forced to conduct stubborn defensive operations along the entire southwestern strategic sector. At a price of enormous losses (around 1 million men, 20,400 guns, over 1,500 tanks and more than 4,000 aircraft⁴), the enemy reached the Volga in the region of Stalingrad and in the Northern Caucasus, but was forced to take a decision to go over to the defensive. Thus it recognized the collapse of its offensive plans for the summer of 1942. Our military leadership was able to maintain the integrity of its strategic front, to concentrate large reserves and prepare for going over to a counteroffensive.

Strategic defenses in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 were fundamentally different. This was characterized by the presence of a general superiority in men and equipment in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces. Our SHC in May had discovered enemy preparations to go over to an offensive in the Kursk sector. By an intentional defensive on previously prepared and troop-occupied lines it determined to defeat the enemy tank assault group, and in the course of the counteroffensive to finally crush it. After this to go over to a general offensive on the western and southwestern sectors in a zone around 2,000 km wide. The given plan was successfully carried out in a short period of time.

On the basis of an analysis of the given examples of a strategic defense, let us examine certain trends in the preparations and conduct of defensive operations.

The greater stability of the strategic defenses during the war was achieved by the prompt discovery of the enemy's plans, by concentrating the main efforts in the sectors of its offensive, by increasing the depth of the engineer preparation of the terrain, the troop formations and increased activity, by the massed use of antitank and air defense weapons, by maintaining uninterrupted coordination and by steady troop control.

Experience showed that the sooner the plan of the enemy command was discovered the more time there was for the defending side to organize a maximum effective defense considering the particular features of the theater of war. Thus, prior to the war it was felt that the Ukraine would bear the main thrust by a probable enemy, and our strongest grouping was created there. However, with the start of the war, the attack was made to the north of the Poles'ye in the Moscow sector. HqSHC was forced to rapidly bring up the basic portion of the strategic reserves there.⁵ Here, at the end of June, the formations and units began to build a defensive line up to 250-300 km deep. However there was not enough time for the complete occupying of it and for creating a defensive grouping. But, under these conditions, the strategic defense carried out a number of major tasks. In particular, by counter-thrusts and counterattacks it wore down the enemy attack groupings, it forced them to make halts in the offensive and ultimately stopped the advance. The Soviet Command thwarted Hitler's plans to seize Moscow, it gained time for forming and concentrating the reserves and prepared the troops for going over to a counter-offensive.

The man-made obstacles played a major role in reducing the enemy's momentum of advance. Upon orders from Headquarters, at the end of June and in July 1941, in the western sector three obstacle building detachments were organized (two or three combat engineer battalions on motor vehicles with a supply of mines and explosives). These set out mixed minefields on the basic likely approaches of the tanks, they blew up bridges and other important installations and thereby held up the enemy advance. On 19 November 1941, upon instructions of Headquarters, an operational engineer group was organized consisting of six combat engineer battalions with the task of building obstacles on the right wing of the Western Front. This group in November set out and moved 52,600 mines (257 minefields) and blew up 212 bridges on the enemy's route of advance. The mines set out by this group blew up 87 tanks, armored personnel carriers and a large number of motor vehicles.^{5a}

In 1942, the direction of the enemy's main thrust, as in the beginning of the war, had been discovered in the course of combat operations. It was concentrating its main efforts in the Donets Basin and in the Voronezh sector and not on the Moscow one, as had been assumed earlier. HqSHC began to rapidly shift strategic reserves to the south. From 23 July through 1 October 1942 alone, 55 rifle divisions, 9 rifle brigades, 7 tank corps and 30 tank brigades arrived in the area of Stalin-grad.⁶ The insufficiently developed network of lateral roads and enemy air supremacy did not make it possible to carry out this regrouping at the required pace. The reserves had to be committed to the engagement by units and under air attack. As a result the defenses were not sufficiently strong and in the summer of 1942 the enemy succeeded in again capturing great territory.

In contrast to the previous campaigns, in the spring of 1944, HqSHC promptly discovered the overall plan of the Nazi command for the summer. The troops of the

three fronts in good time took up the defensive in the region of Kursk where the enemy intended to make the main thrust. In the process of preparing to repel the enemy offensive, five or six defensive zones (lines) were formed to a depth of 250-300 km (two in the tactical zone, one army and three frontal zones) as well as the line of the Steppe Military District and the state frontier along the left bank of the Don River. For the first time during the war, the depth of the tactical defensive zone reached 15-20 km. The main zone was the best prepared in engineering terms. With a depth of 5-7 km, it included two or three positions having each two or three trenches interconnected by communications trenches.⁷ Important significance was given to the construction of switch positions for using them in the purpose of preventing the enemy from reaching the flanks of the troop groupings in the event that the enemy drove a wedge into the defenses. The defensive and firing positions, the shelters and dugouts were covered by man-made obstacles with a density of up to 2,000 mines per kilometer of front.

On the sector of the probable enemy operations, the first three zones (lines) to a depth of 50-70 km were occupied ahead of time by the troops. A high concentration of men and equipment in the main sectors was a particular feature of their operational configuration. For example, up to 58 percent of the rifle divisions were defending an area of 95 km out of the 300-km defensive zone in the Central Front. As a result, the strategic defense at Kursk was insurmountable.

During the period of the war close cooperation between the large troop groupings operating on different strategic sectors played a significant role in increasing the effectiveness of the strategic defenses. This was organized in terms of the missions, sectors and variations of operations as follows: the strategic (HqSHC and the General Staff) between the groupings of the Soviet Armed Forces conducting operations on adjacent strategic sectors and theaters of war; operational-strategic within one strategic defensive operation (by the chief commands on the strategic sectors and later by the representatives of HqSHC) between the elements of the operational-strategic configuration of the troops and the field forces of the armed services.

The cooperation of the Ground Forces with the Air Force was expressed in the making of bombing and fire strikes against enemy airfields in the aim of weakening Nazi aviation and military industrial installations in the enemy rear. With the Navy the aim was to cover the maritime flanks of the fronts, to prevent the landing of amphibious forces in the rear of our troops and secure our sea lines of communications and sea troop movements. Thus, in June 1942, upon instructions of HqSHC, the formations of the long-range aviation and air armies of several fronts attacked enemy airfields. In May-June 1943, two air operations were carried out in the course of which over 745 enemy aircraft were put out of operation.⁸

An example of strategic cooperation would be the active offensive operations by the the Soviet forces at Tikhvin and Rostov during the period of the defensive engagement with the Nazi invaders on the approaches to Moscow in November 1941. As a result, the basic forces of the army groups North and South were tied down. And the enemy command was unable to withdraw resources from these groups for reinforcing the assault groupings advancing on Moscow. During the period of the defenses on the Stalingrad sector, upon orders of HqSHC, on 30 July 1942, the Rzhev-Sychevo Offensive Operation of the Kalinin and Western fronts was commenced. In the course

of it, for aiding the Army Group Center, the Nazi Command was forced to shift 12 divisions from other sectors of the Soviet-German Front, including from the south. All of this told positively on the course of the Stalingrad Defensive Operation.

The effectiveness of cooperation in a strategic defense to a significant degree was determined by the continuity and flexibility of troop control. For direct leadership of them, in going over to the strategic defense on the enormous Soviet-German Front, the experience of the war demanded that there be an intermediate headquarters body between HqSHC and the fronts. As of 10 July 1941, the functions of this body began to be carried out by the high commands of the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern strategic sectors, and from the summer of 1942, by the representatives of HqSHC with their working staffs. Their activities were aimed at coordinating the efforts of the fronts, the fleets, the long-range aviation and the National Air Defense Troops on the given strategic sector. This included control over the carrying out of the set missions and help in preparing and conducting strategic operations as well as sometimes direct leadership of them. (The representative of HqSHC A. M. Vasilevskiy with a group of General Staff officers in October 1941 effectively directed restoring of the strategic front and the organizing of defenses on the Mozhaysk line, and in the summer of 1942 and in June-July 1943, together with G. K. Zhukov, the organization and conducting of defenses on the Stalingrad and Kursk sectors.)

Troop control was rigidly centralized. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally and through the General Staff gave the missions to the fronts and sometimes also to the armies, fleets, long-range aviation and air defense troops. In accord with the decision approved by him, the General Staff worked out a directive for organizing and conducting defenses by each front. This usually gave the objectives and tasks of the operation, the assigned men and equipment, the lines and objectives which should be held, the composition of the second echelons and reserves and their missions. The questions of cooperation and control were also taken up and so forth. The composition and missions for the strategic reserves, the missions for long-range aviation, the air defense troops and the navy as well as the questions of engineer support and support for the flanks and boundary areas were defined by individual directives.⁹

In the course of conducting the defenses, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the chief of the General Staff, in using a high-frequency telephone and other communications equipment, spoke with the commanders-in-chief of the sectors, the commanders of the fronts and armies, they clarified the situation and gave additional missions and listened to their considerations and requests. Representatives of the HqSHC traveled to the fronts and armies in order to personally supervise the carrying out of the set missions and to organize cooperation between the fronts and armed services.¹⁰

Leadership over the course of the strategic defensive operations by HqSHC was carried out also by clarifying the sector boundaries between the fronts, by reinforcing them with men and equipment, by committing strategic reserves to the engagements, by coordinating troop operations in conducting frontal counterstrikes, by involving the long-range aviation, the reserve aviation of the RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve] and the National Air Defense Troops for attacking enemy groupings and by other means.¹¹

As was already pointed out, the defensive operations during the first period of the war were most often carried out out of necessity. As a rule, they were organized hurriedly, simultaneously with repelling the offensive of major enemy groupings. Under those conditions, the most important demands were the maximum use of the allocated time for thorough preparations and support for the operations and able troop command both in organizing the defenses as well as in the course of repelling the enemy offensive. Here efficiency was achieved, along with other factors, by employing in a number of instances the method of parallel work which proved fully effective and is completely applicable now. Its essence consisted in giving the missions to the subordinate troops and forces not after completing the planning of the operation by the superior command but rather immediately after taking the decision for the defenses. For this reason, subsequently the work was conducted simultaneously on several levels and this reduced the time for preparing the operation.

Concrete and purposeful party political work played an inestimable role in creating insurmountable defenses. This was aimed at raising the combat morale of the personnel, indoctrinating hate for the enemy and eliminating tank and aircraft panic. The political workers played an exceptionally important role in organizing and conducting it. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his book "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth] has written: "...If one considers that the combat morale of the troops has always been recognized as a most important factor in the tenacity of the troops, then the most powerful weapon had been given precisely to the political worker in the war years. The souls and hearts of the men were tempered by him and without him neither the tanks, the guns nor the aircraft would have brought us victory."¹²

During the past war the great activeness of Soviet troop operations became one of the most characteristic traits of their strategic defense. As experience showed, this increased as the formations and field forces were equipped with new equipment and weapons, as the organizational structure of the troops was improved on this basis, as the forms and methods of their employment on the defensive were developed and so forth. The activeness was manifested primarily in the conducting of particular offensive operations and strong counterstrikes as well as artillery and air strikes against the advancing enemy groupings at the distant and near approaches to the defenses; in the constant firing for effect against the enemy and in the desire to impose one's will on the enemy. This was also expressed in the conducting of air operations (the making of air strikes) with the objective of defeating or weakening enemy aviation at the airfields, hitting deep important objectives, destroying enemy aircraft in the course of air engagements and using air defense men and equipment not only for combating enemy aviation but also against the advancing ground enemy groupings. The high activeness was ensured by the extensive carrying out of operational and strategic scale troop regroupings in the aim of increasing the depth of defenses on the most important sectors or creating assault groupings for counterstrikes.

As is known, on each strategic sector, the Nazi troops ordinarily made two or three thrusts, of which one was the main one. Here the enemy created the strongest assault grouping and reinforced it in the course of the offensive. The prompt detection of the direction of the main thrust by the Nazis and the able organization of the countering of the assault groupings required great art and generalship talent. All of this came as combat experience was gained and combat practice analyzed.

In the summer-autumn campaigns of 1941 and 1942 alone, the Soviet troops conducted scores of frontal counterstrikes. These played a definite role in defeating the enemy and thwarting its offensive plans. The most effective were the counterstrikes in the course of the defensive operations at Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad. As a result, the enemy assault groupings were bled white and stopped. The Soviet Command gained time for concentrating the strategic reserves and for preparing a counteroffensive in the Moscow and Stalingrad sectors.

The activeness of strategic defenses was also expressed in the fact that while a stubborn, fierce defense was carried out on one strategic sector, on others offensive operations with limited missions were conducted. Thus, during the most difficult periods of the defensive engagement at Stalingrad, HqSHC organized several front and army offensive operations on the western strategic sector and in the region of Voronezh. In the course of them, the enemy suffered serious losses. Its reserves were tied down and it could not reinforce the troops advancing on Stalingrad. The decisive actions by the aviation, National Air Defense Troops and naval forces also contributed to this.

Thus, even during the first period of the war, the strategic defense was marked by high activeness. But the greatest manifestation of this was achieved in the course of the strategic defense in the Kursk sector in the summer of 1943. Here, the strikes by our Air Force against the airfields were made for the purpose of weakening the enemy aviation, artillery and air counterpreparations were carried out for thwarting the enemy offensive being prepared, a stubborn struggle was waged to hold on to the defended lines combined with decisive counterstrikes, and so forth. The defense of the Soviet troops in Hungary in the spring of 1945 was also marked by great activeness. All of this frequently made it possible to halt the enemy offensive in the tactical or near operational depth a distance of 15-40 km away from the forward edge, as was the case at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943. Here the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army (commanders Lt Gen Tank Trps P. A. Rotmistrov and Lt Gen A. S. Zhadov) with two tank corps were involved in making the counterstrike. They were supported by the aviation of the 17th Air Army under Lt Gen Avn V. A. Sudets. As a result of this counterstrike which developed into the largest tank engagement of World War II (involving 1,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts), the enemy, having lost 400 tanks and over 10,000 soldiers and officers killed on the southern face of the Kursk Salient, were able to drive just 35 km into our defenses.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, a number of trends were developed in the preparing and conducting of a strategic defense. These included primarily a continuous rise in the decisiveness of objectives. While in the first period of the war, the strategic defensive operations were carried out in order to halt the enemy advance, to thwart its offensive plans and gain time for the preparation and regrouping of strategic reserves, in the second and third periods, the basic objective was: to cause maximum injury to the enemy assault groupings, to throw them back to the initial position and create conditions for going over to a decisive offensive (counteroffensive). The dynamism and decisiveness of defensive operations grew continuously. The defense of the ground forces developed into a joint defense of the field forces and formations of all the armed services and branches of troops.

The forms of strategic defense underwent substantial development. As is known, at the beginning of the war this had the nature of individual frontal defensive operations. However, the experience of even the first defensive frontal operations showed that the forces of one field force were incapable of halting an offensive by a strategic enemy grouping. For this reason, from August 1941, the basic form of a strategic defense became an aggregate of simultaneous and consecutive defensive operations by groups of fronts (two or three) combined with individual (particular) offensive operations by the field forces of the ground troops, by air strikes (air operations) and by operations of the air defense troops and, on a maritime sector, also the naval forces. Within a defensive operation by a group of fronts, better opportunities appeared to pool the efforts of the involved men and equipment of the armed services and branches of troops on the basis of a unified objective, unified plan and more effective coordination of their actions under an overall command. This was a new phenomenon in military art which has been further developed in the postwar period.

During the war years, with the continuous rise in the number of men and equipment involved in strategic operations, the duration of conducting them was shortened. In 1942, they lasted 27-67 days in zones from 250 to 800 km, involving from 500,000 up to 1.5 million men, 3,000-6,000 guns and mortars, 400-800 combat aircraft and 600-2,400 tanks.¹³ The depth of the defensive formation did not exceed 100-120 km. In 1943-1945, strategic defensive operations were carried out in 10-15 days in zones of 400-550 km, but the quantity of involved weapons and military equipment had risen by 2-3-fold.¹⁴ The depth of the defensive formation had also increased by 2-3-fold. All of this helped to achieve the defensive objectives in a short period of time and with fewer outlays. In the course of the war, the role of measures to prevent a surprise enemy attack constantly increased. This was achieved by the continuous conducting of strategic and operational reconnaissance, by the presence of well-organized and continuously operating air defense and control systems and by the maintaining of the troops in high combat readiness. The experience acquired in solving these questions is of serious significance under present-day conditions.

The experience of the previous war showed that the strategic defense was most stable if it was prepared for ahead of time. As is known, on the Southwestern Sector in 1941, the creation of fortified zones and the occupying of them by the troops contributed not only to causing great losses to the invading enemy but also to the thwarting of its offensive plans. Also of great significance was the organizing in 1941 of the Luga defensive zone, the defensive lines along the line of Nevel', Vitebsk and Mogilev, the Mzhaysk line and others. The importance of the preliminary preparing of the theaters of war has further increased under today's conditions.

A greater role has been gained by firing for effect for the purpose of preventing an enemy offensive. The massed use on the defensive of artillery, tanks, aviation, antitank, antiaircraft and other weapons provided an opportunity for the defending troops to offset the enemy air strikes by an organized air defense system and retaliatory air strikes. Artillery softening up could be countered by firing counterpreparations and the attacks by tank groupings could be checked by dependable antitank defenses and strong counterstrikes.

Of important significance in conducting a defense was the correct use of the strategic reserves and primarily for restoring the disrupted defensive front, for increasing its depth, for reinforcing the first echelon troops, and for creating assault groupings in conducting counterstrikes and going over from the defensive to the offensive. The reserve field forces and formations, as a rule, were turned over to the fronts. Thus, in the second stage of the Belorussian Operation of 1944, the 2d Guards Army and the 51st Army of the Strategic Reserve were put under the First Baltic Front. At the same time, in a number of instances, equally effective was the centralized use of the reserves on the most dangerous sectors under the overall leadership of the General Staff or the representatives of HqSHC (the carrying out of the operation to eliminate the Yel'nya Salient by the Reserve Front at the beginning of September 1941).

Thus, the problem of organizing and conducting a strategic defense during the last war was an acute and difficult one. And not only because this question had not been elaborated in prewar theory. The difficulty was that the defenses were created under conditions when the enemy had thwarted the planned mobilization and strategic deployment. The forms and methods of defense against strikes by a superior enemy had to be sought out in the course of the commenced armed struggle.

The most characteristic traits of the strategic defense were: the increased scale, its close organic tie with the operational defense of the fronts and armies and subordination to the basic type of strategic operations, that is, the offensive. This held a significant place in the combat operations of the Soviet troops, and during the first period of the war was the basic type. During the war the strategic defense assumed such qualities as stability, activeness and insurmountability for the enemy; this cannot be said about the defenses of the armed forces of Nazi Germany or our former Allies. This clearly shows the superiority of Soviet military art over bourgeois.

FOOTNOTES

1. The questions of the organization and conduct of a strategic defense from the experience of the Great Patriotic War are examined in the following works: "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vols 2-7, Voenizdat, 1974-1976; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 7, Voenizdat, 1979, pp 551-552; "50 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1968, pp 255-298, 312-330; "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Vols 1-4, Voenizdat, 1958-1959; "Voyennaya Strategiya" [Military Strategy], Voenizdat, 1968, pp 187-194; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1970, pp 21-32; No 8, 1976, pp 15-23 and so forth.
2. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, p 209.
3. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 7, Voenizdat, 1979, pp 551-552.
4. "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...", Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1975, p 312.

5. TsAMO SSSR, [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 48-A, inv. 1711, file 1, sheets 12-14; folio 96-A, inv. 1154, file 4, sheet 521; "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...", Vol 4, pp 44-45.
- 9a. Ibid., inv. 1554, file 4/2, sheets 529-530.
6. "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...", Vol 5, p 194.
7. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1977, p 537.
8. TsAMO, folio 48-A, inv. 1691, file 5, sheets 95-102; file 8/2, sheets 303-304; file 14, sheets 152-153.
9. Ibid., inv. 1554, file 91, sheet 185.
10. Ibid., file 9, sheets 450-452.
11. Ibid., folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 29, sheet 42.
12. L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 24.
13. "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...", Vol 5, p 321.
14. "Kurskaya Bitva" [The Kursk Battle], Moscow, Nauka, 1970, p 485; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1970, p 22.

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CSO: 8144/0686

MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

NEED FOR COMMANDER CREATIVITY DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 19-22

[Article by HSU Army Gen I. Tretyak, Commander of the Order of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "The Commander's Creative Activity"]

[Text]

Ivan Moiseyevich Tretyak began his service in the Soviet Army in 1939. He participated in the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), fighting on the Western and the 2nd Baltic fronts. He was a deputy battalion, a battalion and a regimental commander. For courage, heroism and gallantry displayed in fighting the Nazi invaders and skilful control of his regiment he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in 1945.

In the postwar period he served in different posts — from regimental commander to commander of a military district. General of the Army Tretyak is a Member of the CPSU Central Committee and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He has been awarded many Soviet and foreign Orders and medals.

A modern battle is the main form of tactical actions of formations, units and subunits, being an organised armed encounter with the enemy in a definite area for the purpose of defeating him and achieving victory.

The conditions, character and volume of missions in a modern battle have undergone considerable changes.

Resolute, high manoeuvrability, intensity and fluidity, rapid and sharp changes in the situation, spatial scope and dynamics of combat actions, participation of large and heterogeneous forces and combat equipment, quick transition from one type of action to another have led to considerable increase in the volume of the commander's troop control and to sharp reduction of the time for taking a decision. In these conditions the com-



commander's creative and reasonable initiative acquires the most decisive significance in battle.

M. V. Frunze, an outstanding Soviet military leader, underscored that the commander had to master entirely the method of thinking and analysing phenomena provided by the Marxist teaching. The essence of this method is that there cannot be anything absolute and ossified, everything flows and changes and any means, any method can find employment in a corresponding situation. The commander's skill is manifested by his ability to choose from a variety of means at his disposal the ones which will give the best results in the given situation.

Thus M. V. Frunze considered absolutely inadmissible stereotyped actions, formalism, adherence to once and for all established canons, to always the same methods of carrying out combat missions ignoring the constantly changing situation.

The operations of the Soviet forces during the Second World War were distinguished by their extreme resoluteness and purposefulness, and effective use of various means and methods of the armed struggle. Competent choice of the time and directions of the main blows, massing of manpower and equipment on them, building up and skilful use of reserves, precise cooperation, use of different forms of manoeuvre, all predetermined the quick defeat of enemy groupings. The originality of concepts of combat actions, creative use of the already elaborated principles of the science of war were vividly manifested during operations.

The Manchurian offensive operation, carried out by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East in August 1945 in the final stage of the Second World War was a brilliant example of creative solution of great strategical missions.

During the Manchurian operation, despite the great scope of preparatory measures carried out by the Soviet Command, the Japanese were unable to guess either the intention of the operation or the time of its beginning. The enemy did not expect the Soviet forces to pass over to the offensive in August during the rainy period, when the roads, not numerous in Manchuria, became impassable. The main blows were delivered at the enemy on directions where he did not expect broad offensive operations because of difficult natural conditions. The appearance of the armoured troops of the 6th Guards Tank Army on the eastern slopes of the Great Khingan, which were considered impassable, was quite a surprise for the Japanese Command.

Creative activity manifested itself not only in planning and elaborating intentions but also in the actions of commanders of major groupings, formations, units and subunits during a battle or operation.

One example of a creative solution of the assigned missions was the achievement of surprise. The Japanese generals taken prisoner testified to the full use of the element of surprise. Thus, former Chief of Staff of the 3rd Japanese Army acknowledged: "The offensive of the Soviet Forces was so unexpected that for the whole night on August 8 and up to 1200 hrs on August 9, the Army HQ did not know and could not get any information on what was happening on the border or on the situation of the units."

On the whole, combat actions in the Manchurian operation demonstrated the high training standard and the ability of the command personnel to solve the assigned missions creatively. This combat experience is widely used in the practical combat training of forces in the Far Eastern Military District.

The development in officers of the habit of a creative approach to solving tasks was and remains the most important concern of the commanders, staffs, political bodies and Party organisations of the district. For this purpose various work is carried out in units and formations to ensure that each field training, every tactical briefing and group exercise is permeated with the striving to search for and find the most rational methods and ways of organising battle, to put into practice all that is advanced, all that was born of experience of combat training and the development of military art.

Take such a question as making a decision. This is a complicated creative process demanding an all-round analysis of frequently contradictory data. The enemy layout and the location of his fire weapons dictate the necessity to have a battle order in one formation, and the terrain conditions—in another. In this case the commander's creative activity must be manifested in determining what battle order will make it possible to make full use of the fire and manoeuvring capabilities of the forces and in restricting the influence of negative factors.

The importance of the time factor has greatly increased in organising a modern battle. It is therefore important to distribute and use the time rationally, to be precise and quick in defining missions for the troops, issuing orders and instructions, and organising cooperation with manpower and equipment. Here the commander must not

lose sight of a single small point.

A commander's ability to find a way of carrying out a complicated mission in a limited time is the talent in which his creative activity is most vividly manifested.

However, it must be remembered that a decision and a well considered manoeuvre can be put into practice if the order is issued to subordinates in good time, the commanders correctly understand the concept of operations and the assigned missions and if all logistic support is provided for the impending battle.

Well coordinated work of the HQ staff and chiefs of fighting arms and services will play a major role in resolving these questions. This teamwork is achieved during the everyday practice under the leadership of the commander. His knowledge, experience, initiative, and persistence help the making of a collective, and its transformation into a smoothly working mechanism.

I always remember with great gratitude the chief of staff of the regiment I commanded during the war. Guards Major G. Bushmakin was a capable organiser. His HQ personnel worked efficiently, precisely and operatively. I never feared that this or that intention would not be realised. This confidence helped me take decisions with assurance. Another thing I was sure of was that at the right time Bushmakin could "suggest an idea" and display self-dependence in fulfilling a mission. Such mutual relations helped us to work out well-grounded decisions and achieve success in battle.

V. I. Lenin frequently warned leaders against one-sided understanding of the one-man command principle and demanded always to rely on the creative activity and initiative of the masses. In contemporary conditions the commander, having at his disposal a very short time for organising battle, simply cannot and will not manage to solve all these problems in good time independently. Therefore during officer training, all exercises, manoeuvres and training lessons we teach the officers to consider attentively when taking a decision the opinions, conclusions and suggestions of attached and supporting subunit commanders and their deputies. We require commanders to be responsible only for the main work: defining the intention of the battle and missions for subunits, distributing manpower and equipment and organising cooperation. The rest of the work should be done by their immediate assistants, the HQ staff and specialists of various services.

It is rightly said that a battle is, first of all, a struggle of brains, an intellectual clash with the enemy. Without thoroughly developed tactical

thinking an officer can hardly expect in a difficult situation to display the necessary acumen and initiative and to take the most appropriate decision in a strictly limited time. On the contrary, if a commander is a man of bold thinking and solid tactical erudition, he is capable of foreseeing the course of events and on this basis of working out a decision which will allow him to win the battle.

Here is a case in point. A Mts Inf Bn under Major Gorlachov, operating in the advanced guard of the regiment in marshy and wooded country encountered a tank battalion — the "enemy" advance guard.

The terrain in the area where the advance party would meet the "enemy" did not allow it to take up an advantageous line and to destroy the "enemy" tanks by fire from where it was or to carry out a manoeuvre in his flank or rear. The Bn CO decided to deploy his main forces at a place some kilometres from the advance party so as to organise a killing ground. He ordered the advance party to force the "enemy" to deploy into battle order and to attack. The advance party fighting while withdrawing was to entice the "enemy" into the killing ground where he would be destroyed by the battalion's fire.

And that is just what happened.

Of course it was only a small episode, moreover a training one, but it does prove that victory or defeat depends not only on the correlation of manpower and equipment but also on the creative approach of the commanders to organising battle and assessing the situation, their skill in troop control, and making full use of the combat equipment.

A deep knowledge of the manuals and instructions which contain the basic principles of Soviet military art, the rich experience of the forces and the experience of combat training and political education is a most important condition for moulding the commander's capability to carry out combat missions creatively on the battlefield. However, they give only points of departure for the commander's activity and do not provide recommendations for all cases.

We teach the officers to do all in their power for the fulfilment of the decision taken, to respond operatively to all changes in the situation, to specify missions to the subunits in good time and when necessary not to be afraid of changing them completely.

Favourable conditions for commanders and all the men to display creative activity are provided at tactical, special tactical, command and staff and other exercises if, of course, they are saturated with complicated situations closely resembling those of actual combat. The very situation in the

course of such exercises compels the commander to search for variants of the solution, ways of best fulfilling the assigned mission.

At a tactical exercise a tank battalion under Captain V. Prikota was assigned the mission to proceed quickly to a large water barrier and not to allow the "enemy" to force it on the move.

Approaching the river the security element commander reported that he had encountered the "enemy" whose advance units had begun to force the water barrier.

Having assessed the situation, the battalion CO concluded that only vanguard subunits were forcing the river. Taking this into account he decided to attack the "enemy" so as not to give him the chance to consolidate on the bank.

Covered by the security element and using the features of the terrain, the battalion attacked the "enemy" from the move with one company on the flank and with the main forces in front and successfully carried out the assigned mission.

I want to point out that the commander's creative activity is not a separate instance of inspiration but a continuous process of search for what is new and original, and the most important thing, from my point of view, is to be firm in carrying out a decision taken. If an officer displayed initiative and determined the most appropriate way of acting but in carrying it out showed sluggishness and lack of poise, little good will come of such creative activity.

The experience of many exercises shows that only officers of those units and subunits where the commanders are really concerned with developing their self-dependence, encourage their initiative and resource in battle in every possible way, and are merciless towards any manifestation of non-observance or irresponsibility, are notable for their high tactical outlook and ability to creatively carry out training and combat missions.

A wealth of experience in educating commanders in a creative approach to their duties has been accumulated in many subunits of the district. There are many skilled commanders who consider it their primary duty to ensure the quickest making of young officers, to teach them to make

bold use of the wide stock of forms and methods of action in contemporary battle.

Developing tactical thinking in their subordinates the commanders skillfully use the very rich experience of the Great Patriotic War and widely popularise it. In this connection I should like to advise officers, especially young ones, to have their own libraries of memoir literature. This is a treasure-house of military thought from which much can be derived. Sometimes, during the exercises one sees that an officer cannot find a way out of the given situation. I remember that in memoir books there is a description of a similar situation with an analysis of the combat actions, conclusions and recommendations. I cannot help thinking that if that officer read this book and really understood what he had read he would find the necessary solution.

The value of front experience also lies in the fact that sometimes this or that manoeuvre can be used in modern conditions. The chief thing that we must learn from front-line soldiers is initiative and courage, ability to solve the most complicated problems independently, the striving to display a commander's insight, military cunning and daring. We encourage in every possible way the commanders who when carrying out tactical exercises and training lessons use to the maximum the experience of past battles, who create a situation approximating the one in which the front-line soldiers operated. It is natural that all this is being done with due account of modern demands.

Combat training is in full swing in the forces of the district. The personnel are mastering weapons and equipment, learn to carry out combat actions in a complicated situation against the technically well equipped enemy. The leading role in achieving high results in combat training and political education belongs to the officers, who immediately organise the training process. Organically combining Party spirit with high competence, disciplinedness and a creative approach to their duty, they successfully carry out the mission of maintaining a high combat readiness of the forces.

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CSO: 1812

MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

RYBKIN'S BOOK ON CAUSES, ROLES OF WARS REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) p 68

[Review by Prof, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen P. Isakov of the book "Kritika Burzhuaznykh Ucheniy o Prichinakh i Roli Voyn v Istorii. Filosofsko-Istoricheskiy Ocherk" (Critique of Bourgeois Teachings on the Causes and Role of Wars in History. Philosophical Historical Essay), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 240 pages]

[Text] The Izdatel'stvo Nauka has published the book "Kritika Burzhuaznykh Ucheniy o Prichinakh i Roli Voyn v Istorii. Filosofsko-Istoricheskiy Ocherk." It gives an analysis of the rise and evolution of bourgeois views concerning the basic questions of an understanding of wars as a sociohistorical phenomenon and their role in history.

Under the conditions of the exacerbation of the ideological struggle over the problems of peace and war as caused by the return of American imperialism to a policy of the "Cold War," the unmasking of all sorts of anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet concepts of war has assumed particularly greater significance. In interpreting in a distorted manner the questions of the rise of wars and their consequences (beginning with wars in the distant past up to World War II and local wars), the ideologists of imperialism endeavor to undermine or distort the Soviet policy of peace. In unmasking such subversion, Soviet military historians have achieved a number of successes. The reviewed work is clear confirmation of this. Proceeding from the principle of communist party loyalty and relying on Lenin's ideological theoretical heritage and the provisions of the CPSU Program and the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the author analyzes the basic provisions of Marxist-Leninist teachings about the causes, social nature and historical role of wars. These serve as a methodological basis for a critique of bourgeois teachings. The book emphasizes that the historical significance of a war is disclosed in its results depending upon what side (progressive or reactionary) has been victorious. The reader can trace the evolution of judgments about war in various socioeconomic formations right up to contemporary imperialist theories of a militaristic nature. The author has given a detailed analysis of the teachings of Hegel and Clausewitz about war and has shown why these were taken up by militarism.

A significant place has been given to the modern bourgeois theories on the causes of wars. A special section is assigned to a critique of bourgeois views on the causes of World War II.

In paying due respect to the philosophical and sociological content of the basic (fourth) chapter, it must be pointed out that in it the author has deviated from the principle of historicism observed by him in the previous chapters and views the entire system of teachings as if static. It would be better to show the system in movement, in development.

The conclusion of the work presents a picture of the development of bourgeois militaristic and pacifist views on the role and essence of world nuclear war as the most acute question in the political life of the postwar period. Both militarism and pacifism in our times are diverse and fluid. This particular feature as well as the trend in the development of bourgeois concepts on the historic role of war in the nuclear age are shown very thoroughly in the book.

As a whole, in our view, the book is of undoubted benefit and will be positively received among readers.

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CSO: 8144/0686

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

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Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) p 2

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON ARMY GENERAL LASHCHENKO

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 30) pp 86-88

[Article by Prof, Hero of the Soviet Union, Arm Gen P. Kurochkin: "Arm Gen P. N. Lashchenko, on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday"]

[Text] In a war the hours and minutes before the start of a battle or operation are particularly trying. And now, years later, I remember with a thrill the nights and days of painstaking work to prepare the breakthrough of the Nazi defenses and defeat the L'vov enemy grouping in July 1944. The 322d Rifle Division was fighting at the peak of the 60th Army of the First Ukrainian Front which I happened to command. Two days before the start of the offensive, the commander of the front, Mar SU I. S. Konev and I visited this formation. Ivan Stepanovich [Konev] listened attentively to the report of its commander, Maj Gen P. N. Lashchenko on the effective combat strength, the condition of his units, the nature of the enemy defenses and the operational plan. You could feel that the division commander and his staff had prepared very carefully for the planning of combat operations. And here I also heard of the great work done to work through variations of actions for the units in exercises and tactical drills involving field firing for the forthcoming battles and to prepare the junior and middle-level commanders for the offensive.

"I am confident that a division headed by such a commander will carry out the given mission," said the marshal after the report.

And in fact, by the end of the second day of the offensive (15 July) the 322d Rifle Division was the only formation in the L'vov sector which succeeded in driving into the second enemy defensive zone and cut a 4-6-km breach to the south of Koltov which was subsequently called the Koltov Corridor. Through it the 3d Guards Army and the 4th Tank Army moved into the breach. The units of the division had to support their entry into battle under extremely difficult conditions, under mortar and artillery shelling and machine gun fire. And the men saw their commander in the most dangerous areas. In one of the battles a severe wound put him out of commission. However the personnel of the division honorably carried out their duty. This was just one of the many vivid episodes in the combat biography of Arm Gen P. N. Lashchenko.

Petr Nikolayevich Lashchenko was born on 19 December 1910 in the village of Tur'ya in the Chernigov area in a peasant family. In 1930, he began his military service

as an officer candidate of the Vladivostok Infantry School, where a year later he was admitted to the Communist Party. Beginning in 1933, he was successively in command of a platoon and company. Then he held the position of assistant chief of staff of a regiment, and after completing the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze was the assistant chief and chief of the operations department on the staff of the XXXV Rifle Corps of the Odessa Military District.

On 22 June 1941, on the Prut River, P. N. Lashchenko entered into battle against the Nazi invaders. In the course of the combat operations of the corps at Kishinev, Bendery, and on the Dnestr River, Petr Nikolayevich was constantly in the units helping the commanders.

From August 1941, being successfully the department chief of the operation section of the staff of the 49th Army, chief of the operations section and deputy chief of the staff of the 60th Army, P. N. Lashchenko took a most active part in the Battle of Moscow and in the engagements in the regions of Voronezh and Kursk. His service qualities were described by the command of the 60th Army, as follows: "Precise in work...disciplined, demanding on himself and subordinates, a firm character, possesses great energy and strong will. Advisable to use in position of commander of rifle division."¹

In the heat of the fierce battles on the Kursk bulge, Col N. I. Ivanov, the commander of the 322d Rifle Division, was severely wounded. Col Lashchenko was ordered by the army commander I. D. Chernyakhovskiy to take over the command of this division.

"You know the situation in the zone of its advance as you took a most direct part in working out the operations plan," commented the army commander.²

Under the leadership of P. N. Lashchenko, the division participated in breaking through the Nazi defenses to the south of Sevs'k and in liberating Glukhov. On 29 August 1943, in pursuing the enemy on Ukrainian land, it reached the Dnepr and was ordered to capture bridgeheads on its western bank.

Under the cover of darkness, the forward detachments of the formation supported the crossing of the main forces, driving off fierce Nazi attacks against the captured bridgeheads. For breaking through the enemy defenses and for successful crossing of the Dnepr, Seym, Desna and Pripyat', 20 men of the division were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, including on 16 October 1943, its commander, Col P. N. Lashchenko. In putting up the division commander for this high title, the commander of the 13th Army, Lt Gen N. P. Pukhov, commented that "the division under the command of Comrade Lashchenko during the period of the offensive battles has shown exceptional examples of courage, steadfastness and valor.... Here it has captured up to 550 enemy soldiers and officers and destroyed up to 1,100. Some 40 machine guns, 26 guns, 30 motor vehicles, 11 motorcycles and 3 aircraft have been captured."³

Subsequently, the 322d Rifle Division participated in the Kiev and Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive operations. Soon after the successful storming of Ternopol', I stated to Maj Gen P. N. Lashchenko:

"We intend to appoint you to the position of army chief of staff. At present we do not see a better candidate."

And not without disappointment, I heard in reply:

"I request to stay with the division as L'vov is ahead of us, and there is no time to adapt to a new position."

The men of the formation under the command of Petr Nikolayevich were amongst the first to break into this city. The inhabitants welcomed the liberators with tears of joy.

In January 1945, P. N. Lashchenko was appointed the chief of the Orel Infantry School and later the Ryazan' Infantry School. He generously shared all his knowledge, combat experience, strength and energy in training the young command personnel.... And from December 1949, he himself was a student at the Military Academy of the General Staff. After completing it, he held a number of responsible positions on staffs, he commanded a formation and field force and was the first deputy commander of the Kiev and Carpathian Military districts and the commander of the Carpathian Military District. From 12 December 1968 through May 1976, he was the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces, and from June 1976, the advisory inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government have had high regard for the accomplishments of Arm Gen P. N. Lashchenko to the motherland, having awarded him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and having presented him with four Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, the Orders of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Second Degree, the Order of the Patriotic War First Degree, the Order of the Labor Red Banner, the Red Star, the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" Third Degree and many medals. He also has foreign orders.

Petr Nikolayevich has always shown high party loyalty, he generously shares his military and human experience, and has taken an active part in the public life of the nation. He has been a delegate at the 20th, 21st, 23d, 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, the 23d Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, he was elected a deputy of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian Supreme Soviets, the USSR Supreme Soviet, three sittings, and has been a member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU.

Arm Gen P. N. Lashchenko is a great-hearted person and an indefatigable worker. He has penned the books "Stil' Raboty Komandira" [The Work-Style of a Commander], "Ofitserskaya Yunost'" [An Officer's Youth] and "Iz Boya--v Boy" [From Battle to Battle]. The veteran has devoted a great deal of energy to the scientific society under the Central Club of the Soviet Army, and as a member of the editorial board of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, has helped in every possible way to raise its ideological content and scientific-theoretical level and to profoundly assimilate the rich experience of our glorious Armed Forces.

We wish respected Petr Nikolayevich many years of life and great successes in labor and creativity for the good of the motherland.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Personal File of P. N. Lashchenko," sheet 7.
2. P. N. Lashchenko, "Iz Boya--v Boy" [From Battle to Battle], Voenizdat, 1972, p 8.
3. "Personal File of P. N. Lashchenko," sheet 9.

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CSO: 8144/0686

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MARSHAL OF AVIATION SAVITSKIY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 88-90

[Article by USSR Honored Military Pilot and Lt Gen Avn N. Moskvitelev: "Mar Avn Ye. Ya. Savitskiy; On the Occasion of His 70th Birthday"]

[Text] April 1943. The situation over Malaya Zemlya was a difficult one. The commander of the III Fighter Air Corps of the RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve], Maj Gen Avn Ye. Ya. Savitskiy in a YaK was flying along the shore of the Black Sea. Below he could see Sudzhukskaya Spit, Solenoye Ozero [Salt Lake] and Myskhako. Heavy battles had been underway for several days. In searching the air space, Savitskiy noted a group of "Junkers" on the way to bomb the beachhead.

"This is 'Dragon'! Let's attack!" he commanded his wingman, Lt N. V. Borodin.

All attention was focused on the target. Speed was picking up rapidly and the fuselage of the "Junkers" was growing larger in the sight. And then in the cross-hair of the sight was the bubble of the Nazi gunner who was already firing at our attacking YaK. Several short bursts and the "Junkers" exploded in the air. Lt Borodin shot down a second enemy aircraft. The formation of "Junkers" was broken up and the Nazis began to turn back without carrying out their mission.

This was just one episode from the combat operations of Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Savitskiy. As a total during the Great Patriotic War he made 216 combat sorties and personally shot down 22 aircraft and 2 others in a group. In air combat he distinguished himself by boldness, heroism and courage. In possessing enormous combat experience, he generously passed this on to subordinates, indoctrinating them in high skills.

The future famous military leader was born on 11 (24) December 1910 in Novorossiysk in a railway worker family. As a youth of 17 he went to work at the Proletariy Cement Plant.

In 1929, sent by the Komsomol, he was admitted to the Stalingrad Flight School which he completed in 1932 to remain as an instructor pilot. Here he became a member of the Communist Party (1931). During the following decade, Ye. Ya. Savitskiy commanded a flight, a detachment, a regiment and a division, and in March 1942, was appointed the air force commander of the 25th Army which was stationed in

the Far East. During the same year, he assumed command of a fighter air division on the Voronezh Front, and in November-December, at Stalingrad, commanded the air group of the 17th Air Army. Savitskiy particularly showed his talent as a military leader, as an able organizer and leader of combat operations and as a skillful innovator in air tactics in the III Fighter Corps of the RVGK, the command of which he assumed in December 1942. The III iak [fighter air corps] participated in fierce air battles on the Northern Caucasus Front. During stubborn battles in the skies of the Kuban', over Novorossiysk and Malaya Zemlya, the pilots of the air corps recorded 445 Nazi aircraft to their score.

Then followed the successful battles for the liberation of the Ukraine and the Crimea. The air corps received the honorary name of "Nikopol'." For skillful command of it, for 107 successful combat sorties and 15 shot-down enemy aircraft, Ye. Ya. Savitskiy on 11 May 1944 was given the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and at the same time the military rank of lieutenant general aviation. Subsequently the campaign record of the corps ran through Belorussia, the Baltic and Poland.... Over Berlin, Ye. Ya. Savitskiy shot down his 22d Nazi aircraft.

The pilots of the III iak made 28,866 combat sorties, and they destroyed 1,653 enemy aircraft and much personnel and equipment. The corps was commended in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief 21 times. On 2 June 1945, Ye. Ya. Savitskiy was awarded a second "Gold Star" for skillful leadership of his formations and for personal heroism shown.

After the war Yevgeniy Yakovlevich commanded a formation, and held responsible positions on the Air Force Staff. He was one of the first aviation military leaders to master a jet aircraft. In leading five jet fighters in the air parade in 1948, he demonstrated not only excellent flight skills but also the might of Soviet air equipment. During the same year, Ye. Ya. Savitskiy was appointed commander of fighter aviation in the National Air Defense Troops. In 1954-1955, he studied at the Military Academy of the General Staff. In 1955, he was awarded the rank of colonel general aviation. During the postwar period, fundamentally new types of interceptor fighters were developed and commissioned, and Yevgeniy Yakovlevich flew on each new aircraft. He personally made certain that the pilots of the air defense aviation mastered the aviation equipment well and maintained high combat readiness. For services in troop leadership, for the rearming, development and improving of the national air defense aviation, in 1961, he was awarded the rank of marshal aviation, and for high personal pilot skills, in 1965, the title of Honored Military Pilot of the USSR.

Since 1966, Mar Avn Ye. Ya. Savitskiy has held the post of deputy commander-in-chief of the National Air Defense Troops. He has carried out extensive work in increasing their combat readiness, he has made a significant contribution to the training and indoctrination of flight personnel and has taken an active part in developing the new generation of aircraft and weapons systems. The Lenin Prize has been awarded to him. The air marshal has been awarded three Orders of Lenin, five Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvurov, Second Degree, the Order of Kutuzov, Second Degree, two Orders of the Red Star, the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" Third Degree and many medals as well as foreign orders.

Since April 1980, Ye. Ya. Savitskiy has been the military advisory inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense.

Mar Avn Ye. Ya. Savitskiy takes an active part in the sociopolitical life of the nation. He has been elected a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee (1961-1966) and was a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Sixth Sitting.

On the day of his 70th birthday, his combat friends wish him good health, many years of life and further successes in strengthening the defense capability of our motherland and the combat capability of its Armed Forces.

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CS0: 8144/0686

ARMED FORCES

LENIN'S VIEWS ON LAW AND ORDER

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 3-8

[Article by Doctor of Legal Sciences, Col (Res) V. Maslov and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank E. Litvinov: "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Socialist Legality"]

[Text] The Communist Party and the Soviet government have been constantly concerned with the strengthening of the legal bases of the Soviet way of life, the greatest possible preservation of law and order and the strict observance of the USSR Constitution and the laws by all officials and individual citizens. The 25th CPSU Congress devoted great attention to these questions. It emphasized the necessity of further improving our legislation and bettering the activities of the Soviet law-protecting bodies which defend legality, the interests of Soviet society and the rights of all its members.

The ratification of the USSR Constitution as well as the constitutions of the Union and autonomous republics was an important stage in the struggle to strengthen socialist legality and ensure law and order. However, this problem is of permanent significance. At present, when all the Soviet people are preparing actively to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress, it is important to analyze the work done to further strengthen the legal bases of Soviet society and examine the unsolved questions. A long-term program for inviolable legality is to be found in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Improving Work in the Area of Preserving Law and Order and Strengthening the Struggle Against Violations of the Law" which was approved in 1979.¹ The carrying out of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and likewise the provisions of the 1977 USSR Constitution has helped to strengthen socialist legality and law and order as well as the greatest possible protection of the rights of citizens.

The party and governmental measures aimed at strengthening socialist legality and law and order in the nation, including in the Soviet Armed Forces, are based on the firm scientific foundation of Lenin's theoretical heritage. "...Without falling under the sway of utopian views," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "it must not be thought that, having overthrown capitalism, people will immediately learn to work for society without any legal standards or that the elimination of capitalism does not immediately provide the economic prerequisites for such a change."²

V. I. Lenin highly regarded the active role of socialist legality in the strengthening of new social relationships. He emphasized that "in promulgating laws which meet the aspirations and hopes of the broad masses of people, the new power leads the way along the path of developing new forms of life."³ Even during the first year of the revolution, a large number of legal enactments was approved with the active participation of the leader and under his direct leadership. On 10 July 1918, the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved the RSFSR Constitution which reinforced the victories of Great October.

Thus, the bases of legality were put down. It was then a question of reinforcing this. In November 1918, Lenin drew up a "sketch of theses for a decree on the precise observance of the laws." Its first point stated: "Legality should be increased (or most strictly observed), for the bases of the RSFSR laws have been established."⁵ The party Central Committee approved this draft, and the Sixth All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, on a basis of it, approved a decree on the precise observance of the laws. The leader gave particular significance to this and he demanded that it be brought to the attention of all officials and the entire population of the nation and published as a separate pamphlet. On 11 December, V. I. Lenin wrote to V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich: "I am sending a pamphlet to you on the carrying out of the laws. Make the titles clearer, more vivid and impressive.

"And publish it as soon as possible."⁶ When this pamphlet was published, Lenin on 6 September 1919 sent a special letter to all members of the boards and to the people's commissars of all commissariats. It stated: "In forwarding herein the pamphlet 'Carry Out the Laws of the Soviet Republic,' I draw your attention to the law republished in it and promulgated by the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

"I remind you of the unconditional necessity of the strict observance of this law."⁷

V. I. Lenin considered the strict and unfailing execution of the laws to be the basis of new socialist discipline and the new social order. "...It is essential," he wrote, "to sacredly observe the laws and precepts of Soviet power and see to their observance by all."⁸ Here Lenin constantly stressed that the principle of socialist legality should be observed primarily by officials, as they must ensure the strict observance of the laws by subordinates and serve as an example of law-abiding conduct. "...If we are to conscientiously teach discipline to the workers and peasants," wrote V. I. Lenin, "then we must start with ourselves."⁹ He demanded that increased judicial responsibility be established for the communists who violated the law.¹⁰ The leader of the party often pointed out the class nature of socialist legality. The law, in his opinion, "is an expression of the will of the classes which have won a victory and hold state power in their hands."¹¹

Lenin's ideas on socialist legality are of great significance for the activities of commanders and superiors. This is explained primarily by the fact that due to the nature of the Soviet Army and Navy, the adherence to legality and law and order, high organization and discipline are inherent to them. No sphere of social activity requires such detailed legal regulation as the Armed Forces. The laws and military regulations express not only the principles of their organizational development. The military regulations and other legal enactments in the most detailed manner regulate all aspects of the life and activities of the troops, the

rights and duties of each commander and superior of whatever rank and each serviceman. The detailed legal regulation of the life and activities of the troops, being a characteristic feature of any military organization, gives our Army and Navy that quality which was particularly highly regarded by V. I. Lenin who wrote that the troops are one of the good models of organization and that "this organization is flexible, being able at the same time to give a united will to millions of people."¹ Thus, the capacity of a military organization to function normally and carry out the tasks confronting it depends completely upon how precisely the requirements of the regulations and other legal standards regulating military legal relationships are observed.

The Soviet Armed Forces have always decisively thwarted any attempts to encroach on military law and order. However, under the conditions of the military-technical revolution, the task of eradicating violations of the law in the troops has assumed even greater urgency. The equipping of the Army and Navy with modern weapons has strengthened the dependence of troop combat readiness and capability upon discipline and the state of legality and the strict observance of the provisions of the law by each serviceman. There is a greater danger from any encroachments on military law and order. At present, when the Army and Navy are armed with nuclear missile weapons, the slightest infraction or inefficiency, in standing, for example, alert duty, can entail severe consequences even to the point of the loss of combat readiness and capability by the corresponding troop unit. This has caused the greater social role of law in the Army and Navy. The necessity has arisen of even more detailed legal regulation of military life and the combat activities of the troops. It has been necessary to more precisely define the competence of the military administrative bodies and the powers of the officials, that is, all levels of commanders and chiefs, as well as more precisely formulate and reinforce in the law the duties of each serviceman, both those common to all as well as those related to the carrying out of individual types of service. These questions were settled in the 1967 Law Governing Universal Military Service, in the military regulations and the other enforceable enactments issued in recent years.

However, in order to ensure the strict observance of the requirements of the laws, military regulations and other enforceable enactments by each serviceman, it is essential to have enormous organizational and indoctrinational activities by the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations. Well organized party political work plays a decisive role. Our party sees in it, in following the legacy of V. I. Lenin, an effective means for preventing infractions and for strengthening law and order and discipline. One must particularly emphasize the enduring significance of the leader's instructions on the conscious nature of Soviet military discipline and the necessity of ensuring its strength and inviolability primarily by persuasion, propaganda and indoctrination. V. I. Lenin constantly emphasized that the method of persuading the masses is the main one in the struggle for the ideals of socialism and communism, for maintaining legality and social order as well as for ensuring military discipline and order. He followed the state of party political work in the Army and Navy and flexibly directed this work, in achieving greater effectiveness from it.

The Communist Party has given constant attention to party political work in the Soviet Armed Forces, to increasing thereby the organizational activities of the commanders and chiefs and to ensuring Leninist socialist legality, proper order

and discipline in the troops. In this regard particular significance has been assumed by the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979 "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination." As the experience of the best military collectives shows, the carrying out of the demands contained in it has a great positive effect upon all aspects of the life and activities of the troops, including on the state of legality, military discipline and proper order.

The strengthening of the role of the military collectives in indoctrinating the Army and Navy personnel is of important significance in preventing infractions. The 1977 USSR Constitution reinforced in legislation the labor collectives as one of the elements of the political system of mature socialism. The theoretical provision of the increased role of labor collectives in the present stage of communist construction is a development of Lenin's ideas on this question. In a society of developed socialism, the labor and military collectives have achieved such maturity that they are capable of carrying out the most complex tasks of communist construction, including the task of preventing infractions of the law and eradicating, as is demanded by the CPSU Program, the causes and conditions which contribute to the commission of crimes.

The commanders and the political workers, in successfully carrying out the plans of the 25th CPSU Congress and the provisions of the USSR Constitution, have been concerned for the development of social activeness in the men. Soon after the congress, many districts, fleets and troop groups carried out extensive work in the area of propagandizing the theoretical concept and practical conclusions contained in the congress materials among the personnel of the units and ships in the area of raising the role of the primary collectives in the indoctrination of the workers, protecting law and order and preventing infractions. Particular attention was given to unsolved practical questions, for example, to raising the social activeness of the primary troop collectives in ensuring firm proper order and discipline in the units and subunits and to maintaining high combat readiness of the troops on this basis.

Scientific practical conferences are an effective form for generalizing and disseminating positive experience in the legal indoctrination of the servicemen and in seeking out ways to further improve preventive work in the troops. In recent years these have been conducted in many garrisons of the Kiev, Belorussian, Far Eastern, Transcaucasian and other districts, troop groups and fleets. An inter-district scientific practical conference was held in Sverdlovsk. It was devoted to improving the organization, forms and methods of work in the area of the legal indoctrination of servicemen in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the provisions of the USSR Constitution and the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

The Baltic Border District has also gained interesting experience. In 1977-1978 in a predominant majority of the units here practical scientific conferences and colloquiums were held on the problems of increasing the social activeness of the primary troop collectives. The questions of increasing their social activeness in defending the USSR frontier and the strengthening of discipline and proper order were also discussed at the party and Komsomol meetings. Prominent military leaders, state figures, scientists, commanders and political workers have appeared on the pages of the district newspaper NA SOVETSKIKH RUBEZHAKH on the questions of

raising the social activeness of the primary military collectives. There was particularly broad response to the articles by the Deputy Director of the Institute for Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof V. N. Ivanov, twice Heroes of the Soviet Union Gen Arm P. I. Batov and Lt Gen Avn G. T. Berezogovoy, the USSR First Deputy Minister of Justice A. Ya. Sukharev, the USSR First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Lt Gen Yu. M. Churbanov, the Hero of Socialist Labor S. S. Vitchenko, the Chairman of the Military Board of the USSR Supreme Court, Lt Gen Just G. I. Bushuyev, the Chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals, Lt Gen Just S. S. Maksimov and others. The thorough examination of various aspects of this important problem by the authors helped to improve the political consciousness of the men and to strengthen discipline and proper order in the district units and subunits.

One of the essential conditions for maintaining firm proper order in the troops is constant, purposeful work in the area of the legal indoctrination of the servicemen. Being a component part of political and military indoctrination, this has a positive effect on the personnel and helps to mobilize their efforts to prevent infractions and to further strengthen Leninist socialist legality and proper order in the troops. The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the new 1977 USSR Constitution, the speeches of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, devoted to the USSR Constitution and to the problems of legality and law and order and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Improving Work in Preserving Law and Order and Strengthening the Struggle Against Violators of the Law"--all of this has provided a powerful impetus for legal propaganda and legal indoctrination in the Army and Navy. The troops have gained valuable experience in organizing and carrying out legal propaganda and indoctrination. This embodies the propagandizing of Lenin's theoretical heritage on the questions of state and law and the theoretical provisions and practical recommendations on these questions found in the decisions of the 25th Congress and the speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. A great deal of attention has been devoted to propagandizing the USSR Constitution, the military oath and the military regulations in the units and on the ships. As is required by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the Army and Navy cultural and legal institutions are taking an evermore active part in the work of legal indoctrination for the servicemen. The military commissariats are conducting great work in explaining the USSR Law Governing Universal Military Service to the population and primarily to the preinduction youth.

In the acquired experience there is the valuable feature that in organizing legal propaganda more measures have begun to be carried out in unmasking bourgeois and various reformist legal concepts and the antipopular, exploiting essence of bourgeois law, particularly bourgeois military law. The latter, being unbelievably repressive and cruel in terms of any freedom of thought, has been widely used by the ruling classes of the imperialist states, in taking cover under the noisy and hypocritical campaign about "human rights," for instilling in the bourgeois armies a blind obedience in the masses of soldiers to the military clique and for suppressing the democratic movement not only in their own but also other countries.

In a word, legal propaganda has become the most important component part in the party political work of the Army and Navy. Its effectiveness has risen in the communist indoctrination of the men. However, there still is much to be done in

order, as is required by the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Improving Work in Maintaining Law and Order and Intensifying the Struggle Against Infractions," to raise the level of legal indoctrination and achieve its even greater effectiveness. It is essential to strengthen legal indoctrination of the sergeants and warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"] who are the immediate indoctrinators of the soldiers and sailors. It is very important to be concerned with raising the legal knowledge of officer personnel. In conducting legal propaganda, proper attention is not always paid to explaining the principle formulated by V. I. Lenin of the equality of all Soviet citizens before the law and that for this reason, in the event of the commission of a crime by someone, the guilty party should be punished regardless of his official position and services in the past.¹⁵

V. I. Lenin gave great significance to the activities of the courts, the prosecutor and to other law-protecting bodies of the Soviet state. He repeatedly emphasized that the court is "a weapon of indoctrination on the solid bases of a socialist society,"¹⁶ and one of its most important tasks is "the task of ensuring the strictest carrying out of discipline and self-discipline of the workers."¹⁷ Lenin demanded that the activities of the court be skillfully used for shaping correct public opinion which would unanimously and decisively condemn a lack of discipline, laxness, mismanagement and other sources of infractions for mobilizing the workers to struggle actively for legality and law and order. It is essential, V. I. Lenin wrote, "to have the courts hand down lessons of public morality and practical policy."¹⁸

The military justice bodies, along with the command and the political bodies, are carrying out extensive work in the area of preventing infractions of the law in the troops. Court trials are ably used for these purposes. In them, as is required by the law, the circumstances of the case and the guilt of the defendant are carefully examined, and in addition the causes and conditions which gave rise to the crime are thoroughly studied. The results are discussed at meetings of the commanders and political workers and chief attention is paid to the taking of measures to prevent infractions and to eliminate all that can become the grounds for them. Court trials are used for propagandizing the law, the requirements of the military oath, the regulations and manuals and for demonstrating in specific examples what the consequences can be of a seemingly insignificant deviation from the established procedure for handling weapons, military equipment and armament. Such work provides good results.

At present, in approaching the 26th CPSU Congress, it is very important again and again to analyze the experience acquired by the commanders, political workers and military jurists in ensuring firm proper order in the troops, to adopt from it all the most positive which corresponds to the ideas of V. I. Lenin and to the requirements of the CPSU and to achieve a rise in the effectiveness of measures helping to maintain constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces which would guarantee, according to Article 31 of the USSR Constitution, the rebuff of any aggressor.

FOOTNOTES

1. See PRAVDA, 11 September 1979.

2. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 33, p 95.
3. Ibid., Vol 35, p 56.
5. Ibid., Vol 37, p 129.
6. Ibid., Vol 50, p 217.
7. Ibid., Vol 51, p 45.
8. Ibid., Vol 39, p 155.
9. Ibid., Vol 50, p 63.
10. Ibid., Vol 44, p 243.
11. Ibid., Vol 16, p 306.
13. Ibid., Vol 26, p 258.
15. Ibid., Vol 54, pp 71, 87.
16. Ibid., Vol 35, p 270.
17. Ibid., Vol 36, p 163.
18. Ibid., Vol 4, pp 407-408.

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CSO: 8144/0686

ARMED FORCES

MILITARY HISTORY WORK IN THE MOSCOW MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 50-56

[Article by Lt Gen A. Bezotosov, chief of staff of the Moscow Military District: "Military History Work in the Troops of the Moscow Military District"]

[Text] The Soviet people, and with them the men of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, have solemnly celebrated the 35th anniversary of the great victory over Nazi Germany. On this day each regiment met with combat and other veterans from the units and the men laid flowers on the monuments and obelisks to the fallen heroes. At one of the meetings during the laying of the wreaths, Guards Sgt A. Kovalev spoke.

"Our generation," said the young soldier, "has been living for 35 years in peace. Only from books and films do we know what a war is. But history itself has charged us to preserve and remember all that is related to the heroic struggle of the Soviet people for the freedom and independence of our motherland."

The guardsman put it well: history has charged us to remember the war. To remember for the sake of happiness and for the sake of peace. And for this it is essential to do everything so that the youth know about the feats of their fathers and elder brothers and add to their glory.

In our Moscow District, military history work is widely carried out and it is a component part of military science. Its aim is to thoroughly study the military theoretical heritage of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the CPSU in organizing the defense of the socialist fatherland. Great attention is given to the role of the party in the achieving of victory in the last war, in directing the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces in the postwar years and in carrying out a peace-loving foreign policy. This work has been closely tied to the process of training and indoctrinating the personnel in the glorious traditions of the Armed Forces, the formations and units which showed steadfastness and heroism in defending the socialist fatherland during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars. This has contributed largely to the successful carrying out of the tasks of combat and political training and to raising the combat readiness of the troops and the political-moral state of the personnel.

Military history work is carried out according to a plan drawn up by the district staff. The leadership of the district, the commanders of the units and formations, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations take an active part in it. The most diverse measures are organized, including: scientific-practical, military history and reader conferences, trips to the sites of engagements and battles, special subject evenings, meetings with war veterans, the visiting of museums, the giving of lectures, reports and so forth.

But the main thing to which attention is paid is the use of the combat experience of preparing and conducting operations during the Great Patriotic War in the operational command-staff and tactical exercises for the troops. Attention is paid particularly to studying the experience of organizing and conducting operations, engagements and battles which were carried out directly on the territory of the Moscow Military District.

Suffice it to say that at one of the operational command-staff exercises, very skillful use was made of the combat experience of the Smolensk Offensive Operation by the Western Front in August-September 1943 in concentrating the men and equipment in the sector of the main thrust. In a second exercise they used the combat experience of the same front in forming the 20th Army directly in the suburbs of Moscow for the subsequent counterattack at Moscow in December 1941. A third exercise used the combat experience of the 33d Army of the Western Front in organizing defenses and making a counterthrust at Naro-Fominsk in the winter of 1941.

In the conducting of tactical exercises, rather wide use is made of the combat experience of organizing antitank defenses by the formations and units of the Central and Voronezh fronts in the battle at Kursk in the summer of 1943, and much else.

In military history work a special place is given to working out the histories of the formations and units and the military schools and to keeping historical records.

Very popular among the men of the district are the book "Ordena Lenina Moskovskiy Voyennyy Okrug" [The Order of Lenin Moscow Military District] as well as the works on the history of the famous Guards Taman' Motorized Rifle Division and Guards Kantemirov Tank Division, the School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR, the Ryazan' Motor Transport School and others.

In recent years scientific practical conferences have become another, equally important form of military history work. As a rule, these are prepared for ahead of time, the plan for holding them is carefully thought out, and the questions on which the participants might speak are worked out. In 1978, an informative joint scientific and practical conference was held for officers and generals of the district staff and directorates and for the representatives of the USSR Writers Union on the subject "The Book of L. I. Brezhnev 'Malaya Zemlya' [Little Earth] a Stirring Document on the Heroism of the Soviet Military and a Treasure Trove of Experience for Party Political Work." Giving a report on it was the candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, the member of the military council and chief of the district political directorate, Col Gen K. S. Grushevoy. With great attention those present listened to speeches by participants in the battles on Malaya Zemlya, the writers and veterans of the Great Patriotic War. The results of the conference were summed up by the candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, the district commander, Arm Gen V. L. Govorov.

Conferences were held on the same subject in the formations and military schools of the district. They made it possible for all the personnel to more profoundly understand the content of L. I. Brezhnev's book "Malaya Zemlya" and understand its significance for indoctrinating the men in the heroic feats of the Malaya Zemlya soldiers.

A major event in the life of the district was the conference for the leadership on the book by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Mar SU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Na Strazhe Mira i Sotsializma" [On Guard for Peace and Socialism]. Giving the report was the deputy chief of the district Political Directorate, Maj Gen L. S. Balashov. The report, like the speeches of the participants, emphasized that Brezhnev's work is a remarkable contribution to the treasure trove of Marxism-Leninism. It further establishes and develops the most important concepts of Lenin's teachings on the war and the army and the theory and practice of the CPSU on the questions of military organizational development, the strengthening of national defense and raising the combat might of our Armed Forces. In bringing out the conclusions found in the book, the speakers linked them closely to the practical activities of the commanders and staffs in the area of troop leadership.

The knowledge of the officers and generals in our district was significantly enriched by the conference on the book by L. I. Brezhnev "Mir Sotsializma--Torzhestvo Velikikh Idey" [The World of Socialism--The Triumph of Great Ideas] held in January 1979 by the military council and the political directorate of the district jointly with the Institute for Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee. The report was given by the first deputy chief of the district Political Directorate, Maj Gen V. V. Dolgov. Participating in the debates were the first deputy district commander Lt Gen L. I. Kuznetsov, the member of the CPSU Central Committee and director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, Academician A. G. Yegorov, the head of the institute's section of scientific communism, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences P. P. Lopata and others.

The report and speeches gave recommendations on how to apply in practice the basic concepts and conclusions from the work of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in troop leadership and the patriotic and international indoctrination of the men. The carrying out of the instructions of Leonid Il'ich [Brezhnev] undoubtedly will play a major role in mobilizing the personnel to unstintingly carry out their military duty to the motherland.

Conferences were held on a high theoretical level on the subjects "The USSR Armed Forces on Guard for the Victories of Socialism. The Carrying Out of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress--A Most Important Condition for Strengthening the Defense Might of Our Nation" and dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces and the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District and on "V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science." They emphasized the inestimable significance of Lenin's concepts and conclusions on the questions of defending the socialist fatherland; these have assumed particular timeliness in carrying out defense missions under present-day conditions.

On the eve of the celebration of the 35th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, a military history conference was held for the district staff and

directorates and dedicated to this significant date. The speaking generals S. A. Zakharov, V. N. Maganov, M. F. Manakin, N. A. Neyelov, V. V. Volkov and others clearly and convincingly disclosed the content and significance of the major strategic offensive operations and they showed the development trends of operational art from the experience of the war, the sources of mass heroism among the men and the role of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District in defeating the Nazis at Moscow. Gens L. I. Kuznetsov and L. S. Balashov gave examples from the titanic activities of our party as the organizer and inspirer of the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

It must be emphasized that the conference participants, in discussing the theoretical and practical questions, closely linked them to the tasks confronting the troops of our district under present-day conditions.

In the military history work in the units and formations, the military schools, facilities and military commissariats, an important place is held by reader conferences, special subject evenings, inductee days, months of mass defense work, the traditional rituals of taking the military oath, book exhibits devoted to historic and memorable dates of the Soviet Army, portrait galleries "Veterans of the Great Patriotic War," skiing agitation runs through the sites of the battles of the Great Patriotic War, evenings of "The Colors Tell," meetings with participants of the Great Patriotic War and so forth. There are even special clubs for interesting meetings.

Military history work has been carried out particularly effectively in the Guards Cossack Motorized Rifle Division and the Guards Kantemirov Tank Division, the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Verkhovnyy Soviet RSFSR, the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School, the Yaroslavl' Higher Financial School and others.

According to the responses of the participants, in the troops there have been very active discussions of the books by L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth] and "Tselina" [Virgin Lands], by Mars SU A. M. Vasilevskiy "Delo Vsey Zhizni" [A Cause of an Entire Life], K. K. Rokossovskiy "Soldatskiy Dolg" [A Soldier's Duty], V. I. Chuykov "Nachalo Puti" [The Beginning of the Way], Arm Gen P. N. Lashchenko "Ofiterskaya Yunost'" [An Officer's Youth], I. Stadnyuk "Voyna" [War], A. Bek "Volokolamskoye Shosse" [The Volokolamsk Highway] and others. The reader conferences have significantly broadened the viewpoint of the men and helped them better understand the events of the previous war.

Film lectures are enormously popular among the men. At them, for example, they have examined such subjects as "The Image of V. I. Lenin in the Film," "Next to a Soldier" and "Dedicated to the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Army," and viewed and discussed the films "Liberation," "Officers," "Chapaev," "Hot Snow" and "They Fought for the Motherland," the training films "The Battle for Moscow," "The Battle of Kursk," "The Stalingrad Battle," "The Storming of Berlin" and "The Defeat of the Japanese Militarists," the movie epoch "The Great Patriotic War" and many others.

In propagandizing the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces a major role is assigned to the museums, to the rooms of military and labor glory at the garrison officer clubs and to the clubs of the oblast military commissariats, the formations and units and military schools. These political educational institutions, particularly the museums, serve the cause of developing military history science, raising

education and culture, the development of a high feeling of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, ideological-political, moral and aesthetic indoctrination of the Soviet military, the Soviet youth and above all the preinduction youth. They aid the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations of the district in mobilizing the personnel to carry out the tasks of military and political training and to raise the vigilance and constant combat readiness of the subunits, units and formations.

Over a short period of time the district has renovated the museums and military glory rooms of the formations and units. On the military chair of the Moscow Power Institute, a museum has been opened for the military glory of the 18th Army. The tone of the work has been set by the Museum for the History of the Moscow Military District with more than 65,000 visitors. Over the last 2 years, it has conducted 1,100 excursions, including 150 special purpose ones on the questions of the military patriotic indoctrination of the men from the formations and units. Here they regularly conduct excursions and exercises with the preinduction youth from the industrial enterprises and schools of Moscow and the Greater Moscow Area and the young soldiers take the oath. For visitors in the movie auditorium they show documentary films on military subjects which have been made by the amateur movie studio of the district officer club. In the troops of the district they show a mobile exhibit organized by the museum on "The Museum of the History of the Troops from the Moscow Military District." To put it figuratively, the doors of the museums are never shut. In their rooms lectures and reports are given and talks are held. The museums, the rooms of military glory and the clubs are willingly attended by the soldiers, sergeants and officers. The Taman' and Kantemirov troops, for example, have visited a museum the exhibits of which describe the activities of the CPSU in creating the defense industry. Each soldier, sergeant and officer who visited the museum undoubtedly was full of pride for our motherland, our party and the heroic Soviet people.

The museum of the Kursk Battle carries out extensive military patriotic work among the youth. This museum was set up under the Kursk Garrison Officer Club. Here each year they conduct up to a thousand different excursions, including special subject ones for the leaders of political exercise groups. Komsomol cards are presented to young soldiers in the rooms of the museum. As a rule, along with the political workers from the garrison, this ceremony is attended by communists who are veterans of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars.

The collective of the Museum of the Kursk Battle has provided great help in organizing the Museum of the Ponyri Defense and the Command Post of the Central Front in the settlement of Svoboda and with their help oblast rallies of young tourists are held.

It has become a regular feature for the men of the district to make trips to the sites of battles. During the difficult year of 1941, the Soviet soldiers fought to their death against the Nazis on the approaches to Moscow. Such names as the Volokolamsk Highway, the Dubosekovo Siding, Petrishchevo, Naro-Fominsk, Tula, Smolensk, Kalinin and the Borodino Field have been entered in the heroic chronicle of the struggle against the Nazi invaders. In visiting the sites of the immortal glory of our people, the men come into contact with the feats of their fathers and elder brothers and burn with a desire to be like them and to serve the motherland in faith and truth.

On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces, a group consisting of 25 officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], sergeants and officer candidates made a sking agitation run along the route of Vitebsk--Polotsk--Sebezh--Opochka--Ostrov--Pskov. They visited the sites of the heroic engagements of the Great Patriotic War which involved the men of the Moscow Military District, they held numerous meetings with the youth, they gave lectures and concerts of amateur artistic activities.

In February 1978, the officer candidates of the Tambov Higher Chemical Warfare Command School traveled to the hero city of Volgograd, where they visited the military history museum, the museum for the defense of Isaritsyn, Mamayev Kurgan and the house of Sgt Pavlov. All of this made an indelible impression on them and inspired them to successes in training and service.

Meetings with Heroes of the Soviet Union, veterans of the Great Patriotic War and prominent military leaders are of great significance in the heroic-patriotic indoctrination of the personnel from the units, formations and military schools of our district. Last year alone, the Guards Kantemirov Tank Division, for example, organized over 80 meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War. The most interesting and instructive of them were the meetings with the former commander of the 13th Brigade and presently the chairman of the veterans council of the IV Tank Corps, Col Gen (Ret) L. I. Baikov and Col A. V. Kuz'min, one of the authors of the book "Kantemirovtsy" [The Men of the Kantemirov Division].

Visiting the troops of the Guards Taman' Motorized Rifle Division were the participants of the storming of Petekop, Col (Res) N. I. Zarubin, Lt Col N. N. Bondar', and N. M. Khlebnikov, A. P. Khrenov, M. D. Solomatin and K. F. Telegin. The officer candidates of the Yaroslavl' Higher Military Financial School were visited by the participant of the battles at Malaya Zemlya, Lt Col V. V. Dyubin.

At the Kholmna Higher Artillery School there is an active club of interesting meetings. It has organized meetings with veterans of the party and the Great Patriotic War, with production heroes and honored citizens of the city and rayon such as Heroes of the Soviet Union P. A. Bogatov, L. A. Bykovets, K. K. Kokkinaki and D. L. Margulis, Hero of Socialist Labor S. P. Nepobedimyy, the full winner of the Order of Glory V. I. Lysikov, the veteran of five wars, Col Gen Art (Ret) M. P. Dmitriyev, and the winners of the State Prize N. N. Kuznetsov and V. A. Kashin. These measures left a profound trace in the hearts of the men and made them reflect whether each of them had done everything to be worthy of the glory of the veterans.

And how much that was new and inspiring was learned by the soldiers, sergeants and officers in one of the district units at a special subject morning meeting on "The Soldiers Fell" and which was organized by the political section together with co-workers from the Central Museum of the USSR Armed Forces. At this the men heard the history of three military banners in Moscow. Equally interesting were the special subject evening meetings held in many district formations and units on the subject "The Ways of the Fathers are the Roads of Their Sons" and "Born in Battle, Tempered in Combat."

The collectives of the district military schools are constantly seeking and finding new forms of military history work. Recently the Voronezh Higher Air Force School held a series of talks on "Thoughts About the Motherland" devoted to the heroic

path of our party and the feats carried out under its leadership by the people during the years of the Great Patriotic War. At the end there was a debate on "An Activist Position in Life. How Do You Understand This?" The most diverse opinions were voiced. But as a result the participants unanimously pointed out that the Soviet soldier is loyal to the cause of the party, the people and the oath, he is constantly improving his knowledge, he is disciplined and is ready to wholeheartedly defend the interests of his motherland.

In the exercises all the schools make extensive use of examples from the experience of conducting combat and the organization of party political work during the years of the Great Patriotic War. They show documentary films on the battles and engagements, they listen to tape recordings and read excerpts from the memoirs of prominent Soviet military leaders.

In the schools they have made it a broad practice to have the officer candidates write out abstracts on military history subjects. Particular attention is paid to the working out of abstracts on troop tactics during the Great Patriotic War.

In the military patriotic indoctrination of the personnel an important role is played by military rituals. The men of the Moscow garrison will remember the day of taking the oath all their lives. They vow loyalty to the motherland in front of the Kremlin Wall where the Eternal Flame burns on the grave of the Unknown Soldier.

The men will long remember the national Memory Watch held in honor of the heroes who died in the Great Patriotic War upon a decision of the Komsomol Central Committee in May 1979 in Naro-Fominskiy Rayon. War veterans from the entire nation participated in it. Speaking at a meeting held in its honor was the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Mar SU I. Kh. Bagramyan. He told about the heroic deeds of the combat veterans and urged the young men to hold sacred and add to the combat traditions.

It has become a tradition to hold the graduation of the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School (imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR on Red Square. The young officers receive their diplomas from the Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, M. A. Yasnov. The ceremony is attended by commanders, party veterans and production leaders as well as participants of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars. Similar rituals are conducted in front of the Monument to V. I. Lenin on the Central Square of Glory, in front of the Monument to the Balashikha Soldiers who perished during the years of the last war, in Tambov at the Eternal Flame Memorial and in other commemorative places.

The district has done extensive work in the writing and the publishing of books, pamphlets, abstracts, lectures and articles on military history subjects. Thus, the book has been published entitled "Dvina" which tells about the valor of the men of the district who participated in the troop exercises under the code name "Dvina." The author collective from the district Political Directorate has prepared a second edition of the book "Voyennyye Parady na Krasnoy Ploshchadi" [Military Parades on Red Square] and this was recently published. It relates the history of the military parades held in Soviet times. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has published articles by the district commander, Arm Gen V. L. Govorov, "Stand Even with the Heroes," by the member

of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate, Col Gen K. S. Grushevoy "In the Main Sector," by the first deputy chief of the Political Directorate, Maj Gen V. V. Dolgov "The Main Element," "When All the Links are Strong" and others. In them the authors shared their experience in the training and indoctrination of the men from the units and formations.

During the year the district newspaper KRASNYY VOIN has printed around 50 articles devoted to various questions of history as well as problems of Soviet military science at the present stage. The editors publish a special issue of the newspaper on "The Army--A Great School, and We Are the Teacher," about military patriotic indoctrination in the leading regiment of the Guards Taman' Division.

The volunteer military science societies under the garrison officer clubs also carry out great military-patriotic work. The lecturers from the Kalinin Military Science Society, for example, have given more than 100 lectures and reports on military-patriotic subjects to the students of schools and vocational schools. They have published a number of articles such as "Our Common Cause," "Through the Pages of History," "And War Returned" and others. The books "Zolotyye Zvezdy Kalinintsev" [The Gold Stars of the Kalinin Troops] (3d Edition) and "Al'bom Pamyatnikov Boyevoy Slavy Verkhnevolzh'ya" [An Album of Military Glory Monuments from the Upper Volga Region] are being readied for publishing.

In the Military Science Society under the Gor'kiy Garrison Officer Club there are three sections: military-patriotic, historical literature and operational-tactical. In 1979 alone, the members of the society published more than 500 materials in various journals and held 72 scientific theoretical conferences. They gave more than 1,000 lectures and reports in schools, at enterprises of the city and oblast and in the troop units. The society has prepared for publishing the 6th volume of the collection "Za Svobodu, Otchizny i Chest'" [For Freedom, the Fatherland and Honor] about the Gor'kiy Heroes of the Soviet Union and the book "Zhenshchiny-Gor'kovchanki v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny" [Gor'kiy Women in the Great Patriotic War]. Upon its initiative 46 TV broadcasts have been organized for "Respond, Fellow Countrymen" and "Thank You, Soldier."

Military history work is being carried out well in the Tula Officer Club. Here over 2 years they have given more than 400 lectures and reports on military history subjects. Military history conferences are held systematically. Two of them were: "The Heroic Defense of Tula During the Years of the Great Patriotic War" and "The Service Record of the 50th Army and the 154th Rifle Division During the Years of the Great Patriotic War." Invited to the conferences were veteran officers from the 50th Army and the division from various cities of the Soviet Union.

For the holidays of the USSR Armed Forces the Tula Officers Club prepared reports and lectures on the following subjects: "The 900 Heroic Days of Battle for Leningrad," "The Great Battle at Stalingrad," "Soviet Women in the Battles for the Motherland" and many others. The reserve officers and generals and members of the military science society visited the subunits and the schools of the city for holding evening meetings and meetings with the youth and Komsomol members. The amateur film studio at the officers club created a number of military history shorts. Bulletins are constantly put out on military pedagogical themes such as "Soldiers from Tula--Heroes of the Volkhov Front" and "The Memory Obliges Us."

The work of the Moscow District Officer Club merits high praise. Here they constantly hold military history readings for the garrison personnel and often organize meetings for the men with historians, philosophers, jurists, editorial collectives of magazines and in particular ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE [Foreign Military Review]. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in 1979 in the district units held two reader conferences which were carried out on a high level. The officer club gives the greatest possible help to the city military commissariat, to the rayon military commissariats and to the rayon organizations of the "Znaniye" [Knowledge] Society in propagandizing military knowledge and military-patriotic indoctrination of pre-induction youth and the civilian population at enterprises. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL has provided great help in conducting military history work in the district troops.

In the military history work a significant place has been given to raising the scientific viewpoint of the generals and officers. Each year the number of military scholars grows. In 1979 alone, the generals and officers of the districts successfully defended five candidate dissertations and ten dissertations are being readied for defense.

The military history work carried out in the district helps to indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of loyalty to the motherland, to the party, to the people and to the oath, and it mobilizes the men to success in operational, combat and political training. This work has picked up particularly in line with the Decree of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 23 June 1980 on the convening of the regular 26th CPSU Congress. The men of the district, in approving the domestic and foreign policy of our party, are determined to fully and effectively carry out the set tasks in the area of military and political training and worthily and with high indicators to greet the 26th CPSU Congress.

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ARMED FORCES

BOOKS ON MILITARY-POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 57-60

[Survey of books by F. Petrov: "The CPSU--The Organizer of the Victories of the Soviet People"]

[Text] Over the last 2 years Politizdat has published a number of works devoted to the activities of the party organizations and to the ideological-political indoctrination of the men of the Army and Navy and the working masses. For the military reader, of greatest interest are the books "Partiya i Armiya" [The Party and the Army], "Vazhnyy Faktor Vozrastaniya Rukovodyashchey Roli KPSS" [An Important Factor in Increasing the Leading Role of the CPSU], "Partorgi Voennoy Pory" [Wartime Party Organizers], "Propagandisty Leninskoy Shkoly" [Propagandists of the Leninist School], "Soldaty Slova" [Soldiers of the Word] and others.

In these works an important place is held by the showing of the work done by the party organizations, the political workers, the propagandists and reporters in the USSR Armed Forces. Precisely through the primary party organizations and the army communists the CPSU carries out its policy in the area of the organizational development of the Army and Navy, it carries out political indoctrination among the personnel of the units and subunits and mobilizes the men to successfully carry out the tasks of military and political training.

Running through the reviewed book is the notion that party leadership is the source of the strength and might of the Army and Navy. In the process of the socioeconomic development of Soviet society and the improving of its Armed Forces, the role of the CPSU has constantly risen as the organizer of the masses and as the creator of the economic and defense might of our motherland. At the same time the significance and authority of the primary party organizations have risen. In commenting on the role and significance of the CPSU in building communism in the USSR, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev had high regard for the work of the primary party organizations in peacetime and wartime. He pointed out that the party "unites all strata of society and all nationalities and arms the people with the will, readiness and ability to fight for the ideals of the most progressive and just society, communism."²

The works discussed here relate the party's activities in organizing ideological-political work in the masses of soldiers and emphasize the role of the primary party organizations, the group party bodies and the individual communists both during the period of the Great Patriotic War and in postwar times. For example, the

book "Partiya i Armiya" points out that in the war years, party political work was constantly improved and the party's influence in the troops was strengthened. The rights of the party bodies were broadened and their role in carrying out combat missions increased. Leadership was improved over the Army and Navy party and Komsomol organizations.

One of the most important manifestations of the leading and mobilizing role of the party in the Armed Forces was the personal example of the communists and their vanguard role in combat. "Communists, forward!" This exhortative cry always rang out where it was most difficult. And the communists, setting examples of courage and self-sacrifice, were in the most crucial and dangerous sectors and went to storm the enemy at the head of the masses. During the first 2 weeks of the war alone, 850,000 communists were killed on the battlefields. But the ranks of the army party organizations grew constantly.

During the most difficult period at the beginning of the war, the institution of military commissars was introduced in the Soviet Armed Forces. The regulation approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet stated that the military commissar was the representative of the party and the government in the Red Army and along with the commander bore full responsibility for the carrying out of the combat mission by the troop unit, for its steadfastness in combat and unwavering readiness to fight to the last drop of blood against the enemies of our motherland. The military commissar was precisely that figure who unified the personnel, who increased the authority of the commander and provided inspiration for more decisive combat actions. During the years of the Great Patriotic War the military commissars developed and added to the glorious traditions of the Civil War commissars.

In showing what an important role was played by the primary party organizations, N. A. Petrovichev in his book "Vazhnyy Faktor Vozrastaniya Rukovodyashchey Rol'i KPSS" has pointed out that they reflected all the internal life of the party. They expressed the opinion of the communists through which the party carried out its decisions. Precisely the primary party organizations are the focal point of the activities of their members as well as their social and production undertakings.

The party organizers were the right flankers of the party and the leaders of the party organizations of the regiments, battalions and companies in the operational army in all the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. They possessed high ideological conviction, principledness, and stood out in their simplicity, sincerity, exactingness for themselves and others. Linked closely with the men, they devoted to the party's cause all their strength, all the passion of their soul, all the ardor of their heart. Their chief weapon in combat was the passionate word of the party and their personal example of heroism, courage and valor.

The role of many thousands such party organizers is described very convincingly in the foreword to the book "Partorgi Voennoy Pory" written by Arm Gen P. I. Batov. "The commissar, political leader and party organizer--all these are high titles of one rank. And although the position of commissar has ceased to exist, each time we say or hear the words company party organizer, battalion party organizer or regiment party organizer inevitably the image of their predecessors arises in our mind. Here there is an inner, profound connection: the same ideas inspired the commissar of the Civil War when he led into the attack his Red Army cavalry troops,

and the party organizer of the Great Patriotic War when he was with the crew of the legendary "katyusha" rocket launchers.

"A commissar.... This word is imprinted in a special way in our memory and has gained its own meaning, its own independent ring. It has become a synonym of party conviction, heroism and nobility. For precisely this reason, the words political leader and party organizer are similar to it, although they often are perceived simply as positions. Incidentally, the political leader and party organizer, like the commissar, are in fact positions which presuppose definite rights and obligations.... To put it briefly, precisely he, the party organizer, first determines the morale of the army and ultimately this is the basic factor in victory" (pp 4-5).

Of exceptionally great interest is the experience of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Stepan Ignat'yevich Khirkov who during the Great Patriotic War was the party organizer of a rifle company. In the book "Partorgi Voennoy Pory" he writes that upon arriving in the company, he gradually acquired new experience in army life and military experience. In the battles against the Nazis he fought at Moscow, Rzhev, Sychevka, he fought and always remembered that he was a communist and that the men were following him. The strength of each party organization, Stepan Ignat'yevich emphasized, consists precisely in the strength of its ties with the nonparty soldiers. If the communists know their comrades in arms, their needs and sorrows well, if they are able to promptly provide help by a specific deed, by a kind word or personal example, the authority of the party organization will be strong and it will always provide faithful, reliable and effective help to the commander. The book points out that the experience of party work under combat conditions and which MSgt S. I. Khirkov had and propagandized was characteristic for the party bodies of all the subunits in the operational army. In applying various forms and methods of mass political work, in showing constant concern for the rank-and-file soldiers and in going into all the complexities of combat life, the party organizations headed by the party organizers were the titanic force which ensured the moral-political unity of the army.

Nevertheless, each party organizer had his own style and his own approach to the men that was unique to him. One is easily convinced of this in reading the essays about the party organizers. Some 61 men from the frontline party organizers became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The good, well-written book "Partorgi Voennoy Pory" is basically concerned with them.

The force of the effect of the just agitation word during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars has been convincingly shown in the collection "Propagandisty Leninskoy Shkoly." The word of truth was so significant that it literally created miracles. Inspired by it, the men went boldly into battle and defeated the hated enemy. The book contains essays on the outstanding propagandists of the Leninist school who had mastered the art of convincing the masses and who were able to arouse the hearts of the people and lead them into battle. Among them were the associates and students of V. I. Lenin, the outstanding figures in the Communist Party and Soviet state: V. V. Vorovskiy, F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, M. I. Kalinin, G. M. Krzhizhanovskiy, N. K. Krupskaya, N. V. Krylenko, A. V. Lunacharskiy, V. I. Nevskiy, M. S. Ol'minskiy, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, Ya. M. Sverdlov and others.

Here is what the collection has to say about M. I. Kalinin. "With each audience, Mikhail Ivanovich [Kalinin] was able to find a common tongue and establish contact.

With the party workers he did not speak in the same manner as he did with the Komsomol, with the workers or kolkhoz members, and different still from the teachers" (p 83). The author of the essay gives the following example. In Orenburg, in 1919, M. I. Kalinin in his long canvas coat took the rostrum which stood in front of hundreds of Kolchak prisoners. He took off his cap and said to them who had expected to see the president in a somewhat different dress:

"Cossack prisoners of war, in front of you stands the representative of worker-peasant power, in front of you stands a person not of aristocratic heritage, not a person who is able to sit a prancing steed...."

And having got their attention, Kalinin began to speak about the suffering of the people and for what Soviet power was fighting. He was ashamed that the Cossacks had given in to the persuasions of the White Guards and believed them.

"You might think that the great Russian people who created all the factories, who built the thousands of versts of railroads, and in whose hands are all the palaces and all the wealth of this world, you might think that this Russian people will take this land from you.... Only a hate-poisoned head could think that an English merchant would send machine guns and money out of sympathy and out of pity for the Cossacks.

"No, he is sending these machine guns so that you, fools, are bound by strong ties, and after you, all Russia."

And the former Kolchak troops were not even insulted that they had been called fools. They approved a resolution which started with the words: "Up to now we have been deceived by the old Tsarist servants..." (pp 83-84).

The reader will find memorable examples in the collection about other outstanding propagandists of the Leninist school. They will help the reader understand in what lies the strength of the propagandist, party organizer and political worker. And a true party worker, as L. I. Brezhnev has written in the book "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth], "is a person around whom people are grouped, and he knows fully their moods, needs, hopes and dreams, and he leads them to self-sacrifice and a feat. And if it is considered that troop morale has always been recognized as the most important factor in the steadfastness of the troops, then it is the political worker who has been given the most powerful weapon in the war years. He has tempered the souls and hearts of the men, and without this, neither the tanks, nor the guns nor the aircraft could bring us victory....

"A majority of our political section leaders, political leaders, Komsomol organizers and agitators were able to find the correct tone, use their authority among the soldiers and it was important that the people knew that at a difficult moment the person who urged them to hold out would be next to them, would remain with them, and with weapons in hand would go in front of them. It follows that our main weapon was the impassioned word of the party reinforced by deeds, by personal example in combat. This is why the political workers became the soul of the Armed Forces."³

The value of the reviewed book consists in the fact that they take up all forms of party political work among the military and show their effectiveness in a combat

situation and in the postwar period. The book "Soldaty Slova" publishes the memoirs of Soviet veteran reporters: Yu. Zhukov, V. Popov, Ya. Makarenko, B. Burkov, V. Golubeva and many others. They share their impressions on the influence of the printed word on the communist soldiers, Komsomol members and nonparty persons and on the difficult job of the war reporters. Thus, David Ortenberg, a former editor-in-chief of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA tells about the work of the newspaper reporter Z. Khirene who was on many fronts of the Great Patriotic War (pp 127-141). A. Yegorov writes about the effectiveness of materials published in the frontline newspaper SUVOROVSKIY NATISK (pp 161-170). N. Potapov shares his impressions about the work of a radio committee (pp 171-182).

The memoirs of other officers are also informative and interesting.

Along with the positive aspects, there are also certain failings in the reviewed works. For example, little is said about the effectiveness of party political work, its results or influence on the quality of military and technical training. The forms and methods of party political work and oral and printed propaganda are not sufficiently shown, and nothing is said about how the experience of the leading party organizations, propagandists, agitators and newspaper editors was used in other units and subunits.

As a whole, Politizdat has done an important and useful thing in publishing the books about party political work and ideological indoctrination of the Armed Forces personnel. In them the reader will find much that is new, interesting and instructive. He will learn how the party has indoctrinated the Soviet people and their military and how it has inspired them to labor and military feats. He will become familiar with the forms and methods of party political work. The reviewed books, undoubtedly, will help the present youth and younger generation see how our military in a self-sacrificing and heroic way carried out their duty to defend the Soviet motherland.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Partiya i Armiya" [The Party and the Army], under the general editorship of Arm Gen A. A. Yepishev, 2d Edition, Supplemented, Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, 461 pages; N. A. Petrovichev, "Vazhnyy Faktor Vozrastaniya Rukovodyashchey Rol' KPSS" [An Important Factor in Increasing the Leading Role of the CPSU], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, 160 pages; I. I. Roshchin, A. I. Marchuk, "Partorgi Voennoy Pory" [Wartime Party Organizers], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, 256 pages; "Propagandisty Leninskoy Shkoly" [Propagandists of the Leninist School], 2d Edition, Supplemented, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, 336 pages; "Soldaty Slova" [Soldiers of the Word], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, 264 pages.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 6, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 112.
3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp 24, 25.

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ILLUSTRATED BOOK ON THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 63-65

[Review by Col (Ret) S. Sukhachev of the fourth volume of the book "Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945 v Fotografiiakh i Kinodokumentakh. 1944" (The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in Photographs and Film Documents. 1944), Moscow, Planeta, 1979, 456 pages]

[Text] The Izdatel'stvo Planeta has published the fourth volume of an illustrated work on the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The materials of the publication reflect the basic events of 1944, a year of decisive victories of the USSR over Nazi Germany. It includes 1,078 photographs and film frames, 8 colored inserts (special exhortative posters and reproductions of pictures by Soviet artists), 5 diagrams of the major operations of the year, a military economic map of the USSR, a colored insert of the orders and medals of the USSR established in 1944 as well as explanations for the text.

The volume opens with an introductory article by the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Mar SU V. I. Chuykov and this takes up the measures of the Communist Party and Soviet government to mobilize the military-economic capabilities of the nation to prepare for and conduct the major offensive operations. It briefly describes the military political situation and shows the plans and groupings of the resources of the belligerents.

Each of the eight chapters contains the very rich documentary materials captured by the news photographers on the battlefields, at the staffs and command-observation points, in the troop formations and partisan detachments, on the kolkhozes and sovkhoses and on transportation.

The first chapter "The Liberation of the Right Bank Ukraine and the Crimea" has 193 photographs. They show the main events of the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation in defeating the enemy grouping surrounded on the Kanev Salient. The pictures of the Nazi atrocities against the peaceful population and the complete destruction and fires leave an angering impression. Inconsolable is the grief of the old persons, wives and children sobbing over the corpses of their relatives and dear ones.

The second chapter "The End of the Blockade of Leningrad" opens with the remarkable words of L. I. Brezhnev: "History knows a number of examples of the heroic defense

of fortresses and cities.... But the legends of antiquity and the tragic pages of the not-so-distant past pale in comparison with that incomparable epoch of human courage, steadfastness and self-sacrificing patriotism which was the heroic 900-day defense of besieged Leningrad during the years of the Great Patriotic War."¹

The 137 documentary photographs show the great feat of the soldiers and the working class of Leningrad which did not surrender to the enemy.

A large photograph shows the moment of the linking up of the assault groupings of the Leningrad Front in the region of Ropsha and these cut off the route of retreat for the enemy to the southwest. Also of interest is another documentary photograph. It shows a long-range gun of the Nazis which sometimes sent shells of great destructive force against Leningrad, having been captured by the Soviet troops, has been turned to fire against the columns of the retreating enemy. And there are those who led the troops that defeated the Nazi grouping at Leningrad: the commander of the Leningrad Front Mar SU L. A. Govorov, the commander of the Volkhov Front, Arm Gen K. A. Meretskov and the Military Council of the 59th Army headed by the army commander, Lt Gen I. T. Korovnikov (pp 116, 127, 128).

The next chapter "The Unity of Rear and Front" opens with a poster by the artist V. Ivanov "Our Military Greeting to the Heroes of Labor." The following documentary photographs detail the basic questions of the theme: the rebuilding and development of industry and agriculture, the mines and railroads which supply the front with everything necessary for life and combat operations on a continuously increasing scale.

The epigraph for the fourth chapter "Party Political Work on the Front" is an excerpt from the book by L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth]: "A true political worker in the army is the person around whom people are grouped, and he truly knows their moods, needs, hopes and dreams, and leads them to immolation and to a feat."²

In the first of the 88 documentary photographs of this chapter, the reader will see a large group of political workers from the III Carpathian Mountain Rifle Corps and the political section of the 18th Army headed by its chief, Lt Col L. I. Brezhnev. The remaining photographs thoroughly disclose the theme, showing the vanguard role of the command and political personnel, the party and Komsomol organizations in mobilizing the men to carry out the combat missions with maximum results in the course of combat operations and the achieving of victory with little bloodshed.

The chapter entitled "The Bagration Operation" includes 193 documentary photographs on the preparation for and carrying out of the Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation, one of the largest in World War II. They provide a notion of the grand offensive by the Soviet troops, the scale of partisan warfare, the mass heroism and skill of the Soviet military, and the firm and continuous leadership of the troops in the combat and operation by the commanders and staffs of all levels.

The villages and towns burned by the enemy, the ruins of the cities and worker settlements, the thousands of hungry and homeless women, children and old people, the captives of the concentration camps and the people forceably driven by the Nazis into slavery from Belorussia and the other temporarily occupied Soviet republics show the vandalism of the Nazi invaders on Soviet territory.

Of interest are the documents showing the combat friendship of the Soviet and Polish fighters and the Soviet and French pilots from the "Normandie--Neman" Air Regiment which fought jointly against the common enemy, fascism.

The sixth chapter "The Partisan Front" which vividly shows the activities of the partisans opens with an exhortative poster by the artist T. Karpov entitled "Partisan, Vengeance for the Motherland!" and a reproduction of the picture by the artist Ye. Gorovyykh "The Rail War." More than 30 percent of the documentary photographs printed here show the bloody crimes of the Nazis on our land and the bestial genocide policy. In the photographs are persons executed, hanged, starved, burned alive, crucified, run through with bayonets and crushed by tank tracks.... And thousands of children behind barbed wire. The fascists used their blood for treating their sick and wounded, they used them as living material for trying out new poisons and toxins designed for the mass extermination of the population in the occupied countries.

The essence of the subject of "The Frontiers of the Motherland are Restored" is shown not only in the documentary photographs of a special chapter, but also in the frames of the third, fourth and other chapters which describe well the struggle of the troops to finally expel the occupiers from the USSR and restore its frontiers.

The last chapter of the volume "The Great Liberation Mission" is represented by 155 documentary photographs related to the carrying out of the great international duty of the Soviet Armed Forces, the "liberation of the peoples enslaved by fascism and the helping of them in restoring national independence and sovereignty."³ A series of valuable photographs is devoted to the combat operations of the Soviet troops and Polish formations which were organized, armed and trained in the USSR. These photographs show their joint efforts in the war against the Nazi invaders. The chapter is opened by a poster of the artist Shmarinov appealing to the Polish people: "Poles! The Red Army is bringing you liberation from the Nazi yoke!" Its purpose is the unity of goals and actions of the Soviet Army and the Polish troop formations to bring much-suffering Poland from under fascist tyranny. It calls not only for all the progressive patriotic forces of the nation to join together to fight against the Nazi "New Order" and its agents, but also all antifascist forces in other countries and in Germany itself.

Impressive are the photographs of the happy greetings of the Romanian people with their liberators, the men of the Soviet Army and Navy. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, expressed heartfelt gratitude for the liberating Soviet Army: "The Romanian people will eternally cherish the memory of the valorous Soviet troops who gave up their lives for the freedom of our country" (pp 406-407).

The sincere gratitude of the fraternal Bulgarian people to the Soviet nation and its army was expressed by their leader, Georgi Dimitrov: "The fraternal heroic Soviet Army played the greatest role in the victory of the Revolt of 9 September and in the liberating of our motherland from the Nazi yoke" (p 413).

The jointly shed blood strengthened the friendship of the Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers as well as the Slovak rebels who cleared the Nazi filth out of Czechoslovakia. One is moved by the photographs which show the entry of the units of the

corps of Gen L. Svoboda into the homeland and the cordial congratulations by the Soviet command for their combat in arms on the occasion of this noteworthy event.

Also impressive are the documentary photographs showing how the inhabitants of liberated Belgrad joyfully greeted the Soviet troops which extended a hand of friendly aid to the fraternal Yugoslav people who suffered greatly in the struggle against the Nazis.

The funerals in Belgrad of the Soviet and Yugoslav soldiers who fell in the battles for the liberation of the city developed into a great demonstration of unity between the two peoples (pp 424-425). In assessing the role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the defeat of fascism, the president of Yugoslavia and the Chairman of the Communist League of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, emphasized: "At this most magnificent moment of victory over Nazi Germany..., the people of Yugoslavia send warm congratulations and express profound fraternal gratitude to the Red Army and the people of the Soviet Union for all those enormous sacrifices and efforts made by them for the salvation and better future of mankind" (p 426).

A number of interesting documentary photos show the actions of the troops in the Second and Third Ukrainian fronts to bring the last ally of Hitler, Horthy Hungary, out of the war.

Having turned the last page of the reviewed book, the reader undoubtedly will express gratitude toward the editorial staff, the compilers and artists for the successful selection and arrangement of the documents, for the accompanying text, for the clarity of a majority of the pictures and the able selection of the posters and reproductions which are an unique epilogue to each chapter.

At the same time, unfortunately, this volume, like the three previous ones, has its shortcomings. These include: a poor depiction of the contribution of the major Soviet military leaders to the victorious conclusion of the operations of 1944 (there are very few photographs of the commanders, chiefs of staffs and members of the military councils of the armies). The patronage ties between the workers of the industrial enterprises and the troops are not shown. There are also unclear, hazy photographs (pp 140-141, 152, 158, 175, 183, 236, 241, 263, 319, 399, 402-403) and unsuccessful, contradictory captions (pp 47, 59, 67, 72, 73, 298, 305, 308, 318, 324, 333, 348, 351, 354, 364, 365, 373, 398, 404, 414, 418) or they are completely absent (pp 7, 13-17, 48, 57, 105, 360, 375, 380, 440).

Certain diagrams are very small, and they include many population points not related to the contents of the photos or the explanatory text for them. Diagrams of the Budapest and Belgrad operations should have been included.

As a whole, the fourth volume is of great scientific cognitive value and has been favorably received by readers.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 11 July 1965.

2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 7, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 28.

3. "Istoriya KPSS" [CPSU History], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 563.

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ARMED FORCES

GENERAL MAL'TSEV'S MEMOIRS REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 17 Nov 80) pp 66-67

[Review by Arm Gen N. Lyashchenko of the book "V Gody Ispitaniy" (Years of Hardship) by Yu. Yu. Mal'tsev, Voenizdat, 1979, 320 pages]

[Text] The memoirs of Arm Gen Yu. Yu. Mal'tsev have been published. The author, an active participant in the past war, writes with great warmth about the magnificent heroism of the Soviet people on the front and in the rear. Of particular interest are the pages where Yevdokim Yegorovich [Mal'tsev] shares his impressions of meetings with the major military and political leaders: L. I. Brezhnev, A. A. Gribanov, K. Ya. Malinovskiy, L. A. Govorov, F. I. Tolbukhin, P. I. Yefimov, N. S. Mal'chenko, K. V. Araynyukov and many others.

Joint participation with L. I. Brezhnev in the battles made it possible for the author to learn the most characteristic traits of the true Leninist type political workers: resourcefulness and efficiency; self-possession in exceptionally difficult moments of frontline action; depth of knowledge; sincere generosity and kindness; a scope and clarity of judgments about the tasks of frontline party political work and on the role of progressive ideas in shaping the moral strength of the men and the community; efficiency in carrying out the main questions of party political work stemming from the nature of the combat activities of the troops; acute observation; the ability to generalize and disseminate advanced experience; a looking to the future; a wealth of creative plans and intentions; concern for the life, military and political training of the men. This valuable fusion of the finest human qualities should become a criterion for the command and political personnel under present-day conditions.

The author has told the reader much that is of interest about fellow servicemen with whom he happened to come into direct contact during the war years. "...The military and political leaders...are original, unique persons who are not alike," he has remarked (p 312). This is confirmed by the concise but complete descriptions.

"A love of duty, readiness of actions, a natural wisdom in the settling of major and minor problems; an exceptionally responsive soul and the kindest heart, smile...this was Rodion Yegorovich Malinovskiy.... A strict officialness in solving military questions, a strong, uncompromising nature, the ability at the same time

to be a good comrade and a considerate chief were particular features which distinguished Ivan Stepanovich Konev.... External severity and taciturnness, and distance were combined in Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov with his emphatically correct, sincere and exceptionally respectful attitude toward others..." (p 312).

The author speaks about working under the leadership of the member of the Politburo of the BCP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, and member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, Andrey Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, as great schooling. Zhdanov was a man of the broadest erudition, charming and simple, strict and exacting on himself and others. In holding a high position in the party, A. A. Zhdanov never played upon his authority, he never set himself apart, although his instructions, recommendations and advice were always accepted for execution since they were profoundly sound.

Lt. Gen V. E. Kravnyukov, a member of the Military Council of the First Ukrainian Front, was an experienced political worker. Konstantin Vasil'yevich [Kraynyukov] had a superior knowledge of party political work and viewed it not as an end in itself but rather as an important means for achieving victory in combat. He did not permit formalism in the indoctrination of people and did not tolerate those who were infatuated with measures for their own sake. He was well known in the troops and respected for a balanced and firm character and for courageous conduct in a combat situation.

The author correctly noted that "extensive experience in party political work which became my calling in life has convinced me that success in these activities is largely determined by the personal qualities of the political worker. The masses of soldiers love not simply prepared and able political workers but also benevolent, optimistic, generous, honest and courageous persons" (p 195). And now Ye. Ye. Mal'tsev right pays particular significance to disclosing the professional qualities of the political workers and the style of their work as important factors.

A true political worker, writes Yevdokim Yegorovich, is one who makes a common cause with everyone, who shares all the hardships of combat life, who is always in the most difficult area, who is concerned not for himself, but for others, for the common cause being carried out by the company, regiment, division, army and front. (p 277).

Ye. Ye. Mal'tsev backs up his judgments about the place and role of party political work with statements by L. I. Brezhnev which profoundly disclose its essence. For example, "this is primarily a human science, that is, a profound knowledge of the thoughts, aspirations and moods of the men.... The success of all party political work... is determined primarily by how the needs of the men, their moral-psychological qualities are studied and considered..." (p 197).

In developing a readiness to carry out a feat, a great deal depends upon the problem of turning ideas into a material force and the ability to introduce communist conviction into the solving of even the most minor daily affairs. The main path to achieving the goal is to make the heart and mind of every soldier aware of the significance of defending his motherland.

Precisely the word, the passionate party word reinforced by deeds, by a personal example in combat, was the main weapon of the political workers. A unity of word and deed at present remains in the forefront in the struggle for communism. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" of 26 April 1979 demands that the ideological cadres eliminate from ideological work the still rarely encountered formalism, the inclination for excessive wordiness, any sort of propaganda cliches, a grey "banal" style of materials, mechanical repetition of general truths instead of their creative analysis and the searching for a lively and applicable form.

The author speaks convincingly about the role of the personal example of the commanders and political workers in conducting party political work. On this level of great cognitive and practical value are the pages of the book where the author takes up the style of work of the commanders and political workers, the political bodies and party-Etasmol organizations and the methods and principles of their leadership over the question of troop indoctrination.

The book teaches the military cadres the art of party political work in the area of increasing combat readiness and the quality of combat training as well as maintaining high discipline and organization in the troops. The commanders and political workers, particularly the young ones, will find in it advice on the organization and conduct of party political work based on a combination of professional competence and the high moral qualities of the indoctrinators. The publishing of the book has been greeted with great interest and approval by the command and political personnel and by the veterans of the Soviet Armed Forces.

However, the value of this useful and necessary book would have been significantly greater if the questions of party political work in the operational Army had been examined in an inseparable link with the specific conditions of the combat operations of the units, formations and field forces in which the author served.

Unfortunately, the book also has certain factual inaccuracies. Thus, on p 159 it is stated that by 31 November 1942 "fundamental changes had occurred on the Soviet-German Front." In actuality, by this time only the encirclement of the enemy grouping at Stalino had been completed, but the destruction of this group lasted until 2 February 1943. The Soviet troops moved toward a completion of the fundamental change through the Kursk Battle and the Battle for the Dnepr (up to the autumn of 1943). As a whole, the reviewed book has been written in a good literary language by a most experienced political worker who went through the severe schooling of the Great Patriotic War from its first to last days. Its rich factual and experiential basis is the guarantee for the book's success among Soviet readers.

REVIEWED: "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1980

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ARMED FORCES

DZERZHINSKIY MILITARY ACADEMY'S 160TH ANNIVERSARY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 84-86

[Article by State Prize winner, Prof, Doctor of Military Sciences, Lt Gen K. Fedorenko, deputy chief of the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy: "The 160th Anniversary of the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy"]

[Text] The History of the Order of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution and Order of Suvorov Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy goes back to the opening of the Artillery School in St. Petersburg on 7 December (25 November) 1820. In 1846, this school became the Mikhaylovskiy School. In the officer classes, this military school for the first time began training artillery troops with a higher military engineering education for the Russian Army. The first chief of the school was Maj Gen A. D. Zasyadko, a prominent scientist in the area of developing combat rockets and the founder of the tactics of their employment. He played a major role in establishing the training process in the school, having paid particular attention here to the questions of the teaching of general scientific and special technical disciplines.

In August 1855, the officer classes of the school were changed into the Mikhaylovskiy Artillery Academy which became a qualitatively new center of artillery scientific thought. Its faculty, in addition to academic work, began to be regularly concerned with scientific research, particularly in the areas of improving artillery weapons and ammunition. The high level of scientific work to a significant degree was determined by the involvement in this of outstanding Russian scientists such as D. I. Mendeliev and P. L. Chebyshev and the students of the academy A. V. Gadolin, N. V. Mayevskiy, K. I. Konstantinov, L. N. Shishkov and others.

At the end of the 19th century, the academy has produced a whole galaxy of prominent designers of Russian weapons: for firearms S. I. Mosin, V. G. Fedorov and S. M. Filatov; for artillery materiel--R. A. Duriyakhov, A. P. Yengel'gardt and N. A. Zabudakiy.

Being the center of leading military and technical thought, the academy could not remain divorced from the social changes occurring in Russian society of these times. Its most progressive representatives from among the faculty and student body were closely linked to the sociopolitical and revolutionary movement of Russia. For precisely this reason, after the Great October Socialist Revolution, the academy

not only maintained its integrity but was one of the first (in February 1918) to begin training command personnel for the young army of the Soviet nation.

On 15 March 1919, the military school began to be called the Artillery Academy of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army]. Prof S. G. Petrovich became its chief and during the years of the Civil War he did a great deal to win the academy faculty over to the side of Soviet power and establish the training process.

In 1923-1924, under the leadership of the academy's chief V. D. Grendal', a number of organizational changes were carried out in it. Three basic faculties were organized: ballistics, mechanical and chemical. Some 19 general scientific and special chairs were opened and the positions of chiefs of chairs and deans of faculties were introduced. On 6 May 1925, the artillery and engineer academies were combined into the Military Technical Academy (VTA) of the RKKA. In July 1926, it was named after F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. During this period, the academy prepared personnel both for the troops and for the defense industry. From its walls there emerged the developers of new artillery equipment such as Hero of Socialist Labor, four-time winner of the State Prize, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Prof, Col Gen Tech Trjn V. G. Grabin, the winners of the State Prize, Doctors of Technical Sciences, Profs, Lt Gen Engr-Tech Serv I. I. Ivanov and Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv M. Ya. Krupchatnikov, D. N. Vlahnevskiy and V. K. Ponomarev.

During these years a major contribution to the development of military science and equipment and to the training of highly-skilled artillery personnel was made by the prominent scientists of the academy, Profs V. A. Alekseyev, A. A. Blagonravov, M. F. Vasil'yev, D. A. Ventsel', P. A. Gel'vikh, I. P. Grave, N. F. Drozdov, V. G. Ufayumov, D. Ye. Kozlovskiy, E. K. Larman, K. K. Snitko and many others.

In the 1920's, the academy (from May 1932, it was again named the Artillery Academy) for the first time began to train specialists for rocket weapons.

For accomplishments in the development of science and technology and the training of personnel for the troops, on 27 March 1938, it received the Order of Lenin.

During the war years, the academy graduated almost 2-fold more artillery officers than over all the previous 120 years. Its faculty carried out many important design and scientific research studies and expert evaluations, and prepared for publishing for the front around 300 various manuals which had a total run of over 20,000 copies. For scientific works and discoveries Profs M. F. Vasil'yev, I. P. Grave, N. F. Drozdov, F. A. Baum and N. A. Levkovich were awarded the USSR State Prize.

Hundreds of academy graduates gave up their lives for the freedom and independence of our motherland. Their names have been engraved on a stela of the memorial complex built on the territory of the academy and dedicated to their memory on 8 May 1978.

During the war years many academy graduates developed into prominent military leaders and operational field forces, the artillery of fronts and armies, and auxiliary formations. They also headed staffs. These included: Mars SU L. A. Lavrent'ev (commanded the Leningrad Front) and K. S. Moskalenko, Chief Mar Art M. I. Bafalin (subsequently first commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops).

Mars Art Yu. P. Bazhanov, V. I. Kazakov, P. N. Kuleshov and G. F. Odintsov, Heroes of the Soviet Union Col Gens P. G. Shafranov and G. V. Poluektov and also Col Gens V. E. Taranovich, I. S. Glebov and others.

For outstanding accomplishments in the training of highly skilled artillery personnel for the Soviet Army, for military achievements to the motherland and on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of the Academy, in 1945 it was awarded the Order of Suvorov First Degree.

During the postwar years the academy has carried out extensive work. In utilizing the very rich experience of the war and the achievements of Soviet military science, it has trained military specialists in various areas. Each year the troops receive highly skilled command and engineer personnel. The academy graduates are able organizers of military and political training in the units and subunits. Year after year the ties of the academy with the troops grow stronger and the experience of its graduates is studied and generalized. On the basis of this the training plans and programs are corrected. The academy maintains close ties with other military schools and scientific research institutions.

The command of the academy, its political section, the party organizations of the faculties and chairs organize all their activities related to the indoctrination of the students and increasing their professional skills in accord with the Decrees of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" and "On the Further Development of the Higher School and Improving the Quality of Specialist Training." The improving of the laboratory and scientific training facilities of the academy is a particular concern for the command, the chairs and the services.

At present, the academy employs a large collective of pedagogues and scientists including Doctors of Sciences, Profs A. I. Alekseyev, S. M. Barbas, L. I. Volkov, Ye. A. Vozdov, V. N. Zakharov, B. I. Nazarov, D. A. Pogorelov, A. V. Solodov, V. S. Sulakvedlidze, A. S. Shatalev and others.

Since the war many of its graduates have become military leaders. These would include A. V. Volkov, M. G. Grigor'yev, A. A. Yegorovskiy, P. T. Levchenko, V. S. Korolchenko, V. G. Privalov, V. V. Okunev, Hero of the Soviet Union M. I. Sobolev, Hero of Socialist Labor F. P. Tonkikh (since September 1969, the chief of the academy) and others. Among the academy graduates are 66 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 16 Heroes of Socialist Labor, 36 Honored Scientists and Technicians of the RSFSR and 17 winners of the Lenin and State Prizes. On the occasion of the 150th anniversary of its founding, in December 1970, the academy was awarded the Order of the October Revolution for great accomplishments in the training of highly skilled command, engineer and scientific pedagogical personnel and in the development of military science.

At present, in approaching the 26th CPSU Congress, the personnel of the academy is honorably carrying out the assumed high socialist obligations and is making a worthy contribution to strengthening the defense might of our motherland.

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AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MODIFIED SA-8 GECKO LAUNCHER DESCRIBED IN GERMAN SOURCE

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 2, feb 81 p 93

[Text] Number of Ground-to-Air Guided Missiles Increased to Six

On the occasion of the 1975 October Anniversary Parade, the Soviet Army for the first time exhibited its most modern, publicly displayed AA guided missile system, the SA-8/GECKO. Since then, this weapons system was presented in its original version during every Moscow parade, including the November 1980 parade (see no 7, 1976, p 5, and no 1, 1981, p 9). As we however already indicated in no 6, 1979, p 309, the original version has been modified in the meantime. This improved weapons system was issued especially to the AA rocket units in the western approaches to the Soviet Union. Here it was presented to the public--hitherto unnoticed by the western media--for the first time during the final parade at the end of the "Arms Comradeship 80" WP [Warsaw Pact] exercise in Magdeburg in September 1980 by an AA rocket element of the GSTD (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany).

In contrast to the known version, the modified SA-8/GECKO is equipped with six instead of four ground-to-air guided missiles, three, each, on both sides of the carrier for the all around search radar. Besides, the guided missiles are no longer placed exposed in the launch frames but are housed in launch containers. In outward appearance they resemble those of the SA-9/GASKIN AA guided missile system but are more than twice as long.

The SA-8/GECKO is particularly distinguished by the fact that it is an autonomous weapons system in which the ground-to-air guided missiles and all required radar units (all around search, target tracking, and fire control radars) are placed together on a carrier vehicle. Each vehicle, with its four-man crew, thus constitutes a firing unit and can be employed flexibly and far forward on the battlefield. The giant range of the hitherto known GECKO guided missile was assumed to be 12,000 meters and its effective altitude was believed to be about 9,500 meters. An improvement of these performance data seems possible in the case of the modified guided missile.

The AA regiments of the Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions are being equipped with the SA-8/GECKO weapons system. In some division it will replace the still existing 37-mm S-60 AA guns. By increasing the number of ground-to-air guided

missiles ready for firing by 50 percent, the firepower of this modern weapons system was further increased and protection for combat units against enemy aircraft attacking at low and medium altitudes was considerably improved. Moreover, resupply and reloading are facilitated and speeded up due to the placement of the guided missiles in the launch containers.



Figure 1. SA-9/GECKO AA guided missile system in the hitherto known version.



Figure 2. The modified SA-9/GECKO AA guided missile system during the parade in Magdeburg in September 1980.

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GROUND FORCES

AIRBORNE COMMANDER ON 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF PARATROOPERS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 28-31

(Text)

This month the Soviet airborne troops mark their 50th anniversary. Paratroopers courageously fought the Nazi German invaders during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) and took part in the rout of imperialist Japan in the summer of 1945. In the postwar period they have been fulfilling with honour the assigned missions to safeguard the Soviet people's peaceful labour.

Our correspondent asked Colonel-General D. S. Sukhorukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Airborne Troops, the following questions.

In their letters our readers often ask us to tell about the airborne troops, their history and traditions. Will you please comply with this request?

August 2, 1930, is considered as the birthday of the Soviet airborne troops. On that day a parachute detachment was dropped during a manoeuvre to fulfil a combat training mission. This was an attempt to determine the prospects of using such forces and to test the servicemen's combat readiness. At the time we had little experience in landing troops in combat situations. In the spring of 1929 a group of Red Army men was dropped in Tajikistan to destroy a Basmachi band in cooperation with the local population.

Of course, modern airborne troops are now as-



sociated primarily with powerful and diverse weapons and equipment. However, they had a long way to traverse before becoming what they are today. In 1932 the Revolutionary Military Council¹ issued a directive saying that the development of aircraft equipment and the results achieved in designing and building facilities for airlifting cargoes, fighting vehicles and men had made it possible to create qualitatively new units and formations. This directive provided the basis for organising airborne troops on a mass scale.

During the subsequent years weapons and combat equipment were improved and qualified personnel trained. To this end, it was necessary to attract the people's, first and foremost young people's, attention and arouse their interest and desire to serve in the airborne troops. On the initiative of the YCL organisation thousands of boys and girls joined parachute clubs, schools and groups, which helped considerably to popularise the new fighting arm.

The young people's striving for the unknown and their desire to test themselves in overcoming difficulties did not fail to bear fruit. Professional skills improved quickly and characters hardened. In 1935 a large group of paratroopers was awarded the Orders of Lenin and of the Red Star. When presenting the decorations M. I. Kalinin² told the recipients how important it was for a paratrooper to be able to get his bearings and take the correct decision behind the enemy lines. He stressed the importance of developing the necessary qualities. As events have shown, paratroopers have always been distinguished for their courage and resolution in fighting numerically superior enemy forces. These qualities were particularly manifest during the Great Patriotic War.

Could you please give us some more details?

It is known that the German attack on the Soviet Union was an act of perfidy. Moreover, in the beginning of the war the Soviet airborne troops deployed in the Baltic region, Byelorussia

and the Ukraine were just being formed and organised. The difficult situation forced the Soviet Command to commit them to battle as infantry formations.

However, in the initial battles of the first period of the war at Kiev, Odessa and on the Kerch Peninsula small tactical landing forces were used. The first major paratroop dropping was performed early in 1942 at Yuhnov and Vyazma on the Western Front, when an airborne corps numbering over 10,000 troops was dropped. This was a complete surprise for the enemy, who found in his rear not a company, a battalion or even a regiment, but a whole corps. The paratroopers made wide use of the element of surprise. Their strikes combined with quick manoeuvres were dealt at the most unexpected places to sow terror among the nazis.

The paratroopers operated in the enemy rear for nearly six months. During this time they fought their way for more than 600 km, liberating about 200 inhabited localities, killing some 15,000 officers and men and destroying large quantities of weapons and equipment. This was substantial support for the forces operating from the front.

In autumn 1943, the airborne forces made a weighty contribution to the rout of the nazis during the battle for the Dnieper by supporting the forces of the Voronezh Front in assault crossing the river.

Although the landing was performed at night in a very complicated situation, the men displayed courage and heroism. Lieutenant-Colonel P. Sidorchuk's brigade particularly distinguished itself. For several days it carried out active reconnaissance and sabotage actions behind the enemy lines, after which it delivered a surprise blow to capture several enemy strong points and enable the advancing forces to force the river quickly.

Paratroopers also fought the nazi invaders staunchly at Minsk, courageously defended Kiev, barred the way to the nazis at Moscow, doggedly fought at Odessa, in the Caucasus and the Crimea, on the Volga and the Dnieper, took part in liberating Budapest and Vienna, and stormed Berlin.

During the Great Patriotic War the airborne troops were provided chiefly with small arms. In spite of this they often achieved success. What helped our fighting men to gain the upper hand over a not only numerically superior, but also better armed enemy!

There are many reasons for this, the main one being our men's high morale, devotion to their Motherland, readiness for self-sacrifice and, naturally, excellent special training level.

Certain people believe that it is sufficient for a soldier to learn to jump with a parachute to become a good paratrooper. However, to fulfil a combat mission successfully, he must be able to fight on the ground.

The specifics of paratrooper training are determined by their purpose, i. e. to fight in the enemy rear. If we consider this training stage-wise, we shall see that it begins long before the "Jump!" command is given. It is rightfully said that the road to the skies begins on the ground. And although this is usually said by airmen, it is fully applicable to paratroopers, because the paratrooper is only minutes under the parachute canopy in the air, while whole weeks are often spent on the ground in the enemy rear to carry out different tasks, e.g. to conduct reconnaissance, approach enemy ammunition depots and communications undetected, "remove" sentries noiselessly, blow up bridges and destroy control posts.

I believe that the following comparison will be most appropriate. Take, for example, an ordinary infantry and an airborne subunit. As a rule, infantrymen closed in with the enemy and became involved in a combat situation gradually. Their actions were generally preceded by thorough reconnaissance and powerful artillery bombardment. Besides, they acted in cooperation with their neighbours and constantly felt their support.

Things were quite different with the paratroopers, their main weapons being surprise, swiftness and manoeuvre combined with accurate fire. A paratrooper engaged the enemy while still under the parachute canopy, with limited information on the enemy's forces and potentialities. While still in the air, he prepared the landing area by firing. Immediately on touching the ground he attacked the designated target or objective resolutely, then held the seized line or cleared out the next mission. Success was ensured by paratroopers' high individual and team field training level. Combat operations being conducted in the enemy rear, the fighting men's best allies

were courage, initiative, resourcefulness and military cunning. Stunning blows, a well thought-out combat formation and swift advance combined with accurate fire were characteristic of paratroop attacks and brought them victory.

Such were paratroopers' actions in routing imperialist Japan's Kwantung Army in August 1945. Landing at several places simultaneously in the depth of the enemy defences, they quickly captured important objectives and promoted a quick advance of the forces operating from the front.

Paratroopers' services during the Great Patriotic War won universal acclaim. All airborne formations were awarded the title of Guards formations. Thousands of privates, sergeants and officers were decorated with Orders and medals, and 196 paratroopers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

As a result of the scientific and technological revolution in the military field during the post-war period, the airborne troops have developed into a qualitatively new fighting arm. The high saturation of subunits with intricate and diverse equipment has naturally brought to the fore the problem of the correlation between man and equipment. Which is, in your opinion, the dominating component in this correlation?

Scientific and technological progress has brought about the development of weapons and combat equipment into complicated multipurpose systems and caused a real revolution in the military field. The level of technological development today allows tanks, guns and motor vehicles to be airlifted and dropped together with men. The airborne troops have in service air-transportable self-propelled artillery, rocket, antitank and anti-aircraft weapons, fighting vehicles, automatic small arms, and reliable control and communication facilities. Air transportation equipment allows landing parties and cargoes to be dropped in any weather and on any terrain, by day and by night and on limited areas. However, this in no way means that man's role has decreased. On the contrary, the new equipment makes higher demands on the men who use and service it.

Hence the increased significance of special training, imaginative thinking, a differentiated approach to solving practical problems and all-round development of the soldier's intellectual and physical capabilities.

Each paratrooper's responsibility for the crew's, section's or subunit's fulfilling the mission has also

increased. The most up-to-date equipment with its immense destructive power has considerably raised the demands on the men's moral and combat qualities. In other words, the man's increased role is an objective consequence of the scientific and technological revolution in the military field.

And this is not at all surprising, for the man with his high moral, political, psychological and fighting qualities, whom no weapon or equipment in itself can replace, has always been the decisive force in war.

To act successfully in most complicated situations, paratroopers must naturally be well trained. What is the main thing in their training?

For paratroopers as for all servicemen in general, there are no secondary matters, for no allowances can be made in battle. Victory is won by those who are better trained. Therefore, paratroopers' combat training and political education are organised so as to teach them to act skillfully in any situation. They train on trampoline nets, looping swings and in gyro wheels, and jump from a special structure without a parachute.

Practical training is combined with theoretical lessons. All this is done to develop the service-

men's ability to retain self-control in the most critical situations.

Now I shall give you an example of paratroopers' practical training. An area is chosen on the map and an airborne subunit is dropped there. To fulfil a combat training mission, the servicemen have to go dozens of kilometres through forests, over mountains and marshes, to find and equip a place for the night and to remain undetected by the "enemy." The paratroopers cope successfully with these tasks.

On the whole, service in the airborne troops develops not only the qualities characteristic of our fighting arm. In two years of service the men develop morally and mature spiritually to become patriots and internationalists. In their daily military labour the paratroopers display high political consciousness, which is manifested in successful fulfilment of socialist obligations, in increasingly great numbers of men with excellent results in combat training and political education, in concerted actions during exercises, in strengthening discipline and military order and in enhanced combat readiness. In the army, including the airborne troops, the men are taught not only to drive fighting vehicles, to fire or jump with a parachute. Military service in the Soviet Armed Forces is primarily a school for developing self-restraint and discipline, where each soldier acquires profound technical, professional and political knowledge. Thus, the two years of service leave their deep imprint on the men's whole life.

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CSO: 1812

GROUND FORCES

ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT IN THE BOBRUYSK OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 18-24

[Article by Maj Art K. Kazakov: "The Combat Employment of Artillery in Breaking Through Defenses in the Bobruysk Operation"]

[Text] The defeat of the Nazi troops in Belorussia was a vivid page in the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War. In this strategic offensive operation conducted by the troops of four fronts, along with the other branches of ground forces, a major role was played by the artillery which made crushing strikes against the enemy personnel, equipment and fortifications, in clearing the path for the infantry and the tanks. Its significance was greatest in breaking through prepared enemy defenses which included five defensive lines.

The present article examines the questions of the combat employment of artillery in breaking through enemy defenses by the troops of the First Belorussian Front (artillery commander, Col Gen Art V. I. Kazakov) in the Bobruysk Operation. In comparison with the other fronts, it had the strongest artillery grouping and the use of its artillery was marked by a number of particular features.

According to the plan of HqSHC, the troops of the front were to rout the Bobruysk enemy grouping and reach the region of Pukhovichi, Slutsk and Osipovichi.

In carrying out the designated mission, the commander of the front, Arm Gen K. K. Rokossovsky, decided to make two strikes along converging axes: one by the forces of the 1st and 48th armies from the region to the north of Rogachev in the general direction of Bobruysk, Osipovichi; the other with the forces of the 65th and 28th armies and the horse-mechanized group (KMG) from the region to the south of Parichi in the general direction of Staryye Foregi and Slutsk.

During the period of preparing for the operation, the artillery commanders and staffs of the front, armies, corps and divisions as well as the commanders of the units and subunits had to carry out many most diverse tasks. Due to the fact that the Red Army possessed the necessary amount of artillery and air reconnaissance facilities, the enemy defenses had been reconnoitered sufficiently fully while the artillery staffs promptly received data without which it would have been impossible to plan firing. The artillery troops had done a great deal to fill out the units with personnel as well as weapons, traction units, instruments and other equipment and they had also repaired the military equipment.

Many difficulties were encountered in organizing the bringing up of the artillery units and formations which arrived by rail on the front into the areas of the forthcoming combat operations. From the Reserve of the SHC (RVGK), the front was reinforced by the 26th Artillery Breakthrough Division, the 30th Guards Brigade and the 157th Canon Artillery Brigade, the 122d and 124th Heavy Howitzer Artillery brigades, the 3d and 4th Corps Artillery brigades and the 315th and 317th Separate Special Artillery battalions.¹ By the start of the operation, the 12th Artillery Breakthrough Division of the IV Artillery Breakthrough Corps had been returned to the front; upon instructions from Headquarters this had been in the region of Bryansk for bringing up to full strength. As a total in the zone of the front, 36 artillery and mortar regiments arriving by rail from the RVGK were to arrive in the zone of the front. Moreover, 60 regiments were assigned from the reserve of the front to the battle formations on its right wing. Four units were shifted from the left wing of the front into the zone of operations of the assault groupings.

Over a short period of time, from 14 through 19 June 1944, the artillery staff of the front had to receive 67 railroad trains with artillery and in accord with the plan organize their unloading at six stations on the Shatsilki--Kalinkovichi leg which was the closest to the front line. Here they planned to unload a large number of trains with tanks, rifle troops, ammunition, fuel and other important freight. Here the Belorussian Railroad was unable to handle such a load. As a result of the developing situation, the dates the artillery was to be ready for combat might not have been met. For the purpose of saving time, the decision was made to unload certain trains at other, more remote stations so that the remaining distance of 130-200 km would be covered by the artillery formations and units under their own power. Only the most mobile regiments and brigades armed with 120-mm mortars, 76-mm canons and 120-mm howitzers could handle this mission. However, it was not precisely known in what trains these units were to be found. For this reason all the questions related to the routing of the trains and the organizing of the moving of the artillery units to the concentration areas were settled by groups of staff officers sent to the spot. Difficulties also arose with fuel, as the arriving units, in counting on a comparatively short march, did not have a sufficient amount of it. However, due to the promptly taken measures, fuel supply was provided directly at the unloading stations. For this reason, even those units which arrived a little late succeeded in participating in the artillery support for the advancing troops.

Thus, by the start of the operation, in the four armies on the right wing of the front, a very significant artillery grouping had been created numbering around 9,000 guns and mortars (not counting antiaircraft artillery) and 149 field rocket launchers.² This operation, more full, than all the previous ones, realized the idea of the massed use of artillery in the main sectors in accord with the tasks entrusted to the field forces and formations. Thus, in the 3d Army, on the sector of the main thrust, there was concentrated over 80 percent of all the available RVGK artillery, with more than 80 percent in the 28th Army and 100 percent in the 4th and 5th armies. And along with the organic artillery of the army assault groupings, 70-80 percent of all the artillery of the field forces was active in the breakthrough sectors. From 8 to 11 artillery and mortar regiments were concentrated in the zone of each of the rifle divisions, that is, 3-4-fold more than rifle ones. Here one should point out that by the start of the Belorussian Operation, the 3rd Belorussian Front included the 11th Guards Motor Division and 11th

artillery divisions. And four artillery divisions (the 5th, 12th, 22d and 26th adp [artillery breakthrough division]) and the Fifth Guards Mortar Division were used in the armies on the right wing of the front.

Such a decisive concentration of artillery in the sector of the main thrust made it possible to create a density reaching 207-223 guns and mortars per kilometer of front on the army breakthrough sectors.

The artillery grouping in the armies was created on a basis of the instructions of the artillery commander of the front and these were approved by the military council.

In all the field forces, with the exception of the 48th Army, long-range army groups and demolition groups were formed. In the 28th Army, an army breakthrough group was created consisting of the IV Artillery Breakthrough Corps (without three brigades), and in the 3d, 48th and 65th armies, army rocket launcher groups.

Corps artillery groups were not formed. Only in the CXXVIII Rifle Corps of the 28th Army was there a corps artillery counterbattery group.

In the rifle divisions of all armies in the assault groupings artillery groups were formed for infantry support according to the number of first echelon regiments; in essence these represented regimental artillery groups.

In the regiments of those rifle divisions which lacked divisional groups, as a rule, mortar groups were organized out of regulation mortars and groups of weapons set for direct laying.

It must be pointed out that although the artillery grouping basically met the missions of the operation, it also had shortcomings. In particular, the large number of army artillery groups led to a situation where the corps were not sufficiently reinforced with artillery, corps groups were not created (with rare exception), nor were there actually any divisional groups.

In preparing for the operation, great significance was given to the planning of artillery support for the Bobruysk Operation. The artillery staff of the front worked out instructions for the use of artillery in the operation, for organizing and carrying out a double rolling barrage and the schedule for artillery softening up.

The artillery staffs of the front and the armies showed particular care in planning all three periods of the artillery offensive and artillery support for committing the mobile groups to the breach. The duration of the artillery softening up was set at 2 hours and 5 minutes. This was organized in the following manner: 15- and 20-minute intense shell fire at the beginning and end with a 90-minute period between them for destroying the observable targets and neutralizing the enemy artillery and mortar batteries. The comparatively long duration of the demolition period was explained by the nature of the enemy defenses which had many protective works.

Of special interest was the organization of the artillery softening up for the infantry and tank attack. In this operation, for the first time in the war, on an

operational scale in the 65th and 28th armies this was carried out with a double rolling barrage. Since this method was new and it was not known in the troops, the artillery staff of the front had to work out detailed instructions both on the organizing and carrying out support for the infantry and tank attack by the double rolling barrage combined with the subsequent concentration of fire.⁵ This document gave the necessary calculations for the consumption of shells according to the lines of the rolling barrage. The use of the double rolling barrage greatly increased the reliability of support for the infantry and tank attack, it raised the rate of their advance and made it possible to cause great damage to the enemy and effectively restrict its maneuvering.

The artillery supply bodies carried out great and difficult work. In the four armies operating in the main sector alone, not counting the supplies at the front-line dumps, there were concentrated around 4 million shells and mortar shells of all calibers. This fully met the demand of artillery for ammunition.

In all the armies there was centralized control of the artillery. Communication was organized along the line of the command and observation posts as well as the staffs.

Combat preparation in the armies was carried out on the basis of the instructions of the artillery staff of the front and the general plans for the combat preparation of the troops of the field forces.

Thus, in the 65th Army (artillery commander, Maj Gen Art I. S. Beskin), from 29 May through 2 June 1944, joint exercises were conducted for the rifle and artillery subunits.⁶ From 12 through 20 June, in the corps of this field force, exercises were held on the subject "The Offensive of a Rifle Battalion with Moving Barrage Support."

In the 28th Army (artillery commander, Maj Gen Art P. N. Petropavlovskiy), courses were held for the artillery chiefs of staff of the rifle corps and divisions where they worked through the questions of planning the offensive with support for the attack by a double rolling barrage.

Analogous measures occurred in the remaining armies of the front assault groupings.

The Bobruysk Operation commenced on 24 June. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force conducted in all the armies of the right wing of the front during the night of 23 June. And on the night of 24 June, not long before the start of the artillery softening up, there was an air reconnaissance of the system of enemy defenses in the sectors of the main thrusts of the armies. The night bomber aviation made bombing raids against enemy airfields in the region of Bobruysk as well as destroyed enemy personnel concentrated 5-30 km from the forward edge. As a total it made 280 aircraft sorties.

Behind the aviation preparations followed the artillery softening up in full accord with the established schedule. In the 3d and 48th armies, this started at 0355 hours, and in the 65th and 28th armies, at 0455 hours. It must be pointed out that the intense shell fire by the end of the artillery softening up was carried out with an increase up to the maximum capability of the guns, as follows:

25 percent of the rated capacity in the first 5 minutes, 50 percent in the second 5, 75 percent in the third 5 minutes, and 100 percent in the fourth 5 minutes. In terms of power and nature this differed little from a rolling barrage. The artillery softening up was very effective. The intense firing of thousands of guns, mortars and rocket launchers shook the enemy defenses and caused it severe losses. The enemy artillery and mortar batteries and the infantry weapons were dependably suppressed while troop control was disrupted.

Immediately after the artillery softening up, the infantry and the supporting tanks of all the armies of the assault groupings went decisively into the attack. Where the artillery support for the attack was carried out in a double rolling barrage (in the zones of the 28th and 65th armies), the enemy was so neutralized that initially it could not put up organized resistance. To the depth of the rolling barrage, that is, to 1.5-2 km, our infantry advanced virtually without losses and significantly faster than was planned.

During the first day of the operation, the troops of the 3d Army (artillery commander, Lt Gen Art N. N. Semenov) and the 48th Army (artillery commander, Maj Gen Art I. I. Timotiyevich), in overcoming fierce enemy resistance, advanced a total of 2-4 km. One of the reasons for the slow momentum of advance was the poor organization of the crossing over the Drut' River and insufficient preparations for crossing its swampy floodplain. For this reason the artillery fell behind and the infantry, without the necessary artillery support, was unable to exploit the success into the depth of the enemy defenses.

During the night of 25 June, the troops of the 3d and 48th armies conducted stubborn battles in repelling enemy counterattacks. The artillery continuously crossed the Drut'. The artillery units which crossed immediately deployed on the western bank of the river and entered battle. This significantly contributed to the successful repelling of enemy counterattacks.

In the morning of 26 June, after the artillery softening up which lasted 45 minutes, the troops of the 3d Army resumed the offensive. The artillery supported the infantry and tanks using a method of successive fire concentration. But the enemy continued to put up stubborn resistance, using the previously prepared defensive lines. During the day it made 16 counterattacks which were repelled. The advance of our troops continued but at a slow pace. The momentum picked up with the committing to battle at noon of the 95th and 108th Tank brigades from the 1X Tank Corps which had also received the 584th Tank Destroyer Regiment. By the end of the day the troops had reached the Dobritsa River and had captured several enemy strongpoints.

A 30-minute artillery softening up was carried out in the morning of 25 June in the zones of advance of the XLII and XXIX Rifle corps from the 48th Army. This started by a 20-minute demolition period and ended with 10 minutes of intense shell fire. In the zone of the LIII Rifle Corps the artillery softening up lasted 20 minutes. After the artillery softening up, the formations of the 48th Army resumed the offensive. The enemy resisted fiercely. The intensity of the battles can be judged from the pitch of the struggle for the enemy strongpoint in Nikolayevka where there were stone buildings with thick walls and strong cellars. In carrying out flanking fire from the strongpoint, the Nazis held up the advance of

units from the XXIX Rifle Corps. Only the artillery could break the enemy resistance here. Several 152-mm guns which were issued around 200 shells were brought up for direct laying against the stone buildings. In many places they succeeded in demolishing the walls but the firing continued from the cellars. Then the artillery commander, Gen I. I. Timotiyevich ordered that fire be concentrated against the strongpoint by the army long-range artillery group consisting of 72 guns of 152-mm caliber. As a result of this intense shell fire, the strongpoint was completely demolished and the Nazis defending it were destroyed.

When the enemy began to rapidly pull back its troops, the army long-range group, the firing of which was corrected with the help of spotter pilots, made several intense firings against the roads and bridges in areas which were 6-8 km distant from the forward edge. As a result the enemy columns of motor vehicles and military equipment advancing toward Bobruysk suffered heavy losses.

Along with the tasks of direct support for the advancing infantry and tanks, the artillery also supported the crossing of water obstacles. For example, on 25 June, the artillery of the 48th Army reinforced by two rocket launcher regiments assigned from the 3d Army, securely supported the crossing of the Dnepr.

The troops of the 65th and 28th armies advanced more successfully and they broke through the main enemy defensive zone along a 20-km front. The greatest success was achieved by the XVIII Rifle Corps of the 65th Army which by 1300 hours of 24 June had advanced 5-6 km and captured strongpoints in Rakovich and Petrovichi. For exploiting the success of the 65th Army, from the region of Chernin the 1 Guards Tank Corps was committed to the formed breach. By the end of the day it had advanced up to 20 km and the formations of the XIX Rifle Corps following it had advanced up to 11 km and thereby carried out the mission of the day.

It is interesting to note the following. The artillery fire of the 65th Army during the artillery softening up and the support of the attack was so effective that by the time the 1 Guards Tank Corps had been committed to the breach, the enemy had still not recovered from the intense shell fire and was unable to put up organized resistance. For this reason it was not even necessary to use the artillery assigned to this formation.

The troops of the 28th Army, by 1200 hours of 24 June, had completed the breakthrough of the main enemy defensive zone and by evening, in cooperation with troops from the 65th Army, had advanced to a depth of up to 11 km, having widened the breakthrough front to 33 km. In this manner it was possible to create the necessary conditions for committing the KMG of Lt Gen I. A. Pliyev to the breach and exploit the success in the direction of Bobruysk. The committing of the KMG to the breakthrough was to be supported by the assigned First Artillery Tank Destroyer Brigade, the three rocket launcher regiments and a battalion of the 22d Guards Mortar Brigade.⁷

It must be emphasized that the support for the advancing infantry and tanks involved definite difficulties. The moving of the artillery battle formations was frequently held up due to the fact that the enemy had blown up bridges in retreating. The artillery troops, without waiting for the field engineer subunits, often rebuilt them themselves and often hand-carried weapons across swampy terrain.

The 65th and 28th armies achieved the greatest success on 25 June. The troops of the 65th Army, with the continuous artillery support, advanced along northern and northwestern axes a distance of 20-25 km and cleared the enemy out of 40 population points. The leading units of the I Guards Tank Corps with the assigned subunits from the Third Guards Artillery Tank Destroyer Brigade had advanced a distance of up to 30 km. The troops of the 28th Army crossed the Tremiya River without a pause and began to pursue the retreating enemy units. During the second half of the day of 25 June, in the zone of the army a KMG was committed to the breach and by evening it had captured the population points of Ratmirovichi and Rabkor. In utilizing its success, the troops of the 65th and 28th armies on the same day widened the breakthrough to 45 km along the front and advanced another 10-12 km into the enemy defenses.

With the dawn of 26 June, the breaking through of enemy defenses was continued. The troops of the 3d Army, after a brief but strong artillery and aviation softening up, broke through the prepared enemy defenses at Dobritsa and conducted a rapid offensive to the west and southwest. The enemy began to retreat destroying its equipment.

The 48th Army was waging stubborn battles against the enemy on the captured bridgeheads on the Dobryna River. In repelling the Nazi counterattacks, a particularly important role was played by the artillery regiment of the 217th Rifle Division which was deployed on the river bank and with point-blank direct laying fired on the counterattacking enemy. By the end of the day the troops of the field force had captured Zhlobin.

The offensive of the 28th Army continued successfully on 26 June. In utilizing the success of the KMG, by the end of the day it had advanced to the Ptich' River and, having crossed this water obstacle, captured Glusk. The crossing of the river was supported by the IV Artillery Breakthrough Corps.

In the course of the offensive of the 65th Army, its CV Rifle Corps on 26 June encountered stubborn resistance from the Nazi units in the strongpoint of Parichi which had a large number of weapons. Only after the artillery had concentrated the fire of several artillery brigades and regiments on Parichi did the formations of the corps crush enemy resistance and capture this strongpoint.

Thus, on 26 June the enemy defenses had been broken. The troops of the First Belorussian Front reached the approaches to Bobruysk and by the morning of 27 June had encircled the enemy grouping to the southeast of the city.

In summing up, it is essential to point out that the artillery in breaking through defenses in the Bobruysk Operation carried out the set missions. Here an important role was played by its rational distribution between the armies on the right wing of the First Belorussian Front, by the careful planning of combat operations and by able organization of the combat training for the artillery units and formations during the period of preparing for the operation.

The combat employment of the artillery was based upon the principle of its massing in the breakthrough sectors. In the course of the offensive, extensive use was made of massed fire from concealed firing positions and direct laying and the

skillful maneuvering of fire and guns for the purpose of creating superiority over the enemy artillery on the major sectors.

It must also be pointed out that in the Bobruysk Operation for the first time a double rolling barrage was employed on an operational scale.

One should also note the artillery support for the committing of the army mobile groups to the breach; this was carefully planned in the fronts and armies and ably carried out. In particular, for these purposes in the 65th and 28th armies, the concentrated fire was prepared by sections on lines with a total depth of, respectively, 3 and 5 km.

The experience of the combat employment of artillery in breaking through enemy defenses during the Bobruysk Operation can be used in the combat training of our troops today.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 233, inv. 2356, file 10, sheet 43.
2. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1964, p 77.
3. "Osvobozhdeniye Belorussii 1944" [The Liberation of Belorussia in 1944], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, p 499.
4. TsAMO, folio 233, inv. 2356, file 10, sheets 56, 246-259.
5. Ibid., sheets 110, 206.
6. "Osvobozhdeniye Belorussii 1944," p 504.
7. G. T. Zakharov, "Sovetskaya Artilleriya v Vitebsko-Orshanskoy, Mogilevskoy i Bobruvskoy Operatsiyakh" [Soviet Artillery in the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruysk Operations], Voenizdat, 1952, p 160.

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CSO: 8144/0686

GROUND FORCES

WARTIME RIFLE BATTALION'S DEFENSIVE BATTLE DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 25-29

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Gruzdev: "Defensive Combat of a Rifle Battalion"]

[Text] By the start of July 1943, the 69th Rifle Division of the 65th Army was on the defensive on the Kursk Salient on a front extending 12 km, from Berezovka to Khlebtovo (15 km to the southwest of Zelenaya Roshcha).¹ In the zone of the division, a deeply echeloned defense had been created with an extensive system of trenches. As an average per kilometer of front, there were 4 guns and 11 mortars. The intensity of small arms and machine gun fire was 4-6 bullets a minute.

The 120th Rifle Regiment which had three rifle battalions and other subunits was positioned on the division's right flank and was defending the sector of Berezovka, elev. 2331.1, Zelenaya Roshcha, along a front 5 km wide and 2 km deep. The forward edge of its defenses ran along the southwestern slopes of elev. 2331.1, a ravine (600 m to the north of Samara) and Zelenaya Roshcha. The battle formation was organized in two echelons: in the first the 3d and 2d Rifle battalions, and in the second (behind the left flank of the regiment) the 1st Rifle Battalion without the 3d Rifle Company (the reserve of the division commander).²

The 3d Rifle Battalion (commander, Capt N. M. Smakhtin) was holding the defenses on the right flank of the regiment, occupying the area of elev. 2331.1, height 229.4, and the western slopes of a nameless elevation (700 m to the southwest of height 222.4). The defensive front was 2 km and had a depth up to 1.5 km. The battle formation was in two echelons. The right flank of the first was defended by the 8th Rifle Company and the left by the 9th. In the second echelon behind the 8th Rifle Company there was the 7th Rifle Company, and in the rear of the 9th Rifle Company, in the area of height 229.4 (req.), height 222.4, the 258th Separate Army Company which was directly under the division commander.³

In the three rifle companies and in a platoon of machine gunners of the 3d Rifle Battalion there were 199 men, with 21 men in the mortar company.⁴

Support during combat was provided by the 1st and 2d battalions of the 118th Artillery Regiment and the 218th Army Mortar Regiment.

In front of the 120th Rifle Regiment subunits of the 133d Infantry Regiment of the 45th German Infantry Division were on the defensive. The enemy's forward edge ran along a line of height 222.0, 200 m to the east of Sovitsa, 400 m to the north of the settlements of Samara and Yamnyy. Wire obstacles stretched in front of the enemy's forward edge and there were antitank and antipersonnel minefields.⁵

The Nazis had decided, by the forces of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the 133d Infantry Regiment from the 45th Infantry Division, to capture elev. 233.1 which prevailed over the surrounding terrain and made it possible from our side to view the enemy defenses to a great depth.

The 1st Infantry Battalion was located in the area of Kavelino (20 km to the southwest of Berezovka) where for several days it had been preparing for combat. During the night of 8 July, it was regrouped in the region of Sovitsa. The battalion consisted of three infantry companies and one machine gun company. It was reinforced by three 75-mm and two 150-mm guns. In the infantry companies with 110-120 men, there were 3 medium machine guns, 8 light machine guns, 11-15 submachine guns, 2-3 company machine guns and 3 flamethrowers. The machine gun company numbering 150 men possessed 12 medium machine guns and 6 81-mm mortars.⁶

The actions of the battalion were supported by a battalion of 105-mm guns (four batteries), two batteries of 75-mm guns and six 6-barrel mortars.⁷

The ratio of forces on 8 July 1943 was approximately 3:1 in the enemy's favor and it had an absolute superiority in flamethrowers and 6-barrel mortars.

In the defensive area of the 3d Rifle Battalion, one continuous trench was dug running along the forward edge and two broken ones. In the second and third trenches there were full-sized two-man fire trenches with two or three sectors in the parapets for firing. These were connected by communications trenches the depth of which (1.8 m) provided concealment of movement along the entire battalion defensive zone.

The firing positions of the guns to be used for direct laying and the antitank rifles and mortars were made full section with shelters for materiel, personnel and niches for ammunition. All the PTR [antitank rifles] were adapted for firing at aircraft. The pillboxes with two or three firing slits were covered by three or four layers of logs 25-30 cm thick and an earth cover 1 m thick. For each platoon (battery) there was one field-type dugout with a cover of three-four layers of logs for the personnel.⁸

Within the battalion defensive zone, a battalion antitank center was created and the fire plan here was organized with a combination of obstacles, the firing of antitank weapons, antitank rifles and artillery from covered firing positions. All the crews had set their guns ahead of time for the lines of the probable appearance of Nazi tanks. On the firing charts of the gun commanders, the distances to them and the settings were given. The basic mass of men and equipment was concentrated in the area of elev. 233.1 (the right flank of the battalion). During the night of 4 July, the combat engineers built little-noticeable obstacles, antitank and antipersonnel minefields in front of the forward edge in the sectors of the probable enemy advance.

In organizing cooperation, Capt N. M. Smakhtin proceeded from the view that the Nazis could simultaneously start the offensive on the flanks and in the center of the battalion defensive area. In this regard a procedure was established for concentrating fire and maneuvering the men and equipment. Each officer firmly knew the signals for cooperation, warning and target designation.


The terrain in the region of combat operations was semicovered, medium-rugged, with brush-covered ravines and accessible to tanks. The road network was well developed and the roads were dirt. From elev. 233.1 it was possible to see the enemy defenses to a significant depth. From 5 through 8 July, enemy reconnaissance aviation had conducted 21 aircraft overflights in the zone of the 69th Rifle Division. The basic object of air reconnaissance were the forested area to the east and southeast of Samara and the forest to the south of Novara (10 km to the south of Vlasovka).⁹ By observation it was established that from 4 through 8 July the opposing enemy had increased the number of weapons and large-caliber artillery had appeared to the southeast of the Lopandino Sovkhoz. During the night of 8 July, in the region of Sovitsa, noise, conversation and individual commands could be heard. The enemy soldiers were felling trees, cutting down brush, clearing arcs of fire for the weapons which were to fire with direct laying.

The commander of the division ordered the units and subunits to be brought to full combat readiness, to increase vigilance and strengthen observation.

During the night of 6 July, the Nazis covertly removed the wire obstacles on a sector from elev. 220.0 to the southwestern edge of Sovitsa, a distance of 800 m. During the second half of the day on a nameless elevation (500 m to the east of height 212.0), our observers spotted two reconnaissance groups. The interest which the enemy had shown on following days in elev. 233.1 and his removal of the wire obstacles in front of it were reason to assume that it was preparing for offensive actions. During the night and day of 8 July, in individual sectors the Nazis carried out weak rifle and machine gun fire. At 2100 hours, from the regions of Uporoy, Sotsializm, Korobova, Sovitsa and the Lopandino Sovkhoz, they opened up heavy artillery and mortar fire against elev. 233.1 and partially against Zelenaya Roshcha. During the artillery shelling lasting 20 minutes, along the entire front from elev. 222.0 to Yammy the Nazis set out a smokescreen. At 2120 hours, the enemy artillery bracketed elev. 233.1, and upon the signal of a series of rockets the enemy opened up with heavy rifle and machine gun fire along the entire front.

At 2130 hours, under the cover of fire and a smokescreen, the 2d and 3d infantry companies of 133d Nazi Infantry Regiment from the region of Sovitsa went over to an attack against elev. 233.1. The attack was made in the direction of our battle outposts which were in slit trenches under tanks hit in previous battles and against the boundary of the 8th and 9th rifle companies.¹⁰

By a signal (red rockets) the battle outposts warned the 8th Rifle Company of the start of the enemy offensive and, in meeting the Nazis with strong submachine, rifle and machine gun fire, caused it great losses. However, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, it was forced to retreat along the communications trenches to the positions of the 8th Rifle Company which was in the first trench. The retreat was covered by Pvt K. I. Vafin who, being severely wounded, fired his light machine gun.



The engagement of the 3d Rifle Battalion
in the region of elev. 233.1 of 8 July 1943.

Key: 1--First enemy attack undertaken at 2130 hours; 2--Position of enemy after unsuccessful first attack; 3--Second enemy attack undertaken at 2200 hours; 4--Destruction of enemy group which had broken in; 5--Retreat of enemy to initial position.

A group of Nazis numbering 50-60 men advanced against the squad under the command of MSgt A. I. Sobolev; this was on the defensive as part of the left-flank platoon of the 8th Rifle Company. Although the enemy encountered heavy fire, it succeeded

in drawing 40-50 m closer to our trench. Then A. I. Sobolev jumped out of the trench, ran 10-15 m, ducked into a shell crater and opened flank fire against the advancing troops from his submachine gun. Several Germans headed by an officer dashed toward him but were killed. As a total the courageous master sergeant destroyed 19 Nazis.¹¹ At the same time, the remaining men of the squad by close fire and grenades successfully repelled the enemy attack. The enemy subunits with losses began to retreat and dug in 150-200 m from our forward edge.

At 2145 hours, the enemy artillery and mortars made a new 15-minute intense shelling against elev. 233.1. At 2200 hours, under the cover of artillery, mortar, rifle and machine gun fire, the 1st Infantry Company from the region of Sovitsa went over to the offensive.

Through the passages formed in the course of battle through the minefields, 20 enemy soldiers reached the trench on the boundary of the 8th and 9th rifle companies.¹²

The commander of the 9th Rifle Company, Sr Lt I. I. Shestakov, himself headed the rifle platoon which was in the reserve and led it into a counterattack. As a result of the fire fight which ended with hand-to-hand combat, the enemy which had reached the trench was completely destroyed.¹³

At the same time, a group numbering around a German infantry company, having captured one of the hit tanks, endeavored to break into the positions of the 8th Rifle Company following the communication trenches running from it to our first trench. The commander of the 8th Rifle Company shifted one medium machine gun and two teams of antitank rifles from the left flank to the right. At the same time Capt Smakhtin sent a submachine gun platoon here. This maneuver was timely. The submachine gunners and the 1st and 3d platoons of the 8th Rifle Company attacked the enemy by surprise. Stunned by the rapid counterattack, the Nazis fled. Many enemy officers and soldiers fell into the minefield and hard-to-see obstacles where they detonated the mines or came under our rifle and machine gun fire. The Nazi attack was driven off.

The enemy endeavored to bring up reinforcements from the grove to the northwest of Usozha. Our observers promptly detected the infantry concentration. It was scattered by artillery and mortar fire.

The Nazi subunit which had dug in by a hit tank, after a brief artillery shelling, was attacked by a submachine gun platoon sent here by the battalion commander and was destroyed. By 2400 hours of 8 July, the former position was fully restored in the defensive zone of the 3d Rifle Battalion of the 120th Rifle Regiment.

The personnel of the 3d Rifle Battalion, under the command of Capt N. M. Smakhtin, having shown tenacity and decisiveness in combat, successfully drove off two fierce attacks by superior enemy forces. The enemy did not succeed in taking the elevation. It left over 180 of its soldiers and officers on the battlefield. The success of the defense was achieved primarily due to its skillful organization. The widely developed network of observation posts and around-the-clock observation made it possible to rapidly detect enemy preparations for the offensive and to guess its plan and the sector of the main thrust against elev. 233.1. This

provided an opportunity to promptly bring the subunits to full combat readiness and prepare to repel the attack.

The battalion commander correctly assessed the situation and concentrated the basic men and equipment in the sector of the probable enemy thrust. The skillful organization of the battle formation and fire plan ensured the strength of the defenses and made it possible to destroy the enemy in front of the forward edge and on the flanks and rapidly concentrate fire on any threatened sector. The defense was organized in close cooperation with all types of fire combined with man-made obstacles and natural impediments. The equipping of the defensive area with trenches protected the subunits against artillery fire and provided concealment of their positions.

Of exceptionally important significance were the steadfastness of all the personnel, the courage of the commanders and their ability to direct combat, the high activity of the subunits, the rapid maneuvering of the men and equipment, the ably and promptly organized counterattacks. The battalion commander and the company commanders, in using the extensive network of trenches and communications trenches, skillfully moved up the weapons and subunits to the threatened sectors, removing them from the unattacked areas.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 1202, inv. 1, file 14, sheet 4.
2. Ibid., folio 944, inv. 1, file 15, sheet 2.
3. Ibid., folio 120sp, inv. 240382, file 2, sheets 1-2.
4. Ibid., sheet 5.
5. Ibid., folio 944, inv. 1, file 15, sheet 12.
6. Ibid., sheets 15-17.
7. Ibid., sheet 23.
8. Ibid., folio 120sp, inv. 240382, file 2, sheet 21.
9. Ibid., sheets 27-29.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., folio 69, inv. 1, file 104, sheet 14.
12. Ibid., folio 120sp, inv. 240382, file 2, sheet 36.
13. Ibid., inv. 216595, file 1, sheet 18.

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GROUND FORCES

WARTIME OPERATIONS IN MANCHURIA DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 30-35

[Article by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Arm Gen A. Beloborodov: "In the Hills of Manchuria"¹; this is the first part of a continued series of unspecified duration.]

[Text] If one looks at a geographic map of the Far East, in the south of the Primorskiy Kray, to the west of Lake Khanka, one can see an area which protrudes into Northeast China (Manchuria). Precisely this was occupied by the 1st Red Banner Army in the summer of 1945, on the eve of the Manchurian Offensive Operation.

The particular features of the terrain over which we were to advance, for us, old Far Easterners, were generally known since the tayga was the same on both sides of the frontier. Mountain ranges with elevations running up to 1,000 m like a barrier separated the Soviet Maritime from the Central Manchurian Plain. The mountains were covered solid by virgin forests. Large oaks, cedar, pine, linden and birch overgrown with liana and wild grape alternated with creeping brush and subbrush. Thickets filled the spaces between trees, covering the ground like carpets with spines as long as one's finger and strong and sharp as a sewing needle. For an inexperienced person, these naturally created obstacles in the literal sense could strip one in several minutes, cutting into your flesh and piercing the thick soles of your footwear. Here it would have been difficult even for experienced infantry. Along the foothills for many kilometers there stretched narrow also overgrown valleys which are called ravines or creek valleys. Through them flowed streams and creeks that were so swampy that even such a powerful and maneuverable tank as the T-34 became stuck. The swamps were found not only in low-lying areas but also in the hills. If you fought your way to the top of a hill you would be stuck in weak crumbling dirt. These were the particular features of the mountain tayga here.

Add to this the lack of roads and the absence of large population points. There was no question of any large settlements! The maps which we used showed that for the first 18-20 km of Manchurian territory there were no population points if you did not count the Japanese border posts and individual Chinese fanza (clay huts). These were connected by mountain paths where it would be hard for even two persons to pass. And we were to move through this territory with six rifle and antiaircraft artillery divisions, more than 400 tanks and self-propelled guns, a heavy artillery brigade, two combat engineer brigades and thousands of motor vehicles with freight.

According to the most objective assessments, the zone assigned to us for the offensive was considered impassable for troop formations with their heavy equipment. And why did the command of the First Far Eastern Front give the 1st Red Banner Army this sector? Primarily because it was counting on the army. The army for several decades had served in the tayga. All the exercises and long marches and virtually the entire life of the troops had been carried out under the extremely difficult conditions of the mountain forests and swamps where only the hunter or soldier trod. Certain army formations, for example, the 39th Rifle Division in 1929 and later had acquired combat experience precisely in this sector near Lake Khanka. A majority of the men, commanders and political workers were born in Siberia and the Far East. Since their youth they had grown accustomed to the tayga wilderness and felt at home in it.

Also considered was the circumstance that the enemy also considered this terrain impassable and had organized its defenses appropriately. Along the flanks of our zone lay heavily fortified areas of the Japanese, the Mishan and Pogranichnyy and between them, only individual strongpoints and these were in the interior. Reconnaissance had established that the enemy was prepared to meet the advancing Soviet troops wherever they met between the fortified areas. Hence the breakthrough of the 1st Red Banner Army across the mountain tayga would put the Japanese command in a difficult situation, confuse its plans, and force the rapid shifting of troops into the zone of advance of our formations. This would substantially facilitate the operations of the adjacent units, the 35th Army under Gen N. D. Zakhvatayev and the 5th Army under Gen N. I. Krylov.

We were fully aware of the difficulties involved in carrying out the possible mission of the army. Experience from previous service in the Far East and recent exercises had suggested how to cross the 20-km zone of mountain tayga and come out into areas where there were a few but at least some roads. The decision was taken to build cross-country roads over the tayga and for this it was essential to assign special groups consisting of three or five tanks, a combat engineer platoon and one or two companies of submachine gunners. The tanks would knock down the forest, the combat engineers would clear it and the submachine gunners would protect the workers. It was assumed that the first group would roughly mark the passageway. The following one should uproot the particularly large stumps, lay brushwood across the swampy areas, while the third would lay log planking when necessary and so forth. To put it briefly, the troop columns as they went deeper into the tayga would improve this forest road so that the artillery could pass over it as well as the rear units with the motor transport carrying ammunition, fuel and food.

Having outlined the ways for carrying out this mission, we were confronted with a new one. The first to cross the cross-country road would be the forward detachments of the corps, the tank brigades with a party of machine gunners. But what would 40 or 50 tanks following the same route leave from the improvised road? They would turn all the brushwood and planking into useless rubbish and cut deep tracks in the weak ground here. And the rifle division with its artillery and motor transport in stretching out into a column many kilometers long ultimately would also, to put it figuratively, "grind up" the road. Consequently, in order to maintain the cross-country roads in relative order, they had to be built two or three per division and three or four per corps.

These considerations forced us to abandon a deep echeloning of the battle formations. We resolved to break through the tayga on a maximum broad front. Was this risky? It certainly was! The advance of the rifle corps across the wild tayga along seven or eight routes simultaneously, virtually in linear battle formations, sharply reduced the opportunity to increase the force of the thrust from behind. This was extremely dangerous in the event of strong enemy resistance. Moreover, it was completely impossible to shift troops along the front through the tayga maze. These were the minuses. But there were also pluses. In advancing over many routes in compact columns, the army would more quickly cross the difficult terrain and the gain in time was one of the decisive factors in the war. Moreover, we would immediately commit strong forces to battle and their breakthrough deep into the enemy defenses along a broad front could determine the outcome of the operation.

These plans were of a tentative nature. Although the specific combat mission was not yet known to the staff of the 1st Red Banner Army, we were aware that the army had been moved up into the border salient not for the purpose of carrying out passive tasks. We were aimed either to the west, across the mountain tayga, to the city of Muling (Bamiantong) or to the northwest, to the Mishan fortified area (FA). We also carefully studied this second of the possible sectors.

The Japanese had built the Mishan FA along the northern side of the Khanka Border Salient and its fortifications ran along the mountain ridge stretching from Lake Khanka deep into Manchuria and separated our frontier from the Mulinghe River. The total length of the FA was 75 km. It consisted of five centers of resistance, each of which had several strongpoints. This was a strong defense saturated with various man-made structures. For example, the Nanshan center of resistance lay on the slopes of the highest mountain here, Nan Shan, and, stretching to neighboring mountains, reached up to 10 km along the front and up to 6 in depth. It included a large number of pillboxes and a predominant majority of them were permanent (concrete or reinforced concrete). As an average there were two structures for every square kilometer. Such a high saturation with pillboxes made it possible to cover both the distant and near approaches to the center of resistance as well as its interior area with multilayered, that is, flanking, concentrated, oblique and direct fire.

The flanks of the adjacent centers of resistance to the Nan Shan, the Zuomutai and Sipai were located 1.5-2 km from it, and this ensured fire coordination. As a whole, in the Mishan FA there were around 420 pillboxes alone.² I should point out that the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus has 350 pillboxes. This comparison makes it possible to gain an idea of the fire power of the Mishan FA.

Naturally it would have been difficult to take such a FA. This is why, in viewing this sector as a possible variation for the offensive operations, the command of the 1st Red Banner Army reached the unanimous conclusion that we should endeavor to avoid a direct attack on the Mishan FA. For this it was better to make the main thrust in the western sector, toward Muling, leaving only the necessary cover on the right flank opposite the Japanese FA.

On 8 July 1945, the staff of the 1st Red Banner Army received a directive from the command of the Maritime Group of Forces.³ The combat mission given in it basically

coincided with our suppositions. The army, having deployed its main forces along the front from the Chortov Range to Tiger Hill, was to make a thrust in the westerly direction toward the city of Muling, to cross the Mulinghe River and, in continuing the advance, come out at the Mudanjiang River to the north of the town of the same name in order, in cooperation with the adjacent unit on the left, the 5th Army under Gen N. A. Krylov, to crush the Muling-Mudanjiang enemy grouping. At the same time, in the course of combat operations, the army was also to carry out another important mission: to skirt the Mishan FA on the south and in cooperation with the adjacent unit on the right, the 35th Army under Gen N. D. Zakhvatayev, to encircle and destroy the Mishan Japanese grouping. This decisive and very bold plan was based, in particular, on the rapid breakthrough by the troops of the 1st Red Banner Army across the tayga wilderness in a 40-km zone between the Mishan and Pogranichnyy FA.⁴

The 35th Army was aimed directly at the town of Mishan, while the 5th Army, having captured the Pogranichnyy FA, was to advance against Mudanjiang. In order to cooperate closely with these armies, we were to advance on a broad front along divergent axes (west and northwest). On the 18th day of the offensive, when the 1st Red Banner Army was to cut the parallel lateral roads of Mishan--Muling and Mishan--Linkou--Mudanjiang, the zone of its breakthrough would be broadened to 60-65 km, from the town of Linkou in the north to the village of Toudahezi in the south. And the entire front of the army, considering the right flank covering our assault grouping against the Mishan FA, would stretch for 260 km and possibly even more. But the army had only six rifle divisions.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War had shown that the broadest front of advance did not exclude but, on the contrary, required the creation of assault groupings. Since it was impossible to be strong everywhere, we must try to create superiority in men and equipment on the decisive sector or sectors. For this reason the directive from the Maritime Group of Forces demanded: "The operational configuration of the army should be in two echelons. In the first echelon, in the sector of the main thrust, have at least three rifle divisions."⁵

With the comrades involved in the planning of the army operation in its first stage, the member of the army military council Ivan Mikhaylovich Smolikov, the chief of staff Fedor Fedorovich Maslennikov, the artillery commander Konstantin Petrovich Kazakov and the chief of the operations section Vladimir Vladimirovich Turantayev, we carefully, point by point, discussed the directive. Only one of them quoted above differed from our preliminary plans. If the army crossed the mountain tayga in two echelons, corps after corps, it would scarcely be able to carry out both major combat missions set for the troops on time.

"It is essential, Afanasiy Pavlant'yevich [Beloborodov] to defend our decision," commented Gen Smolikov. "If we set off on these cross-country roads, we won't come out. And if we do, the show will already be over."

On 12 July, with the elaborated plan for the army operation, I arrived at Voroshilov-Ussuriyskiy at the headquarters of the Maritime Group of Forces which at that time had not yet been renamed the First Far Eastern Front. The commander, Mar SU K. A. Meretskov, having examined our plan, immediately noticed the single-echelon operational configuration of the army, to the proposal of creating not one

but two approximately equally strong assault groupings (the LIX and XXVI Rifle corps) and in accord with this start the breakthrough not with three but rather four rifle divisions. He was silent for a long time, as if weighing something in his mind, examining the graphic depiction of the operational plan, the tayga routes of the regiments and divisions which fanned out from the top of the Khanka Salient. Having thought a bit, he asked:

"The tayga is terrible?"

"Dangerous, Kirill Afanas'yevich [Meretskov]. You, an old Far Easterner, know it first hand. The vanguard of the XXVI Corps will come out at Muling, but the LIX Corps would be stuck somewhere in the swamps of Shitouhe. And we could not bring it up to the level of Muling...."

I had prepared so long for this discussion that the question of whether to make the breakthrough on a narrow or broad front was so important to me that the arguments in favor of our plan had developed into a firm system and were engraved in my memory like a multiplication table. Having set them out before the commander, I was waiting for questions and in my mind had resorted to examples from military history as my last argument. But they were not needed. The commander said:

"Let's think. To advance in linear battle orders? That is old fashioned. You are afraid of getting stuck in the tayga but you will get stuck in the enemy defenses. A good risk?

"A risk, comrade marshal. But we have a strong reserve in such an instance. A rifle division. Tanks."

"I see, I see," he said. "Let's think."

I return to my command post and several days later, when together with the commanders of the LIX and XXVI corps Gens Aleksandr Sergeyevich Ksenofontov and Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Skvortsov, I was, according to the plan, reconnoitering the terrain near the frontier, on the hills which rose in a semicircle over the Xiyanghe valley, a message came in that we were to be visited by Vasil'yev and Maksimov (the pseudonyms of Mars SU A. M. Vasilevskiy and K. A. Meretskov). The arrival of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East along with the commander of the front at the frontier could have various reasons. But since the army plan was not yet officially confirmed, I related the arrival of the senior chiefs to precisely this. And this was the case. The discussion was rather long, and I reported to Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevskiy twice, initially on the general considerations and then the particular. And both times he interrupted the report and consulted about something with Kirill Afanas'yevich. It was not difficult to imagine the subject of these discussions. Certainly Ksenofontov, Skvortsov and I, in moving off to the side in order not to hinder them, were talking about the same thing, that is, the variations for the breakthrough of the 1st Red Banner Army across the tayga.

"Our plan will not be the number-one," Ksenofontov lamented. "And how many sleepless nights we spent on it. Do you recall?"

How could we help it! When in 1938-1939, the Japanese militarists went from minor border violations to more aggressive actions, and when our lands and the territory of fraternal Mongolia began to be invaded not by companies but rather entire divisions with artillery and tanks and supported by hundreds of bombers and fighters, the Soviet command had worked out a plan of operations in the event that the Kwantung Army would undertake a general offensive. This envisaged a strong retaliatory strike. Our XLIII Corps was on the Khanka sector and all those difficulties of advancing across the mountain tayga which I have already described had been discussed back in those years among Aleksandr Sergeyevich Ksenofontov, myself and other comrades. Several variations of a counterstrike had been drawn up. One of them was aimed at Muling approximately in the same sector as the present thrust of the 1st Red Banner Army.

Having ended his talk with K. A. Meretskov, A. M. Vasilevskiy summoned us. I approached and saw that both were smiling. It was a good sign.

"We had our doubts. We had!" said Aleksandr Mikhaylovich. "They are gone. You have won. Now act! As in Koenigsberg, with few losses and many prisoners."

"The 1st Red Banner Army will do its utmost, comrade marshal!"

I was so pleased by their decision that I could not help but shout to Ksenofontov (he and Skvortsov were waiting a distance away):

"Our version number-one, Aleksandr Sergeyevich."

Vasilevskiy asked what sort of version this was and I told him.

From the top of the mountain where we were, from the border observation tower, one could see into Manchuria. To the south our view was obstructed by the top of Mount Diershiyihao. In the west the forested hills dropped like terraces down to the valley of the Shitouhe River. Even the naked eye could see a path winding down the slope of the divide to the north past a solitary Chinese fanza. Somewhere there, beyond the Shitouhe, the path came out at the town of Changgulin, on the road to Muling. This was one of the four routes of the LIX Rifle Corps.

A detail of Japanese border guards was walking along the path. Without taking his eyes from the "donkey ears," Mar Vasilevskiy asked:

"As quiet as before?"

"Here it is quiet. But in the Mishan FA, on the forward edge, it is like an ant hill. They are digging trenches and setting up wire obstacles."

"Let them," he said. "But they do not know about version number-one."

By 22 July, the army had been fully assembled in the waiting areas, and 2 days later the combat order was given. Its basic points reflected the plan of the commander of the front with those corrections which our staff had proposed. The right wing of the army deployed along the northwestern side of the border salient, from Lake Khanka (the settlement of Turiy Rog) to the Chortov Range, opposite the Mishan

Japanese grouping, was to carry out a defensive mission. Five machine gun and artillery-machine gun battalions which were part of the 112th FA and the 6th Field FA were to tie down the enemy and prevent its possible counterthrust from Mishan at the landing of forces on the shores of Lake Khanka. The mission was very crucial. For the enemy could, in benefiting from the shape of the salient, come out in the rear lines of communications of our assault grouping. For this reason the fortified areas united under the command of my deputy, Gen A. M. Maksimov, were reinforced with artillery in the form of tank destroyer and mortar regiments. Also under Maksimov were the 69th Border Detachment and the Khanka Detachment of Armored Launches. To the left flank of the group of Gen Maksimov was a rifle regiment from the LIX Corps which was to carry out an analogous mission. The distance from Lake Khanka and the settlement of Turiy Rog to the Chortov Range and then across the Pogranichnyy Range to Command Hill was 120 km, that is, each battalion (the five battalions of the fortified areas and three rifle ones) was to defend a sector 15-16 km long. The defensive front, as we see, was very broad for such forces. For this reason our antitank reserve consisting of two heavy self-propelled artillery regiments and the 60th tank destroyer artillery brigade, was positioned in such a manner so that they could quickly move up to the threatened sector if required.

The assault grouping consisting of the LIX and XXVI rifle corps under Generals A. S. Khenofontov and A. V. Skvortsov, were to break through the front in the sector of Command Hill, Broom Hill, elev. 921.2 (approximately 15-16 km) and, in advancing to the west toward Muling, in simultaneously widening the breakthrough to the north toward Lishuzhen and Linkou, was to capture these rail and dirt road junctions. The advance along two widely (almost at a right angle) divergent axes forced us to create two assault groupings consisting of a rifle corps in each.

The army operation was planned to be conducted in three stages. In the first lasting 4-5 days, the assault groupings were to capture the road junctions of Lishuzhen and Linkou in the north of the zone and Muling in the south. The second stage (6-8 days) would end after the crossing of the Kengtel-Alin' Range and the reaching of the Linkou--Mudanjiang lateral road by the assault groupings with the crossing of the Mudanjiang River to the north of the town of the same name which was the main enemy strongpoint on its third defensive line. Finally, the last stage of the operation (4-6 days) envisaged close cooperation with the 35th Army in the north and the 5th Army in the south for the joint elimination of the Mishan and Mudanjiang Japanese troop groupings.⁷

Up to this point I have spoken only generally about the enemy, and I will now take it up in more detail.

In the area of the 1st Red Banner Army, the Japanese command had concentrated its main forces. They were positioned 40-50 km behind the frontier, in the interfluvium of the Mulinghe and the Mudanjiang. Here, according to the data of our reconnaissance, were positioned up to four infantry divisions, a tank division, heavy artillery and several cavalry brigades with a total of over 65,000 men. The 135th Infantry Division, three border detachments and other units numbering 25,000-26,000 men had been left on the first (Mishan FA) and second (the area of Muling) defensive lines. Thus, in the first stage of the offensive the 1st Red Banner Army (69,000 men) had almost a triple superiority in infantry and an absolute one in tanks and artillery.

The Japanese generals were hoping that while our units were breaking through the permanent defenses of the Mishan FA, they would suffer high losses and the Japanese would make a counterthrust from the Mulinghe--Mudanjiang interfluvium with a favorable balance of forces for them. Thus, at least, this is how the commander of the 5th Japanese Army, Gen Shimizu Naritsunyo explained his plans to me after he had been captured. But events, as we will see further, developed differently.

FOOTNOTES

1. Voenizdat is preparing to publish the memoirs of Arm Gen A. P. Beloborodov entitled "Na Sopkakh Man'chzhurii" (In the Hills of Manchuria) written up by N. S. Vinokurov. We are offering the readers excerpts from this book. During the described period A. P. Beloborodov was in command of the 1st Red Banner Army.
2. TsAMO SSSR (Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense), folio 294, inv. 6961, files 15-18, sheet 111, inv. 6984, file 29, sheets 25, 142, 198-202.
3. Ibid., folio 294, inv. 6961, files 15-18, sheets 1-29. The Maritime Group was renamed the First Far Eastern Front on 2 August 1945.
4. Actually this interval was even narrower (around 30 km), since the Japanese strongpoint of Xiao-Tiang-Tai (the Volyn center of resistance in the Pogranichnyy FA) was located close to Tiger Hill.
5. TsAMO, folio 294, inv. 6962, files 15-18, sheet 3.
6. The difference in the combat strength of the fortified areas (FA) and the field fortified areas (FFA) was determined by their purpose, that is, the defense of permanent works with stationary artillery or field works created in the course of combat. For this reason the battalions of the PUR had more artillery and were called artillery-machine gun ones.
7. TsAMO, folio 294, inv. 6961, files 15-18, sheets 10-17.
8. Ibid., file 66, sheets 2-9.

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GROUND FORCES

BOOK ON TANK TROOPS REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 61-62

[Review by Hero of the Soviet Union, Col Gen A. Burdeynyy of the book "Stroitel'stvo i Boyevoye Primeneniye Sovetskikh Tankovykh Voysk v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" (Organizational Development and Combat Employment of the Soviet Tank Troops During the Years of the Great Patriotic War), edited by Prof, Mar Tank Trps O. A. Losik, Voenizdat, 1979, 416 pages.]

[Text] Voenizdat has published a new work on the Soviet Tank Troops from the period of the Great Patriotic War; the book is designed for a broad range of readers. It undoubtedly will attract their attention in the newness of the content and the successful exposition of the material.

It is pleasant to note that in recent years a number of interesting works¹ have been published dealing with various aspects of the combat employment of the Soviet Tank Troops during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The reviewed monograph does not repeat the previous publications. It is based upon the decisions of the party and the government on military questions, new archival documents, official publications and major works, as well as the memoirs of the chief political leaders and veterans of the Tank Troops. It contains not a description of combat operations, but rather an analysis of the basic problems of the organizational development and combat employment of the tank troops during the course of the past war. Such an approach has made it possible for the authors to bring out the most important trends and patterns in the development of the main attack and maneuvering force of the Soviet Ground Forces from the period of the Great Patriotic War, that is, the tank and mechanized troops. Many of these have maintained their importance under present-day conditions.

¹"Tanki i Tankovyye Voyska" [Tanks and Tank Troops], Voenizdat, 1970; "Sovetskiye Tankovyye Voyska 1941-1945. Voenno-Istoricheskiy Ocherk" [The Soviet Tank Troops 1941-1945. Military History Essay], Voenizdat, 1973; A. I. Radziyevskiy, "Tankovyy Udar (Tankovaya Armiya v Nastupatel'noy Operatsii Fronta po Opytu Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny)" [A Tank Strike (A Tank Army in an Offensive Operation of a Front from the Experience of the Great Patriotic War)], Voenizdat, 1977 and many others.

After World War II, in line with the equipping of the army with nuclear missile weapons, there was a fundamental change in the nature of armed combat. This had a decisive influence on the role and place of the tank troops in a modern nuclear missile war and on the basic directions of their organizational development. But an analysis and skillful use of the very rich combat experience acquired by the Soviet Army in the war years is of great importance for disclosing the scientifically based ways for the further development of the tank troops. On this level the reviewed work can be of substantial benefit.

The book discloses the leading and organizing activities of the CPSU in the area of the development of the Tank Troops, as a result of which they always met the needs of the war. The authors rightly emphasize that in the course of the war, the able employment of the tanks caused the exceptional dynamism of combat operations under various climatic and natural conditions and gave the operations of the Soviet troops a fluid nature and great spatial scope. Here one could feel the work of the party in the area of increasing the capacity of the tank industry and in achieving quantitative and qualitative superiority of the Soviet tanks over the enemy ones. The work examines in detail the questions of the organizational development of the Tank Troops and the training of personnel for them. This was carried out in accord with the enormous requirements of the front (pp 90, 95). However, it would have been advisable to confirm this by quantitative and qualitative indicators describing the process of the training of the personnel both during the course of the entire war and in its individual periods.

In the work a major place is given to the experience of the combat employment of the tank troops. There is a thorough examination of the problems of using individual tank units and formations as direct infantry support tanks as well as the use of individual tank (mechanized) corps and tank armies for the exploitation of success in offensive operations. The reasons are established for the use of the mobile groups of armies and fronts for completing the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone (pp 112, 126-127, 137).

Of great value is the material on meeting engagements and encounters. The generalized numerical data of Tables 14-17 make it possible to disclose the conditions for their occurrence, the particular features of conducting them, as well as the methods of preparation. However, a reader may be disappointed by the discrepancy of the individual figures of the tables and text (pp 154, 157, 175).

Of significant interest is an analysis of the actions of the tank troops in carrying out marches, in crossing water barriers and in going over to the defensive. This experience can be used also under present-day conditions. Thus, in speaking about the use of tanks on the defensive, the authors point out that the tank units and formations gave stability to the defenses and were a sort of powerful armored shield for the troops on the defensive (p 245). The book points out that more than 50 percent of the time of the active operations of the tank and mechanized corps during the past war went to marches (p 275). And under present-day conditions, with the sharp rise in the fluidity and dynamicness of combat operations, the proportional amount, roll and significance of marches will further rise.

From the experience of the war, the work thoroughly examines the fundamental questions of controlling the units, formations and field forces of the Tank Troops in

various types of combat operations. The estimates and conclusions are reinforced by concrete operational-tactical indicators. The measures related to the technical support for the tank troops are examined in detail.

The reviewed work discloses the basic areas of party political work in the Tank Troops during the time of the war. Main attention has been given to its forms and methods under various conditions of the combat situation, ensuring the high fighting morale of the troops and their desire to most effectively carry out the combat missions with minimal losses. However the party measures should have been shown in greater detail aimed at improving the activities of the political bodies and party organizations in the course of the great offensive along the entire Soviet-German Front, in liberating Soviet territory of the occupiers and in carrying out the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In noting the undoubted accomplishments of the book, we would also like to voice certain suggestions. In writing the monograph, wider use should have been made of published works, particularly those which have appeared in recent years. A number of chapters and sections have a poor historiographic basis.

Thus, in the third chapter "The Training of Personnel for the Tank Troops," there is only one reference to the archives relating to the period of the Great Patriotic War (p 81). The fourth chapter and a series of sections from the first, second, third, seventh, eighth and ninth chapters do not have references to sources, and of the 23 very essential tables, only two are substantiated by footnotes. The reader must take the interesting data of the remaining tables on faith and this, undoubtedly, reduces the scientific cognitive value of the book.

As a whole, the new work on the Tank Troops from the period of the past war is a useful and necessary publication. It will be greeted with great interest by readers and will play a positive role in indoctrinating and training the young military cadres.

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GROUND FORCES

COMPLICATIONS NOTED IN WARTIME UNIT NUMBERING SYSTEM

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 74-77

[Unattributed letters to the editors and their answers: "You Ask and We Answer"]

[Excerpt] [Question] In studying certain operations, writes I. D. Khandozhko (Kaliningrad), it is sometimes difficult to make out the actions of formations, as there were several divisions with the same number, either doubles or different formations. This is particularly difficult to do if they operated near one another. Please tell us of the double divisions (the time of their formation, what formations they were part of, who commanded them and so forth). This will greatly facilitate the work of historians.

[Answer] During the Great Patriotic War there were several divisions with the same number, that is, double divisions: the 106th, 126th, 160th and 186th rifle divisions. In order to better distinguish them, we will describe all these formations which had the same number.

At the outset of the war there was the 106th Motorized Division (commander, Maj K. S. Monakhov). It included the 1st and 2d mp (motorized regiment), the 540th sp [rifle regiment], the 106th ap (artillery regiment) and other units. The division participated in engagements from 15 July through 28 August 1941, and then was changed into the 106th Rifle Division [sd]. But this number had already been given to another rifle division fighting in the Crimea. Thus, at the end of August 1941, in the Soviet Army there were two divisions with the same number. The 106th sd which was changed from the 106th md (motorized division), had the 1st, 2d and 3d sp and other units. It was part of the 24th Army of the Reserve Front (Moscow Sector). It participated in battles from 28 August through 27 December 1941. It was then broken up. It was under the command of Maj K. S. Monakhov.

The other 106th sd (the 397th, 442d, 534th sp, the 553d ap and other units) fought as part of the IX Rifle Corps on the Southern, Southwestern and Northern Caucasus fronts (the 51st, 56th and 9th armies). It was on the front from 22 June 1941 through 28 November 1942. It was successively under the command of: Brigade Commander M. S. Tkachev (16 July 1940--1 July 1941), Col A. N. Pervushin (2 July--20 December 1941), Col D. P. Monakhov (21-29 December 1941), Lt Col V. L. Savchenko (30 December 1941--6 March 1942), Col N. G. Lyashchenko (7 March--11 September 1942). It was broken up at the end of 1942.

Thus, during the period from 28 August through 27 December 1941, there were two rifle divisions with the number 106: one of them fought at Moscow and the other in the south of the nation.

In addition to these two double divisions formed at the start of the war, there was also another 106th sd formed later. It was organized in November 1942 out of the Transbaykal sd of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] (the 43d, 188th and 236th ap, the 362d ap and other units) and became part of the 70th Army of the Central Front. It participated in battles from 15 February 1943 through 11 May 1945. The division was successively under the command of: Maj Gen S. I. Donskov (23 November 1942--13 May 1943), Maj Gen F. N. Smekhotvortsev (14 May--1 August 1943), Col M. M. Vlasov (2 August 1943--1 September 1944), Maj Gen Z. T. Trofimov (2 September--17 December 1944), Col G. M. Kochenov (18 December 1944--9 March 1945), L. I. Mikheyev (10 March--16 March 1945), A. S. Sarkisyan (17 March--14 April 1945) and Maj Gen Ye. I. Vasilenko (15 April--11 May 1945).

For a long time two rifle divisions existed simultaneously with the same number 160. They fought not far from each other on the central sector of the Soviet-German Front. The 160th sd (the 443d, 537th and 636th sp, the 566 ap and other units) was part of the 40th, 13th and 6th armies (the Southwestern, Bryansk and Voronezh fronts. It was successively under the command of Maj Gen I. M. Skugarev (16 July 1940--18 September 1941), Col M. B. Anashkin (20 September 1941--27 August 1942), M. P. Seryugin (28 August 1942--18 February 1943) and A. I. Baksov (19 February--18 April 1943). On 18 April 1943 the division was transformed into the 89th Guards Rifle Division.

A second division with the same number appeared in September 1941. On 26 September, the 6th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia was turned into the 160th Rifle Division, although another division already had this number. The second 160th sd included the 1134th, 1290th (from 1 through 31 March 1942), the 1293d, 1295th and 1297th sp, the 973d ap and other units. It fought as part of the troops of the Western and Second Belorussian Fronts. It was successively under the command of: Col F. M. Orlov (26 September 1941--30 January 1942), Maj V. M. Rusetskiy (31 January--8 February 1942), Maj Gen V. A. Revyakin (9--23 February 1942), Maj V. M. Rusetskiy (24 February--23 April 1942), Col E. Zh. Sedulin (24 April 1942--17 February 1943), Col I. I. Oborin (18 February--8 March 1943), Col (from 1 September 1943, Maj Gen) B. F. Zarako-Zarakovskiy (9 March 1943--5 May 1944), Maj Gen N. S. Timofeyev (5 May 1944--24 April 1945) and Col I. M. Abdulayev (25 April--9 May 1945).

Thus, both these double divisions for a long time (from 26 September 1941 through 18 April 1943) operated under the same number but on different fronts. They could be differentiated by the composition of units and the names of the commanders.

Two divisions also existed simultaneously under the number 186. The 186th Regular Division fought in battles with short interruptions virtually during the entire Great Patriotic War (from 29 June 1941 through 9 May 1945). It included the 238th sp (up to 1 June 1942), the 234th sp (from 10 April 1942), the 238th sp (from 1 June 1942), the 290th sp, the 298th sp (the 879th and 653d sp), the 327th ap and other units. The division operated as part of the Western, Kalinin, Bryansk, Central, Belorussian and First Belorussian fronts. The division was successively

under the command of: Col (from 4 June 1940, Maj Gen) N. I. Biryukov (19 August 1939--12 September 1941), Col A. P. Pilipenko (13 September--25 October 1941), Maj Gen A. I. Zygin (26 October 1941--28 February 1942), Maj (from 19 May 1942, Lt Col) M. I. Nikitin (1 March--30 August 1942), Maj Gen V. K. Urbanovich (31 August 1942--3 July 1943), Col N. P. Yatskevich (4--26 July 1943), Col (from September 1943, Maj Gen) G. V. Revunenkov (27 July 1943--27 November 1944) and Col S. S. Velichko (28 November 1944--9 May 1945).

On 28 September 1941, the first Polar Rifle Division (the 1st and 2d ap) of the Karelian Front (commander, Col S. V. Kolomiyets) was renamed the 186th Rifle Division, although there was already a division with this name. This division (the 238th, 290th, 298th ap, the 327th ap and other units) fought as part of the Karelian Front. It was on the front from 28 September 1941 through 26 June 1943. The division was under the command of: Col S. V. Kolomiyets (28 September 1941--1 June 1942) and Col F. I. Litvinov (2 June 1942--26 June 1943). On 26 June 1943, the division became the 205th Rifle Division in a second reorganization.

Thus, during the period from 28 September 1941 through 26 June 1943, there were two rifle divisions with the same number, 186.

There were also double divisions with the number 126. The 126th Rifle Division first organized as such included the 366th, 539th (690th) and 550th ap, the 358th lap [light artillery regiment] (up to 30 November 1941), the 501st gap [howitzer artillery regiment] (up to 25 October 1941), the 426th gap (from 30 October 1941) and other units. It was on the front from 22 June through 13 December 1941. It fought as part of the 11th and 27th armies on the Northwestern Front and the 22d and 16th armies on the Western Front. It was broken up in December 1941. The division was successively under the command of: Maj Gen M. A. Kuznetsov (27 January 1941--21 July 1941), Col Ye. V. Bedin (22 July--1 November 1941) and Col Ya. N. Vronskiy (2 November--13 December 1941).

The 126th Rifle Division organized second (the 366th, 550th and 690th ap, the 358th ap and other units) fought on the front with short breaks from 28 July 1942 through 9 May 1945. It was under the command of: Col V. Ye. Sorokin (1 September 1941--29 August 1942), Col D. S. Kuropatenko (3 September--4 December 1942), Col V. S. Romanov (5 December 1942--7 January 1943), Col K. V. Sychev (8 January--4 March 1943), Col (from 15 September 1943, Maj Gen) A. I. Kazartsev (5 March 1943--10 June 1944), Col A. I. Kazakov (11 June--14 October 1944), Col I. I. Vasilenko (15 October 1944--20 January 1945) and Col F. A. Safronov (21 January--9 May 1945).

Thus, during a 4-month period, from September through December 1941, there were two different divisions with the same number 126. One fought as part of the 22d and 16th armies at Moscow, while the second at this time was just being formed in the Volga Military District, and then, later, in 1942, began operations as part of the 64th Army at Stalingrad.

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GROUND FORCES

BTR-70 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER DESCRIBED IN GERMAN SOURCE

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 3, Mar 81 pp 156-157

[Text] Wheeled AFV Version To Be Retained

As we reported earlier--without illustrations--in our article on the 1980 Moscow October Anniversary Parade in No 1, 1981, p 9, the Soviet army is introducing a new wheeled AFV, the BTR-70. It will probably take the place of the BTR-60 PB which has been in service since 1962.

The introduction of this model, which is very similar to its predecessor, confirms statements in the technical press of the East Bloc according to which wheeled armored fighting vehicles are considered to be full-fledged combat vehicles for the motorized rifle units and are to be retained in addition to the BMP tracked APCs introduced back in 1967. As far as we can tell right now, only the motorized rifle regiments of the tank divisions and only one out of the three motorized rifle regiments of the motorized rifle divisions were equipped with the BMP tracked APC. The other two motorized rifle regiments of the motorized rifle divisions will continue to be equipped with the less powerful but cheaper and more easily maintained wheeled AFVs.

If this organizational pattern and the western order of battle layout of the Soviet army's combat divisions are correct (see no 1, 1981, p 21), then, out of the total approximately 400 motorized rifle regiments in the Soviet ground forces (46 motorized rifle regiments in the tank divisions, 354 motorized rifle regiments in the motorized rifle divisions), three-fifths (236) will be equipped with the wheeled AFVs and two-fifths (164) will be equipped with the BMP tracked APCs.

This situation however shifts in favor of the BMP in the central European area: because of the large percentage of tank divisions among the "Group of Forces" in the western approaches of the USSR, we have a ratio of 1:1 here between wheeled and tracked armored personnel carriers. In this calculation we overlook the fact that some motorized rifle regiments, stationed in Northern Europe and in the Far East, constitute an exception because of the terrain and weather conditions prevailing there; they use a special version of the MT-LB armored transport vehicle in the form of an APC (see no 5, 1980, p 278).

The outward differences between the BTR-70 and the BTR-60 PB are illustrated in our comparative photos.

Figure 1 shows the front and the right side of the hull of the BTR-70; figure 2 shows the BTR-60 PB roughly from the same angle. We can clearly recognize the following:

The angular shape of the lid of the commander's hatch in the BTR-70 as compared to the round hatch lids in the BTR-60 PB;

The wider bow front of the BTR-70, covering the front wheels, as compared to the more pointy bow front of the BTR-60 PB, where the front wheels are exposed;

The baffle plate of the BTR-70, placed on the top of the bow, as compared to the baffle plate of the BTR-60 PB which is on the underside of the bow;

The absence of the two rectangular hatches on the hull side of the BTR-70;

The reduction in the number of shackles on the side of the hull from five in the BTR-60 PB to two in the case of the BTR-70;

The increase in the number of firing slits in the area between the second and third axle from two in the case of the BTR-60 PB to three in the BTR-70;

The elimination of the middle mount-up clip (between the second and third axles) in the BTR-70. Here we obviously now have, on the underside of the hull, one exit hatch for the crew which is only difficult to recognize because of the shadow on the photo.

Photos 1 and 2 furthermore confirm that the main armament in the turret continues to be a 14.5 mm KPVT machinegun.

Figure 3 shows the tail of the BTR-70; figure 4 shows the tail of the BTR-60 PB roughly from the same angle. Here we recognize the following:

The elimination of the forward hitching points for a reserve fuel tank in the BTR-70;

The altered shape and location of the exhaust system in the BTR-70;

The tail end of the BTR-70, which ends more flat, with the perpendicularly dropping tail front compared to the more compact and subdivided tail of the BTR-60 PB.

At the same time, this pair of photos shows that the water jet engine was retained in the arrangement used so far.

Finally figure 5 shows the BTR-70, figure 6 shows the BTR-60 PB in a full side view. Here we clearly recognize the increased interval between the second and third axles and the slimmer tail end of the BTR-70 with its probably larger engine compartment.



Бил 1. Frontalni SPz BTR-70



Бил 2. Frontalni SPz BTR-60 PB





Бил 3. Heckansicht SPz BTR-70

Бил 5. Seitenansicht SPz BTR-70



Бил 4. Heckansicht SPz BTR-60 PB

Бил 6. Seitenansicht SPz BTR-60 PB



- Figure 1. Front view of BTR-70 AFV.
 Figure 2. Front view of BTR-60 PB AFV.
 Figure 3. Tail view of BTR-70-AFV.
 Figure 4. Tail view of BTR-60 PB AFV.
 Figure 5. Side view of BTR-70 AFV.
 Figure 6. Side view of BTR-60 PB AFV.

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GROUND FORCES

TANK BATTALION TACTICAL TRAINING

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, 1980 pp 25-26

[Text]

The path to the peaks of combat proficiency is a thorny one. Every new achievement is a source of joy and encourages effort for further progress. The men of the excellent tank battalion under Captain V. Prikota have set themselves precisely this aim. The battalion is justly regarded as the best in the formation. But the present level of proficiency is not the limit. The tankmen are working to improve on their achievements in combat training and political education, as tells us in this article Major A. Yakubovskiy, our correspondent.

PROFICIENCY ACQUIRED IN THE FIELD

Captain Prikota attached special importance to company tactical exercises with field firing. They reveal the level of team-work, the proficiency of the men, and the skill of the commanders in fire control and orientation in a difficult and rapidly changing situation. Senior Lieutenant S. Karmanov's company was the first to stand the test.

When the day of the exercises came the company performed a long-distance cross-country march to arrive at the departure area. There the commanders were briefed on the mission and the company prepared for the attack. Senior Lieutenant S. Karmanov and the platoon leaders reconnoitred the ground and the configuration of the "enemy's" forward edge. The "enemy" had built a strong defence position, organised a fire system with adequate antitank weapons and covered the approaches with mine fields.

Though the company commander was short of time he kept his head and worked efficiently. He defined the missions assigned to his subordinates, organised cooperation and settled all questions bearing on control. Hearing the officers' opinions on the various versions of combat Captain Prikota saw that they had not wasted a minute of the time allotted for preparing for the engagement.

The company commander's decision was as follows: the "enemy's" flanks resting on boggy ground, he would launch a frontal assault. The assault would be swift, the subunits combining movement with accurate fire.

At the assault position the company assumed attack formation. The tankmen opened fire at the "enemy" emplacements that had survived the artillery preparation. The attack began and the distance to the forward edge diminished quickly. The

fire increased in intensity, the roar of the guns being accompanied more and more by machine-gun bursts. The company pierced the enemy defence position and started to develop its success. Unable to resist the onslaught, the "enemy" began to withdraw. The company began to pursue the "enemy."

Making steady progress the tankmen sought to break out into the open as quickly as possible. This would enable them to make full use of the potentialities of their weapons and equipment. They knew that at any moment the "enemy" might undertake a counter-assault from the depth of his defences. The company commander was expecting it from the right flank, where there was a small wood. Intelligence had revealed that the "enemy" had concentrated about a tank company there. The company commander had made provision for a countermeasure: Senior Lieutenant Kolesnik's platoon was

to hold the counter-attacking "enemy" force with fire from the front, while the main body of the company took advantage of a smoke screen to manoeuvre into a position from which it could launch a surprise attack on the "enemy" from the flank.

This was the company commander's preliminary plan. However, events took a different turn. The "enemy" did counter-attack, but not from the right flank. He launched the assault from the left flank. "Enemy" tanks appeared when the company was in a hollow. A moment's delay would have exposed the attacking tanks to deadly flanking fire. The officer in charge of the exercise introduced a narrative seriously complicating the situation: the company commander was put out of action.

Despite this, the attackers continued to display the same purposefulness and teamwork that had distinguished them at the earlier stages of the exercise. Senior Lieutenant Kolesnik, who had taken over, made a correct estimate of the situation and decided to repulse the counter-assault with fire from a stationary position. He issued the order over the radio and defined the mission. The company dashed forward, took up an advantageous position and opened fire.

After the engagement Senior Lieutenant Kolesnik commented on his course of action as follows:

"Beating off a counter-assault with fire on the move is advisable only on open ground. Here any slowdown in the rate of advance would only benefit the enemy. It is easier to fire at a stationary target than at a moving one. Our situation was totally different. The company was repulsing an assault on rough wooded country with features offering effective cover. Why should not a tank take up position in a hollow or behind a hillock to enhance the effect of its fire and ensure cover from enemy fire?"

Senior Lieutenant Kolesnik's decision proved sound. The tankmen won the fire engagement with the "enemy," repulsed the counter-assault and then pressed home the attack.

Senior Lieutenant S. Kermanov's company fulfilled its mission.

EVERY SHOT A HIT

The day before the tactical exercise the battalion held a conference under the motto: "Every Shot a Hit." Its purpose was to analyse earlier firing practice, reveal the shortcomings, remove them and sum up the experience of the best men.

Senior Lieutenant V. Stanishevsky said it was above all necessary to determine the range accurately, because this factor essentially influenced the results of the firing. He pointed out:

"I noticed that some of the gunlayers failed to hit the target with the first round. The reason was that they were unable to set the range. They scored hits only after correcting the results of the first round. This involved serious loss of time."

In real combat the belligerents will try to display greater activity and will try to score more hits with accurate fire.

Practice shows that it does not really take much time or trouble to lay a gun and fire it. Modern armament and the sights on tanks ensure a high degree of accuracy. But still, unless the gunlayers have acquired the necessary proficiency, they will fail to determine the initial firing data correctly in a difficult situation.

In a competition for hitting the target with the first round it is above all necessary to teach the tankmen to sight the target quickly and then to determine the range accurately. In tank firing drills primary attention is paid to sighting targets by observation and carrying out fire missions. To develop reliable skills the time for fulfilling such missions is limited.

Experienced method experts are placed in charge of drills. Every drill is imbued with the spirit of competition. Every man tries to be the first to sight the target and to determine the range more accurately. Generalisation and introduction of advanced experience help mobilise the tankmen constantly to improve their firing skill. The best gunners are well known in the battalion. The tankmen are eager to learn from them the skill of hitting a target with the first round.

Some of the men said at the conference that there were cases when gunlayers tried to blame the weather for poor results. In real combat this reason would not be considered valid. Sometimes the gunlayer failed to take into account the decreasing range, when the tank closed in on the target. A certain time elapsed from the moment the commander designated the target to the moment the round was actually fired. The range, naturally, changed. Unless the gunlayer took this into account, he was bound to miss.

Experienced driver mechanics gave the others few pieces of useful advice. For instance, one suggested that acceleration should be smooth. The same goes for slowing down. The driver mechanic should maintain constant contact with the gunlayer through the intercommunication system to inform the latter on the obstacles and results of firing. Sharp jerks and turns must be avoided because they interfere with accurate fire.

The battalion regularly holds such conferences. They contribute effectively to improving the proficiency of gunlayers.

MUSEUM OF COMBAT GLORY

Major Andreyev, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, has a sound knowledge of the history of the regiment, he knows the feats of valour the veterans performed during the Great Patriotic War. He regularly has talks with the men about the courage the older generation displayed in battles against the Nazi invaders. Once he invited a veteran soldier of the unit, Pyotr Baskirov, to such a meeting in the Museum of Combat Glory. He had been with the unit when it was formed and fought with it in practically all its engagements. He laid telephone lines in the Battle of Stalingrad and again in the Battle on the Kursk Bulge. He repaired lines under enemy fire during the crossing of the Dnieper. He laid the last telephone line during the liberation of Prague.

The men listened attentively to his low, slightly hollow voice as he related the story of the fighting and his comrades-in-arms. He spoke at length about the men who did not live to see Victory Day. He also mentioned the men who went into the reserve after the war, passing on their skills to the younger generation of soldiers.

What he said about heroism, team-work and military duty carried weight, because the speaker himself had repeatedly exhibited such qualities. This was evidenced by his awards — two Orders of the Red Star and many medals. Pyotr Bashkirev was also awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labour for his contribution to building communist society. The veteran's narrative was moving and exciting; he too displayed interest in various aspects of the life of the regiment he had fought in. He asked the men about combat training and political education, about mastering new equipment and progress in combat pro-

ficiency.

The men were proud to say that their battalion had been an excellent subunit for several years and that it was the best in the formation. It had become a tradition to exhibit high skill, team-work in difficult conditions.

Such meetings benefit the tankmen very much, because they encourage them to make a worthy contribution to the history of the unit and to improve their combat proficiency. And this they are doing despite the difficulties. They are constantly confronted with tests. One day they have to demonstrate their skill in operating AFVs, another day in practice firing and still another in tactical exercises. Every day they make progress in gaining better results and acquiring higher standards of proficiency. This brings them to the most rigorous test, when they have to confirm their right to the title of excellent subunit. If the tankmen take a pledge, they live up to it.

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CSO: 1812

NAVAL FORCES

PACIFIC FLEET PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 34-36

[Article by Vice-Admiral V. Sabaneyev, member of the Military Council, Chief of the Order of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet Political Administration]

[Text]

During the Great Patriotic War the Pacific Fleet's diverse activities were subordinated to the main task—to defend the country's eastern maritime frontiers. The Pacific Fleet also helped the other fleets fighting the Nazi aggressor and secured sea communications.

During the first war year the Pacific Fleet sent to fight to the land fronts 13,000 navymen, in 1942 over 102,000 and during the whole war period 143,000.

Many Pacific Fleet sailors fighting against the Nazi invaders inscribed glorious pages in the annals of the Soviet Armed Forces. Four naval rifle brigades composed of Pacific Fleet personnel fought gallantly in the Battle of Moscow making a weighty contribution to the defence of the capital. Men of the Fleet set examples of heroism on other land fronts too. Mikhail Panikakha of the Pacific Fleet is famous throughout the Soviet Union for the feat of arms he accomplished.

—This happened at Stalingrad. Enemy tanks launched an offensive from the Mamai Hill area. Leaving his cover Seaman Panikakha rushed to the highway where the enemy tanks were advancing and set one of them on fire with an incendiary bottle. The next tank turned aside and drove straight at him. Panikakha was about to throw another incendiary bottle when it broke into pieces, presumably being hit by a bullet or splinter. The sailor blazed up like a torch, but far from seeking safety he rushed at the approaching tank and set it aflame.

The Pacific Fleet sailors also fought the enemy in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea and detachments of surface ships and submarines also went to reinforce the Northern Fleet.

It is worthy to note the history of the Guards and the Order of the Red Banner S-56 submarine (commanded by G. I. Shchedrin, who was later awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and is now a retired vice-admiral). The submarine started its combat record in October 1942 from the Pacific coast and covered 17,000 miles. On April 10, 1943, in its first battle the S-56 sank a big enemy transport and another vessel. Subsequently its crew accomplished numerous heroic deeds, thus making their craft one of the most famous in the Soviet Navy. After the war the submarine served on in the Northern and then returned to the Pacific Fleet. Now the S-56 is mounted on a pedestal in Vladivostok as an eternal symbol of the navymen's combat glory, its compartments accommodating a branch of the Order of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet Museum.

Tramping the war roads together with their comrades-in-arms thousands of the Pacific Fleet navymen drove the enemy back to the west. They fought on the Dnieper and the Oder and took part in the Battle of Berlin. Among those storming the Reichstag was a battalion under Captain K. Samsonov who formerly served in the Pacific Fleet.

During the war securing sea communications between the Soviet Union and the USA was an

important part of the Pacific Fleet activities. This was a complicated and strenuous task, for Japan, disregarding international law and the established international relations, controlled the narrows leading from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean. As a result Soviet ships were frequently subjected to direct acts of aggression, inspections and unlawful detentions. But despite all the difficulties the Pacific Fleet navymen ensured reliable and uninterrupted shipping on these lines of communication, which were exceptionally important for the Fleet and the country as a whole.

When the Soviet Union, true to its allied duty, entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945, the Pacific Fleet played a substantial role in ensuring the success of the Far Eastern campaign. It was assigned the mission, acting in cooperation with the 1st Far Eastern Front, to complete the encirclement of the Japanese forces on the Manchurian and Korean bridgeheads and to protect the Soviet coasts against attacks by the Japanese Navy. To this end it was necessary first of all to land troops in order to seize the ports and bases of Yuki, Rashin and Seishin and thus to ensure outlets to the ports in the central part of Korea.

In the night of August 9 the Fleet's air arm pounded enemy objectives in the ports of Yuki and Rashin combining its bombing and straling raids with MTB attacks. After the fighting ships and transports harboured in Yuki and Rashin had been destroyed and the defences of these ports had been overwhelmed from the air, a landing was effected. The next mission was to capture the port and city of Seishin — an important link in the Japanese defence system. The landing operation was preceded by a thorough preparation. The Seishin operation was carried out by the Fleet forces between August 13 and 16. As a result of the joint action of the landing force, the air arm and ships, the naval base of Seishin was completely cleared of the enemy by the afternoon of August 16 and by the end of the day units of the 1st Far Eastern Front entered the city.

On August 11-23 the Pacific Fleet forces participated in the South Sakhalin operation and also in landing forces in the north of the Kuril Islands.

At the meetings held among the Fleet forces before the beginning of the operations the navymen swore they would fight without sparing their life. And they kept their word. The names of those who distinguished themselves in action were entered in the annals of the Pacific Fleet.

Heavy fighting developed on the Shumushu island (the Kurils), its heights repeatedly changing hands. The seamen showed mass heroism in

battle. For instance, when no other means were available to neutralise enemy fire, Starshina 1st Class Nikolai Vilkov, a Communist, and Seaman Pyotr Ilyichov rushed to the enemy pillboxes and closed the embrasures with their bodies so as to enable their subunits to resume their advance.

In the Seishin operation Senior Seaman Mariya Tsukanova, a nurse, showed outstanding bravery and staunchness. She carried more than 50 wounded off the battlefield. But being badly wounded the girl was taken prisoner. The enemy tortured her savagely, putting out her eyes and mutilating her with knife wounds. M. Tsukanova, N. Vilkov and P. Ilyichov were posthumously awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The navymen's great services were highly appraised by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. Thousands of officers and ratings of the Pacific Fleet were awarded Orders and medals. More than 50 navymen were honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and 18 ships and units were given the name of Guards. Sixteen ships and units were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and honorary names were conferred on many units and formations.

The thunder of battles had long since died away and a new generation has come to serve in the Pacific Fleet. They follow the example of their predecessors — the Fleet war veterans, and are just as loyal in serving their Motherland, just as selfless discharging their duty. They put all their soul into their daily combat training. The Fleet's combat readiness grows steadily, as testified by the increasing number of highly qualified combatants and rated specialists, excellent ships and advanced subunits and their success in carrying out missions on distant cruises.

This year, when the country celebrated the 110th anniversary of Lenin's birthday and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, the socialist emulation movement for achieving higher results in combat training and political education developed on a large scale in the Order of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. This movement was initiated by one of the best collectives of the Fleet — the crew of the large "Petrovsk" antisubmarine ship under Captain 3rd Rank A. Kuzmin. Bearing with honour the title of an advanced crew, the ship's complement showed excellent proficiency in coping with their missions on a recent cruise.

A hard working crew is that of the "Minsk" antisubmarine cruiser. They underwent a serious test when the ship put out to sea under the flag of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. One of

the many who distinguished themselves was Major Yurov, a pilot of the ship-based aviation. For his high combat skill and courage he was awarded a valuable present by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Other navymen also received awards.

Numerous are the instances of courage and valour displayed by the Pacific Fleet navymen in their daily service and training. For instance, striving to save his comrades during a forest fire Praporshchik Alexander Zharkov perished, but he fulfilled his duty to the end. The Order of the Red Star was his posthumous award. Guards Seaman Pyotr Shtukarev did not hesitate to plunge into icy water in order to save a schoolboy. These and many other instances testify to the seamen's noble desire to enrich themselves spiritually and to live up to their fathers' glory.

Recently many seamen of the Pacific Fleet received decorations for their selfless service to the Motherland. Among them were officers G. Bochinsky, A. Goncharov, Yu. Belenkov, Mitchmans V. Nikitin, R. Baigerov, Senior Seaman N. Gorbulya and others. The Orders and medals they received bear witness to their great merits in defending their country's sea frontiers and fulfilling other difficult and important combat training missions.

A movement for the right to be called the successors of the best front-line specialists has grown apace in the Fleet. Thus, this movement embraces one out of every two Komsomol members of the "Retivy" escort ship crew, which has an excellent reputation. The results of this emulation movement are summed up twice a year — for Victory Day and for the day when the Leninist VCL was founded. At a ceremonial meeting the victors are presented with honorary diplomas and special certificates. Their achievements are reported to the Komsomol organisations of the enterprises where the seamen worked before being called up and also to their parents and military commissariats.

Standing the watch in memory of Heroes of the Soviet Union who fell in action is an important means of education based on loyalty to comic traditions. Each time before taking over such watch commanders and political workers, Part, and Komsomol activists recall a feat of arms performed by a hero. This helps to mobilise navymen to stand their underway watch in an excellent manner.

Various forms and means of ideological and political education work are used in the Fleet to multiply its combat traditions and improve seamen's standards. To form their scientific outlook the navymen are taught Marxist-Leninist theory and are kept up to date on the Communist Party's peaceful home and foreign policy. This helps to cultivate patriotism and internationalism in the seamen and makes them active fighters for communism.

The efficiency of educational work in the Fleet is promoted by close ties with the local Soviet bodies, Party and Komsomol organisations, enterprises, collective farms, institutions and educational establishments of the Far Eastern territories and regions. These ties are maintained by meetings with veterans of the Revolution, heroes of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars and with notable people of the country; by arranging memorial evenings, trips, lectures, amateur art performances participating in such gatherings as month's campaigns for raising the country's defence capacity and also by rendering mutual aid in solving problems of both naval and civil life.

The Pacific Fleet sailors frequently receive letters calling on them to work selflessly in performing their patriotic duty. One such letter reads: "Dear Comrades, our best wishes to you! The authors of this letter, former seamen of the Pacific Fleet, now work at the Vorovsky Plant in Melitopol. You guard the Far Eastern frontiers which are at a great distance from our small town. But no matter how distant the Maritime Territory, the Chukot Peninsula, Kamchatka or the Kurils are, they are Russian, Soviet land which is dear to all our hearts just as Moscow, the Ukraine and any other inch of the native soil. We know that we share common thoughts and cares for our beloved country: you guard its peaceful life and we spare no effort to raise its economic potential. Communism is our great goal and we toil together to achieve it. Let each of you be worthy of the great mission of the Soviet serviceman — to guard vigilantly the peaceful labour of his people."

The Soviet country's heroic past, its happy present and bright future serve for a Soviet man a source of pride, energy and enthusiasm. To defend the Soviet Union's state interests is a sacred duty of the Pacific Fleet sailors and they do their best to carry out this mission with honour.

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CSO: 1812

NAVAL FORCES

TACTICAL COOPERATION OF NAVAL FORCES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 37-39

[Article by Rear-Admiral G. Kostev, Cand. Sc. (Navy)]

[Text]

Some objective notions of military art constitute the basis without which no success is ever possible in war. "Cooperation" can undoubtedly be included in these, and it is beyond doubt an indispensable condition for victory in modern military operations including naval warfare.

Cooperation, i. e. concerted actions began to be practised in a war long ago, but there was not as yet a scientific definition of this term. For instance, no such term can be found in the Russian Military Encyclopedia (1911). Bourgeois military science of that time could not single out this most important principle of military art and this was no mere hazard. Bourgeois theorists either denied the principle of cooperation altogether or overestimated some new weapon or fighting arm which resulted from their one-sided appraisal.

The scientific discoveries made late in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century found wide application in the army and navy. Ironclad ships were replaced by more powerful battle-ships of the dreadnought type and a new naval arm — submarines — was being developed.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) gave an impetus to the improvement of the navies of different countries. Thanks to the combat experience of this war it became possible to formulate many new propositions and to define the main trends of naval development. Nevertheless, despite the radical changes that had taken place in military art no new weapon or naval arm was created capable of emerging victorious independently, without combat cooperation with the other naval arms.

On the contrary, to defeat a strong and well-organised enemy in new conditions became possible only thanks to the concerted action of all the naval arms and formations of the other fighting services.

In consequence, naval art had to solve a new problem concerning the elaboration of the theory of and recommendations on combat cooperation proceeding from an analysis of the new combat conditions.

The experience accumulated during the First World War showed that cooperation between the naval arms became indispensable in a sea war and that building balanced fleets was the main trend in the development of naval forces.

This was also the direction taken by the young Soviet Navy in its development.

The cooperation between naval arms aimed at mutual compensating their weak points became one of the principles of naval art which was laid down in the first Soviet Navy Regulations.

During the prewar years the Soviet fleets devoted special attention in combat training to organising joint concentrated blows of surface ships, MTBs, the fleet air arm and submarines at likely enemy groupings on the approaches to the coast and on mine fields and artillery positions organised in advance in narrows and in the vicinity of naval bases.

The correctness of the theoretical substantiation of combat cooperation was convincingly proved in practice by the Soviet fleets during the Great Patriotic War.

Military operations may be conducted on a tactical, operational or a strategic scale depending

on the aims pursued, the forces used and the tasks confronting them and this, in turn, determines the specifics of combat cooperation.

Tactical cooperation is organised between separate ships and aircraft or groups of ships and aircraft. Its purpose is to exclude the possibility of mutual interference of units (or tactical groups) in their deployment and manoeuvring, in the use of the main types of armament by these groups and to increase their power of striking at the enemy. And it is most important that the results of such a pressure exceed the sum of the blows (attacks) delivered by separate ships, aircraft or groups engaged in battle. This can be achieved by using the appropriate methods of action and by creating the conditions necessary for the utmost use of weapons.

Nowadays, in addition to simultaneous operations tactical cooperation presupposes a sequence of actions enhancing their mutual effect. (For instance, achieving superiority over the enemy in a definite direction).

Tactical cooperation is organised with due consideration of the combat characteristics of the weapons and equipment, the conditions of their use (time of the day, weather, military-geographical specifics of the battle area) and the training level of the crews of the ships and aircraft which are to take part in fulfilling the assigned mission. Well-organised cooperation makes it possible for the heterogeneous forces to attack the enemy (deliver blows at him) from different directions using different weapons and, at the same time to prevent his evading the blows. As a result the enemy sustains heavy losses with minimum losses by the attacker.

Apart from firing on the enemy a modern naval action includes such components as search for the enemy by tactical reconnaissance, training weapons on him, approaching to within weapon range of the enemy, dealing a blow and pressing home the attack. It is clear that to carry out all these measures it is necessary to establish tactical cooperation of all the forces committed to action.

A naval battle today forms an integral part of an operation. Hence the indissoluble connection between operational and tactical cooperation.

Operational cooperation consists in coordinating the efforts of different units and formations of the navy and the other fighting services to achieve the aim pursued by naval operations.

Operational cooperation of naval forces may be effected both during a single operation carried out in different directions and during several operations conducted in one operational direction. In the former case the forces operating in the directions of the secondary effort support those fighting in the direction of the main attack and, in the latter case, previously operating forces contribute to providing favourable conditions for the forces which have to operate afterwards.

Thus, operational cooperation in a sea war boils down to coordinating the actions of the naval arms in one or several directions to achieve the common operational aim. Thereby the naval forces may operate at different times against different or the same enemy objectives or may deliver simultaneous blows at objectives located in different areas. Naturally, the actions of cooperating forces do not always have an immediate mutual effect. Nevertheless, they contribute to attaining the common aim of the operation.

In modern conditions the ability of all fighting arms to fulfil strategic missions has grown considerably. This, in turn, greatly enhanced the role of cooperation between the fighting services, which implies their coordinated and interdependent employment.

Cooperation has some features in common with military operations of any scope. For instance, these include coordination of action according to objectives, time and place. Coordination according to objectives envisages specifying the primary target and auxiliary ones for each tactical element or grouping. Coordination of action according to time implies fixing the moment when to deal a blow on the specified objectives, observing the required priority of actions, the periods of action against the enemy and the intervals between them. Coordination of action according to place presupposes the selection of the area in which the specified forces are to strike at the designated target under favourable conditions.

The cooperation procedure specifies who has to do what, where, when, after whom (or with whom).

Joint efforts ensure fulfilment of the main mission, since, as a rule, the actions of the various forces supplement each other.

As the cooperating forces all have the same understanding of the common mission, they can correctly select the manpower and equipment and also the methods for using them at all stages of

the battle or operation.

Precise control of the cooperating forces guarantees optimal fulfillment of the assigned combat mission with minimum losses.

In the postwar period the problem of cooperation between naval arms continues to occupy a prominent place in the theory and practice of naval art. One of the main lines of cooperation is cooperation to fight enemy submarines since modern conditions require the concentration of naval effort on the destruction of nuclear submarines. According to specialists a success can be achieved only by the joint actions of surface ships, submarines, aircraft and helicopters.

The theoretical elaboration of questions concerning cooperation between heterogeneous naval forces is one of the major problems of naval art confronting scientific thought.



SUBMARINERS' SELFLESSNESS

For over a month submarine "SHCH-303" was in the nazi-occupied Gulf of Finland. It remained under water an average of 23 hours a day. More than two thousand bombs were dropped on it. Many times its hull touched the mooring cables of mines. But the boat returned to base, although the enemy repeatedly announced that the "SHCH-303" had been destroyed. Later it dealt many smashing blows at the enemy.

For three days and nights submarine "SHCH-408" was chased by enemy ships. When its batteries had run down the ship surfaced and engaged the enemy. Despite the enemy's superiority in fire power, the "SHCH-408" sank two motor torpedo boats. And only after being several times hit by the enemy did the submarine lose buoyancy and sink. Its crew had fought the enemy to the last.

"CAPTAIN VIKTOR"

Captain Viktor Kruzhilin was wounded and taken prisoner during the fighting for Kharkov. The nazis tortured him for a long time but failed to get anything out of him. Then they sent him westward. On the way, in Czechoslovakia, the prisoners tore up the floor boards of the freight car in which they were locked and escaped.

Kruzhilin and his comrades joined a partisan detachment formed by Czech Communists. Later the Soviet officer headed a detachment. The Czechoslovak friends called Kruzhilin "Captain Viktor." A documentary collection of articles "Partisan Struggle in Czechoslovakia," published in Prague in 1961, says that Kruzhilin's detachment fought in the north of the Dragensky highlands.

The partisans conducted explanatory work among the local population, drew antifascists into their ranks, established contact with the Czech underground fighters, attacked gendarmerie posts and blew up military installations. Viktor Kruzhilin distinguished himself particularly by his courage and bravery.

A nazi punitive force finally managed to trace the partisan detachment and defeat it. Its commander was killed. The fraternal Czechoslovak people cherish the memory of the courageous Soviet officer who gave his life for their happiness.

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CSO: 1812

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

SOVIET COMMENTS ON 'ATOMIC BLACKMAIL'

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 8, Aug 80 pp 47-49

[Article by Col. A. Yakushevsky, Cand. Sc. (History)]

[Text]

As the Second World War was drawing to a close 35 years ago the defeat of militarist Japan was obvious. It was then that the USA employed the most lethal weapon known in the history of mankind. On August 6, 1945, the US Air Force dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and three days later on Nagasaki. An atomic mushroom — a phenomenon so far unknown rose over the Japanese cities and in a matter of seconds a deadly flash reduced everything below it to ruins and ashes. Raging flames, shrieks and groans of burning people — that was Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the atomic bombing. Thus the US government made use of an outstanding scientific achievement to kill several hundred thousand Japanese civilians.

Nor did the tragedy end there. Even today thousands of Japanese are suffering from radiation disease. It produced a pernicious effect not only on the direct victims of nuclear explosions, but also on their children and grandchildren.

The US ruling circles regard the employment of the nuclear weapon against Japan's civilian population as a legitimate act required, they say, by "military necessity," by the desire to shorten the war and to cut down the losses in human lives. But despite the assertions of official US propaganda there was no real military necessity to drop atomic bombs on Japanese cities. By the time the atomic bomb was developed Hitler Germany, the main force of the fascist bloc, had surrendered. And it was the Soviet Union that had played a decisive part in defeating it.

After Nazi Germany surrendered, the attitude of the Soviet Union was of paramount importance to the government of Japan. It realised that the entry of the USSR into the war in the Far East on the side of its Allies in the antifascist coalition deprived Japan of all further chances to offer resistance. In the decision it adopted on May 11-14, 1945, the Japanese Supreme Council for Direction of the War, stated: "It is absolutely necessary, regardless of how the war against Britain and America may develop, that our Empire make supreme efforts to prevent the USSR from participating in the war against us, because it will be a fatal blow to our Empire." In summer 1945 the Japanese government undertook vigorous diplomatic steps to neutralise the USSR. However, the Soviet Union remained true to its allied obligations and would not engage in any deals with militarist Japan. It was preparing to fulfil entirely the terms of the agreement on the Far East signed at the Crimean Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in February 1945. In keeping with the agreement the USSR, seeking to eliminate the last centre of the Second World War as quickly as possible, to ensure the security of its Far Eastern frontiers and to help the peoples fighting for their freedom against the Japanese militarists, undertook the obligation to enter the war against Japan two or three months after cessation of hostilities in Europe.

In the middle of June 1945 General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army, reported to the US President: "An important point about

Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation." Early in July the Combined Anglo-American Intelligence Committee concluded that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese that their complete defeat was inevitable.

It is worth noting that after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the Japanese government was above all eager to know the Soviet position. On August 7 Tokyo sent an urgent telegram to Moscow telling the Japanese ambassador to the USSR: "...we must have a clarification of the Soviet attitude as soon as possible." The atomic bombardment did not arouse any special alarm among the Japanese military and political leaders. The Supreme Council for Direction of the War was not even convened.

However, as soon as the USSR entered the war Suzuki, the Japanese Prime Minister, called a meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War. That was on August 9. It considered the question of surrender. Addressing the meeting Suzuki said: "The entry of the Soviet Union into the war this morning has put us into an absolutely hopeless position. It makes further continuation of the war impossible."

The Japanese government began to take concrete steps in pursuit of the capitulation.

After the war many prominent US and British military and political leaders admitted that there was no military necessity for using the atomic weapon against Japan. This point of view was voiced by the then Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston S. Churchill, General G. Arnold, Commander, US Army Air Force, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe.

What was it then, that prompted the US government to use this barbaric weapon against the civilian population?

The atomic bombardment was chiefly a political, and not a military act. By demonstrating the destructive power of the atomic weapon the US government wanted to frighten the peoples of the world, to secure decisive superiority for US imperialism in the world arena during the postwar period to establish American world domination.

In carrying out its atomic programme the USA sought to gain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union and to use it to exert pressure on the USSR and to fight the progressive forces of peace. General L. Groves, US Army, who headed the Manhattan Atomic Development Project in September 1942, later admitted: "I think it important

to state that there was never from about two weeks from the time I took charge of the project any illusion on my part but that Russia was the enemy and that the project was conducted on that basis."

Though the USSR was America's Ally in the war against the fascist bloc and was shouldering the main burden in the armed struggle, the US government shrouded all the works on the development of the new weapon and the plans for its employment in deep secrecy as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.

The successful offensive operations of the Soviet Army at the final stage of the war against Germany led to the liberation of the peoples of many countries from nazi slavery. This enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union to an unprecedented degree and activated the progressive and revolutionary forces. This aroused considerable alarm among the US ruling circles, who wanted to stem the democratic changes in the countries that had won freedom from fascism. The socialist forces also grew stronger. Under these circumstances the Truman administration decided to use the atomic bomb as the "main trump" in the US policy of strength towards the USSR. James Byrnes, Secretary of State, "thought that the possession of the bomb by America would render the Russians more manageable in Europe" and make them accept the American plan of world peace.

Having decided to pursue "atomic diplomacy" the US government deliberately delayed the convocation of the Potsdam Conference (July 17 — August 2, 1945) of the Big Three leaders. In an effort to time the convocation of the conference to the atomic bomb test Truman postponed its opening three times. The purpose of his manoeuvring was to acquire an additional "trump" in the talks with the USSR. In an interview Harry S. Truman admitted in 1962 that "the development of the atomic bomb was a consideration in his decision to postpone the meeting."

Some US political leaders feared that direct participation of the USSR in the rout of the Japanese militarists would enable it to play an influential role in the solution of Far Eastern problems. The US ruling circles hoped that the atomic bomb would force Japan to surrender without the USSR entering into the war. Byrnes emphasised:

"We wanted to get through with the Japanese phase of the war before the Russians came in."

The preparations for the experimental explosions were carried out in great haste. This was also true of the work to assemble the first and second atomic bombs. Defying the protests of

the scientists, the initial deadlines for the dropping of the bombs were brought closer. The military and political leadership of the USA took a definite risk in order to prevent the USSR from participating in the solution of Far Eastern problems.

True to its allied duty the USSR dealt a crushing blow on militarist Japan. On August 9 the Soviet forces launched an offensive from the Transbaikalia, Amur and Primorye regions. The Soviet Air Force and Pacific Fleet attacked Japanese objectives in Manchuria, Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kurils. The war in the Pacific ended in less than three weeks after the Soviet Union's entry.

The decisive role of the Soviet people and the contribution the socialist state made to the rout of fascist Germany and militarist Japan had a profound influence on the destinies of all mankind and encouraged a powerful wave of the revolutionary and national-liberation movements.

These developments did not suit the US imperialists, who were out for world domination. That was why after 1945 atomic blackmail became the alpha and omega of US foreign policy and an instrument of cold war against the Soviet Union. In the late 1940s the US imperialists persistently urged their government to take advantage of the atomic bomb monopoly to destroy the USSR and other socialist states. The Pentagon produced concrete plans (such as Dropshot) for nuclear war against the USSR and subsequent occupation of Soviet territory.

US political and military leaders believed that the Soviet Union would require from ten to fifteen years to produce an atomic bomb. However, the USSR carried out the first successful test in September 1949. Soviet scientists, engineers and workers completed the atomic programme in approximately the same time as the Americans, despite the fact that the USSR was engaged in the rehabilitation of its war ravaged economy. The USSR had no other alternative. It had to oppose the US policy of atomic blackmail and threats.

Having lost their atomic monopoly the Washington strategists feverishly sought to make use of every new technological development to secure military superiority over the USSR. The atomic bomb was followed by the hydrogen bomb. Then the USA developed and produced solid fuel mis-

siles, nuclear submarines carrying strategic missiles, multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles and finally cruise missiles. In contrast to the USA the Soviet Union used the achievements in atomic power engineering and rocketry above all for peaceful purposes. It was the USA that acted as initiator in the application of every technological development in the arms race.

Every time the US nuclear warmongers start another round in the arms race, they say that they are countering the "Soviet military threat." They said this in the 1950s and 1960s, when the USA "was catching up with" the USSR in the number of heavy bombers, and later — in the number of intercontinental missiles. Having inaugurated in December 1979 a campaign about "the Soviet threat" the USA forced NATO to adopt a decision on the deployment of new medium range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

In the recent period the ruling circles of the USA have stepped up their preparations for war. Washington has adopted a new long-term programme for accelerating the arms race. It provides above all for the modernisation and expansion of the US nuclear strategic force. This implies accelerated production of cruise missiles for strategic bombers, new MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Trident submarine system — a new generation of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles. The USA is carrying out this programme despite the fact that it has already built up a vast nuclear stockpile. In appraising US policy Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the USSR, said:

"US militarist circles have not yet abandoned the hope of securing military superiority over the USSR by developing more and more new weapons of mass destruction. Life has repeatedly shown that such calculations are totally futile. It is worth noting that the development of new weaponry has never increased US security in practice. Those who are seeking to gain military superiority over the USSR with the help of such weapons should remember that its economy, science and technology have reached a level that enables us to develop in the shortest possible time any type of weapon on which the enemies of peace may wish to lay their stake."

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

ATTACHE ON SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 36-40

[Article by Col Do Theh Nhan, military, naval and air attache at the Vietnamese Embassy in the USSR: "On Guard for the Liberty and Independence of the Vietnamese People"]

[Text] The Vietnamese people have never had such highly organized, well equipped and trained armed forces as at present. This has been achieved due to the efforts of the Communist Party, the entire people and the nation following the path of socialism and due to the support from the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist commonwealth. The strength of our armed forces has been forged in the struggle against imperialist aggression, national suppression, neocolonialism, social injustice and Great Han expansionism.

The people's armed forces of Vietnam, along with all the people, directed by the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] threw off Japanese rule and carried out the August Revolution of 1945 which led in September 1945 to the creation of the first people's democratic state in Southeast Asia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). They were victorious also in the 9-year war of resistance against France. They won a victory over American aggressors and their puppets as well as the Beijing expansionists who up to now have not abandoned the plans to carry out new aggression against Vietnam, hoping thereby to open up the way for Chinese expansion into the southeast of the Asian continent.

The past years have been a time of struggle for the Vietnamese people and their armed forces. Obeying a high feeling of international duty, sparing neither their lives nor blood, they have provided selfless aid to the fraternal peoples of Laos and Kampuchea for the sake of their independence and liberty.

As a river begins with streams, so the Vietnamese People's Army grew out of small red self defense detachments, paramilitary organizations which arose in the 1930's. Their backbone was made up of members of the worker and peasant units and the communist youth organizations. They took an active part in the political struggle of the masses against the fierce repression from the colonialists and exploiting classes.

In the course of World War II, the situation in the world as a whole as well as in our country, due to the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces over the troops of Nazi Germany and its satellites, began to favor the preparations for a general revolt for the purpose of winning power. At the same time our party was in favor of changing the methods of struggle. This would combine a political struggle with armed actions; the political organization of the masses with the formation of paramilitary and military detachments and subunits. It began to create a revolutionary base on the spot.

The armed revolutionary organizations during the resistance to the Japanese and French invaders arose one after another. These were the first armed detachments of the Vietnamese People's Army. Being poorly armed and with little combat experience, they fought under unbelievably difficult conditions. However, relying on the people, the patriots succeeded in winning moral superiority over the enemy, they gained enormous political authority in the masses and everywhere lit the flames of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese invaders.

On 22 December 1944, President Ho Chi Minh gave instructions to form the "Agitation Detachment of the Vietnamese Liberation Army." At that time Ho Chi Minh said that, although at the outset the size of the detachment was small, it had a glorious future. This, he emphasized, was the beginning of the liberation army which would be able to pass through all Vietnamese land. The leader's prediction came true. Since then, 22 December 1944 has been celebrated as the birthday of the Vietnamese People's Army.

On 24 December 1944, the detachment began its campaign record. It defeated the military post at Phaikhut and then destroyed the military post at Nangam (both in Cao Bang Province), thereby beginning the tradition of winning not by numbers but rather by skill.

As a result of the defeat by the Soviet Armed Forces of the Kwantung Army, the main strike force of militaristic Japan, a favorable situation was created for intensifying the national liberation movement of the Asian peoples. The August Revolt of 1945 was a vivid manifestation of this. In the course of it, the guerrilla detachments were united, having formed the Vietnamese Liberation Army of a new state, the DRV.

However, on 23 September 1945, the French colonialists resumed aggressive operations against Vietnam. The young army which did not have sufficient forces, experience and weapons, was besieged. Under these very difficult conditions, under the leadership of the party and the Chairman of the Vietnamese Provisional Government, Ho Chi Minh, relying on the enormous strength of all the people fighting against the enemy, the commanders and soldiers with unprecedented courage surmounted enormous difficulties, captured enemy weapons and fought the enemy with these. At the same time production of our own weapons was started. The men of the Liberation Army both fought, built and participated in production...the army grew continuously and matured.

Everywhere, in the cities and in rural localities, the liberation war went on. The armed forces at that time included three clearly formed services: the regular units, the local troops and the people's guerrilla detachments. And mobile formations comprised the main force of the army.

Guerrilla operations often began to be replaced by concentrated strikes first on a regimental scale and then by divisions. In the autumn and winter of 1950, the Vietnamese troops successfully carried out the first operation "Frontier." As a result they seized the initiative on the basic sector of the front in the north of Vietnam.

In parallel with the operations in the north of the country, more and more operations were carried out over all Vietnamese territory. An important operation of that period was the defeat of the French corps of 21,500 men in the area of Dien Bien Phu. The corps has been surrounded in January 1954 and was finally routed from 13 March through 7 May 1954. The victory won marked the complete defeat of the French aggressors.

The United States did not like the prospects of the peaceful development of the nation. It had other objectives and plans. At the beginning of the 1960's, Washington, having flagrantly violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements, commenced aggression in Vietnam. Our army and people rose to a just struggle against the invaders which were armed to the teeth.

Headed by the Communist Party, upon the appeal of President Ho Chi Minh "there is nothing dearer than independence and liberty," the armed forces of the nation and all the people fought sparing no effort, in demonstrating miracles of heroism, carrying out unprecedented feats and continuously winning victories in the difficult, bloody war. From the struggle of 1959-1960 which led to the overthrow of the puppet regime in a majority of the population points, the armed forces went on to decisive actions aimed at the final destruction of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, a faithful American minion. The battles for Binh Son (1964), Ba Son and Dong Soai (1965), where the basic groupings of the puppet army were eliminated one after another, and then the defeat of the Americans at Nui Than, Van Thuong, Bao Bang and Pleima convinced us that although the enemy was well equipped, there was a real possibility of winning. By the decisive offensive and uprising in the spring of 1968, by the victorious operations along Route No 9 in the south of Laos (1971) and by the strategic offensive throughout the South (1972), the people's armed forces of the Liberation each day caused evermore serious defeats to the enemy.

The DRV Armed Forces, in receiving aid and support from the USSR, more and more often began to win victories over the large U.S. air armadas.

The achieved successes, particularly the strategic offensive in the South (1972) and the victories in the air war (December 1972) forced the American imperialists to sign the Paris Agreements, to admit to a humiliating defeat in the aggressive war against Vietnam and agree to withdraw the expeditionary troops from Vietnamese territory. However the United States constantly violated the agreements. For this reason, our army and people intensified the struggle against the invaders.

The general offensive and revolt in the spring of 1975, the high point of which was the historic "Ho Chi Minh" Operation, marked an end to the more than 20-year war against American aggressors.

After the invasions by Japanese militarists, French colonialists and American imperialists, further new serious hardships befell our people. For a long time the reactionary grouping of ruling circles in Beijing had been hatching plans to seize Vietnam and conquer the Indochinese Peninsula and Southeast Asia. In carrying out

a hypocritical policy, in providing certain aid to our country in the military and economic areas, the Chinese hegemonists at the same time endeavored to play down the importance of the Vietnamese revolution. Beijing, in playing its "Vietnamese card," endeavored to strike a deal with the imperialists, proceeding from its own selfish objectives and violating the vital interests of Vietnam. It put pressure on Vietnam to force it to leave its independent path and be subordinate to China.

Regardless of the obstacles and the subversive actions of Beijing, the struggle against the United States, due to the selfless, enormous and effective aid of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, was crowned with victory. This meant not only the defeat of American imperialism but also struck a blow against the plans of the Chinese reactionaries.

In stubbornly following a hegemonistic policy, the Maoists showed their hostility toward Vietnam. Encouraged by them, the grouping of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, having seized power in neighboring Kampuchea, carried out aggression on the southwestern frontier of our motherland. Involved in this were also Chinese troops who had penetrated from the north. This aggressive action was completely defeated.

The army and people of Vietnam securely defended the southwestern frontier, and in January 1979, aided the patriots of Kampuchea in overthrowing the bloody, dictatorial regime of Pol Pot who upon instructions from Beijing had carried out a policy of genocide.

However, the Chinese reactionaries were not satisfied. In February 1979, they threw an army of more than 600,000 men against our six northern provinces.¹ The army and people rose decisively to defend the motherland. After fierce battles lasting 30 days, a victory was won over the aggressors. We were not alone, receiving dependable support and aid from the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries.

Our success was eloquent proof of the force of the people who had set out on the path of socialist development which made their country invincible. This was proof that under the wise leadership of the party, the Vietnamese people and their army are united in the struggle against foreign invaders.

In past years, the commanders and soldiers selflessly sacrificed their lives and spared no blood in carrying out their national and international duty. The CPV in the struggle against the enemies followed the fine traditions of international proletarian solidarity.

In continuing the peace-loving line of our party, the Vietnamese people and their People's Army are marching in the same formation with the peoples and armies of the USSR, the other fraternal socialist countries and all the revolutionary forces of the world. Our people are sincerely concerned with the revolutionary cause of the fraternal peoples in Laos and Kampuchea and friendship with them has deep historic roots. The people's armed forces of Vietnam have repeatedly fought with the revolutionary armies of these countries for their national independence and for common goals.

In being guided by the instructions of President Ho Chi Minh of "help another and help yourself" and in following their international duty, the Vietnamese patriots, for many years, at the request of the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea, have repeatedly come to their aid in the struggle against the colonialists, thereby overcoming enormous difficulties and always respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the fraternal states.

At present, when a threat of Chinese aggression against these countries has arisen, at their request the Vietnamese people have again come to their aid regardless of the fact that they themselves are exposed to the threat of attack.

The peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have similar historical destinies and common enemies. The lessons of the past indicate that unity means life and a split means death. For this reason, at present the fraternal peoples are closely united in order to defend the independence of their countries and to protect their peoples against Beijing genocide.

Over the long period of the struggle, our state has obtained enormous, effective and selfless aid from the Communist Party, the government and people of the Soviet Union. The successful implementation of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the DRV and USSR signed in November 1978 indicates that the Soviet people unanimously expressed a feeling of sincere solidarity with the Vietnamese people.

The importance of this alliance was pointed out by Comrade Le Duan in a speech in presenting high Vietnamese awards to Soviet leaders on 3 July 1980: "Combat solidarity and all-round cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam have given our people new enormous forces for rebuilding the nation and dependably defending their motherland when confronted by the hostile policy of the ruling circles of Beijing and the imperialist forces."¹

A vivid symbol of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship was the flight of the "Soyuz-37" spacecraft which was manned by an international crew consisting of the cosmonauts Viktor Gorbatko and Phan Tuan. In greetings to the international crew of the orbital scientific research complex of "Salyut-6"--"Soyuz-36"--"Soyuz-37," Comrades L. I. Brezhnev and Le Duan wrote: "This flight was the result of many years of friendship and fruitful cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DRV."² And although the Beijing hegemonists in collusion with American imperialism are continuing to increase the military danger, the people and the Vietnamese People's Army, united closely with the peoples of the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries, are ready to deal a worthy rebuff to the aggressors.

FOOTNOTES

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2. PRAVDA, 4 July 1980.

3. Ibid., 26 July 1980.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

SUCCESS OF CUBAN REVOLUTION DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 27 Nov 80) pp 40-45

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Shcheglov: "The Struggle for the Army in the Course of the Cuban Revolution"]

[Text] The coming to power of Batista in Cuba as a result of the military coup in March 1952 exacerbated the already complex social problems of the nation. The situation of the masses of people had become much more severe. A majority of the peasants lived under conditions bordering on poverty. The number of unemployed had reached 500,000 persons.

Having seized power, Batista began to cruelly persecute the opposition forces. A military dictatorship was established in the nation and this served the interests of U.S. imperialism and the upper Cuban bourgeoisie. The firing on striking workers and students became a daily occurrence. The prisons were overloaded with political prisoners who were subjected to barbarian tortures. Over the 7 years of the Batista dictatorship, more than 20,000 persons were killed and tortured in the nation.

The political crisis grew more acute. Dissatisfaction with the existing regime engulfed the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the students and other strata of the population. One of the leading political organizations which along with the Popular Socialist Party (the party of the Cuban communists) headed the struggle of the masses of people against the dictatorship was the revolutionary "Movement of 26 July" which had been named after the attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba on 26 July 1953. The movement was headed by Fidel Castro. The situation which had developed on the island, the balance of forces and the experience acquired in the struggle made it possible for him to conclude that it was necessary to wage an armed struggle to overthrow the dictatorship.

The young revolutionaries, having trained a combat detachment on Mexican territory, landed in Cuba on 2 December 1956 and having established themselves in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, began a guerrilla war against the Batista troops which protected the dictatorial regime. After 25 months the dictatorship was overthrown and a people's revolution was victorious in Cuba.

The "Movement of 26 July" and the other revolutionary organizations, along with an armed struggle against the government troops, widely carried out ideological propaganda in the dictator's army. "Military operations as well as social and mass struggle," stressed Fidel Castro, "in our understanding were closely linked from the very outset."¹

In working to bring about the disintegration of the enemy's army, the rebel command used the experience of previous revolutions, and above all the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia which showed that without involving the armed forces in the revolutionary process victory is impossible. "...If a revolution," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "does not become a mass one and involve the troops itself, then there can be no question of a serious struggle."²

An analysis of the political work carried out by the Cuban rebels in the dictator's army is of important significance since, in the first place, the consistent agitation and propaganda activities by the revolutionaries among the Batista soldiers and officers was a part of extensive political work aimed at creating and strengthening the revolutionary army and at turning a portion of the government troops from a military bulwark of the exploiters into an armed force of the rebel people. Secondly, a further study of this question provides an opportunity to show the invalidity of the concept of bourgeois historians who are "specialists" on Cuban problems and who have endeavored to show that one of the main tasks of the rebels during the period of the guerrilla war was supposedly a general physical extermination of the Batista army.

In Cuba, in prerevolutionary times, the armed forces had been organized under the aegis of American imperialism even back during the years of the first military occupation of the island by the United States. From the very outset their purpose was to carry out antipopular functions. The army played the role of a policeman in driving the peasants off their lands and in the bloody suppression of worker actions; it protected the interests of the ruling classes. With the help of the army and the support of the internal reaction and U.S. imperialism, a coup was carried out and as a result of this Batista came to power. In endeavoring to maintain the army as a support, the dictator granted significant privileges to the servicemen and above all to the upper officers. At the same time, great attention was given to the ideological indoctrination of all personnel. The basic directions of this were flagrant anticommunism and praise for the American way of life and the bourgeois system as a whole. In propagandizing these ideas, a major role was played by American military advisers as well as that portion of the Cuban officer corps which had been trained in the U.S. military training centers. In the armed forces of the dictatorial regime there was an entire machine at work which fabricated lies.³ The soldiers in every possible way were protected from the influence of the revolutionary forces and kept in the barracks, being permitted to read only the government press and army publications. They were prohibited from talking with representatives of the opposition. The military was watched and the slightest suspicion was enough to cause dismissal from the army or the landing in prison. Fidel Castro gave an accurate description of the status of the soldier in the Batista army: "Triple security, confinement to barracks, a constant alert, hostility from the population, a lack of confidence in the future...."⁴

The army lived in isolation from the people and was in opposition to them. At the same time, in ideological terms, the army, like any other bourgeois army, was not monolithic. Profound internal contradictions were inherent to it. These were the class contradictions between the rank-and-file and the officer personnel, racial discrimination (negroes were actually not permitted to command positions as well as to officer positions in the Air Force) and the differences of opinion between the junior and senior officers basically caused by the unjust promotion of those who were under Batista protection to the high command posts.

The contradictions which beset the army helped to weaken its combat capability and created conditions for disintegration from within. "Without the 'disorganization' of the army," stressed V. I. Lenin, "no great revolution has occurred and could occur."⁵

The basic areas of ideological work by the rebels among the government troops were the informing of the personnel of the true objectives of the struggle and the unmasking of the antipopular policy of the Batista dictatorship; showing the successful combat operations of the Rebel Army and explaining the inevitability of the approaching defeat of the dictator's armed forces; propagandizing the successful socio-economic changes on the liberated territory as well as appeals to the servicemen to join the ranks of the fighters against the Batista regime. For the purposes of agitation among the servicemen, the revolutionaries used the radio, they carried out printed and oral propaganda as well as explanatory work among the prisoners. The rebel leaflets were aimed at the soldiers. Letters were often sent to subunits of the government army which had been encircled. An example would be the letter written by Fidel Castro to the commander of the 18th Infantry Battalion of the Batista army, Maj Quevedo, when his battalion was surrounded by the rebels in the region of Jigüe. In it he wrote: "You know better than anyone else that the soldiers under your command are suffering and dying for an unjust cause. You know that the dictatorship does not have the right to sacrifice the soldiers of the republic to maintain a regime which is suppressing the nation, repressing liberty and lives by terror and crimes.... We are waging a war not against the army but against tyranny. We do not want to kill the soldiers and we feel profoundly for each Cuban who dies defending an unnoble, shameful cause. We feel that the army exists to defend the motherland and not the tyranny." The letter then went on to show the hopelessness of the position of the surrounded men and contained an appeal for them to surrender.⁶ Among other factors, the message from Fidel Castro was instrumental in having the battalion lay down its weapons and surrender.

Letters to servicemen in the Batista army were also sent in other regions where the rebel army was operating. For example, in the course of the battles for the population points of La Maya, Songo, Sagua and Guantanamo in the zone of the Second Eastern Front, its commander Raul Castro sent letters to army officers who, according to information from the front's intelligence section, were prepared to surrender because of the weaknesses of their troops and differences with the armed forces command of the dictatorship in Havana.⁷ Upon the instructions of Raul Castro, photographs taken at orgies of Batista officers were distributed among enemy soldiers. They also had a strong impact on the rank-and-file and sergeant personnel.

The rebel radio was also an important means of ideological propaganda, and its first broadcast was on 24 February 1958. By the end of the war the rebel forces had more

than 30 transmitters. "Radio Rebelde" (Rebel Radio) broadcast speeches by the command of the Rebel Army, information on combat operations, political commentaries and so forth. In using the radio network, the rebels came into direct contact with the Batista officers and soldiers. The latter did not come off well in these debates and considering that they were heard by the population, the General Staff of the Batista Army prohibited its subordinates from engaging the rebels in debate.⁸

Radio broadcasts were also made during combat operations. Here two important tasks were carried out: confidence was strengthened in victory and the authority of the government was undermined. This had a substantial influence on the moral and political condition of the enemy. This was the case at Santo Domingo, Jigue, Maffo and in other places.

Loudspeakers were used for appealing to surrounded units of the government army. Often captured soldiers and officers spoke over the radio. Thus, in the battle at Maffo, using loudspeakers captured officers, including one lieutenant colonel, spoke to the surrounded subunits of Batista troops. They urged their comrades to surrender.⁹

The appeals to the enemy were brief, clear and profound in meaning. Here, for example, is one of them addressed to pilots and sent in the form of radiograms: "Cuban pilots! Cease bombing the unprotected towns and firing on peaceful inhabitants. The blood shed by blameless victims and you will be held responsible. Take heart, give up bombing not only the positions of the Rebel Army which is a part of the people but also the peaceful towns and settlements, the unprotected population points where your Cuban brothers live."¹⁰

In the broadcasts of "Radio Rebelde," an important place was played by speeches given by the leaders of the Rebel Army, primarily Fidel Castro. He exposed the Batista command which had sent soldiers into a fratricidal war and he clearly and convincingly showed the necessity of unity between the army and the people for overthrowing the tyranny. "We are fighting against tyranny and not against the armed forces," said F. Castro in one of his radio speeches. "The task of the armed forces of the republic is to break its ties with the most infamous and hated regime which has ever suppressed our nation. The dilemma presently confronting the army is clear: either to take a step ahead, having completely cast off the disintegrated Batista regime and join up with the people, or doom oneself to suicide." Fidel Castro proved that the soldiers had been deceived in being forced to shed their blood for the interests of the ruling circles: "They (the soldiers) are never told that behind this chatter, lies and deceit of which they have become a victim there lies the sole desire of the regime's politicians to plunder more, and for this it is essential that the soldiers die defending their inglorious and rotten regime."¹¹

The military defeats, along with the various forms of ideological influence, had a sobering effect on the soldiers and officers in the Batista army. Instances increased of desertion and surrender by the servicemen from the Batista troops.

The rebels carried out extensive work with the prisoners. Even in the course of the attack on the Moncada Barracks on 26 July 1953, the young revolutionaries followed a path of humane treatment of prisoners. At that time Fidel Castro said: "Armies which during a war killed prisoners always merited the contempt and condemnation of

the entire world."¹² In the course of military operations in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, the rebels did not try to destroy the military, on the contrary, they were often released to their units while the wounded were given medical aid. In his memoirs about the battle in the La Plata region, Maj Ernesto "Che" Guevara who had assumed the duties of medic in the detachment of F. Castro, wrote: "There always was an enormous difference between the attitude toward prisoners in our units and in the government troops. There they not only killed our wounded but also left their own without aid.... That day, to my great chagrin (as a position I felt it essential to keep the medicines for our troops), Fidel ordered that all the medicines available to us be given to the prisoners."¹³

The conditions for prisoners were humane among the rebel forces. Officers were permitted to keep their personal weapons and all were given food and medical aid. In releasing prisoners, the command of the Rebel Army gave them special passes to travel without obstacle through the territory under the control of the rebel forces.

The agitation and propaganda work of the rebels among the government troops contributed to the military successes and became evermore effective. It had an effect not only on the soldiers but also on enemy officers. Quevedo Perez, the former commander of the 18th Infantry Battalion of the government army, in describing propaganda activities conducted by the rebels among the personnel of his battalion, commented: "The broadcasts (by radio and loudspeaker.--author) were kept in a correct tone and their content cut to the quick."¹⁴ The influence of the propaganda by the revolutionaries on the political and moral state of the troops was also recognized by the command of the Batista army. The commander in Oriente Province, Gen E. Cantillo, wrote: "The recent failures and messages that now the enemy was well armed, together with the knowledge that it did not deal harshly with prisoners, including entire subunits, and that all problems were ended when one surrendered, greatly undermined the desire to fight in all army spheres.... The number of soldiers wounding themselves to escape from service sharply increased. It was necessary to resort to punitive measures against entire subunits which refused to advance and take up the positions indicated to them."¹⁵ In one of the counterintelligence reports sent to the command it was stated that "virtually all the troops in the central province are engulfed in pessimism."¹⁶ By the end of 1958, for example, the "Charco Redondo" Garrison consisting of 50 soldiers and 2 officers went over to the side of the revolution and joined the rebels.¹⁷

The diversity of forms, methods and means of ideological work conducted by the rebels among the dictatorship's troops helped to demoralize and break down the 70,000-strong Batista army. One should also note the great role which was played in this process by the Cuban communists, as their "underground cells distributed hundreds of thousands of leaflets, pamphlets and books which opened the eyes of millions."¹⁸

Victory was achieved by the Rebel Army with the support and aid of the masses. The revolution was victorious not only by force of arms but also by the force of the just ideas which the revolutionaries were able to spread among the servicemen of the governmental troops.

At present, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba are a modern army defending the revolutionary victories of the Cuban people. Cuba holds a worthy place in the

battle formation of the armed forces of the socialist commonwealth. The development of contacts between the USSR and Cuba has served to strengthen the might of the Cuban Armed Forces. A vivid example of cooperation between the peoples of the USSR and Cuba was the visit to the Island of Freedom by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in January-February 1974. This opened a new stage in the development of Soviet-Cuban relations. The space flight by a Soviet-Cuban crew on board "Soyuz-38" was of enormous significance for strengthening the friendship between our peoples. In their joint greetings to the international crew of the orbital scientific research complex "Salyut-7"--"Soyuz-37"--"Soyuz-38," the cosmonauts Popov, Ryumin, Romanenko and Tamayo Mendez, Comrades L. I. Brezhnev and F. Castro Ruiz wrote: "Your flight, dear comrades, at the same time is a new contribution to the strengthening of Soviet-Cuban friendship. This is a bridge of solidarity thrown up by the peoples of the USSR and revolutionary Cuba across the seas and oceans. The Soviet and Cuban peoples now feel even closer and are aware of the great strength of fraternity and proletarian internationalism."¹⁹

FOOTNOTES

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